Some circles may claim that Israel, willingly or unwillingly, has consistently been at Turkey's side. But one point that should be kept in mind is that Turkey has always represented the “hilal” [1] in the eyes of the Jews. However, in 1948 the situation changed all of a sudden. Israel got engaged to a new groom (the US), and the ex-groom (the Ottoman Empire) became the new co-partner. Following the end of the Cold War, prominent NATO members agreed on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which obliges signatories to destroy or limit large amounts of their weapons. However, this treaty paved the way for the gushing of weapons into Greece and Turkey, whose armed forces have come to the fore in Europe, in addition to Israel being the main weapons provider. On the other hand, 1996 saw a breaking point in Israeli-Turkish relations. They were no longer allies and Turkey was no longer a protector of the Jews because they had an independent nation-state. Let's have a look at the timeline of relations between Israel and Turkey throughout 1996.
1996
January: Onur Öymen, the undersecretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, visits Israel.
February: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) advises and equips Turkish security forces at borders with Iraq, Syria and Iran.
Feb. 23: The two nations sign a five-year agreement -- renewable annually thereafter -- on military training cooperation. The agreement involves the exchange of military experience, visits between the armed forces of the two countries and joint training as well as separate exercises in each other's territory, and attendance of observers from each country.
March: Turkish President Süleyman Demirel visits Israel, the first trip to Israel by a sitting Turkish president, and numerous economic agreements are signed.
March 14: A Turkish-Israeli free trade agreement is signed.
April: Israeli F-16s train in Turkish airspace, a routine that is scheduled to continue for one week, and four times annually.
April: Turkey publicly announces its new military cooperation agreement with Israel. The Israeli Air Force conducts its first joint air exercise with the Turkish Air Force.
June: Israeli President Ezer Weizman visits Turkey.
June: Twelve Turkish planes train in Israel, a routine that is scheduled to continue for one week, and four times annually.
June 8: During a summit of Syrian, Egyptian and Saudi leaders in Damascus, participants urge Turkey to reconsider its Feb. 23 accord with Israel in order to maintain “relations of good neighborliness” in the region.
August: Turkey and Israel engage in the joint production of $150 million in Popeye I air-to-ground missiles.
Aug. 28: An agreement on military-industrial cooperation is signed.
Dec. 8: Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan signs a $632.5 million contract with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for the upgrade of 54 Turkish F-4 Phantoms. This is IAI's largest deal to date.
An Israeli submarine crew trains in Turkey.
A forum is established for the biannual convening of Turkish and Israeli leaders for strategic evaluations.
The Jewish Diaspora really enjoyed the high level of cooperation between Turkey and Israel. They reaped the fruits of the alliance and lobbied both in the US Congress and business world against Greek or Arab interests in the region. The members of the diaspora were mostly pro-Turkey, even more pro-Turkey than the Turks themselves. This engagement was very natural under the auspices of Washington's ambitions regarding the Middle East. Military elites were happy with the improvement of Turkey's military and technical capabilities as a result of Israel's support in upgrading the Turkey's planes, tanks, submarines, etc.
What caused Ankara to inverse its pro-Israeli posture and condemn Israel's actions against the Palestinians, especially during the Jewish state's latest Gaza offensive, resulting in troubles regarding the alliance? Turkey's current foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is seen as the mastermind behind the latest profound changes in Ankara's foreign policy. His moves have urged Turkey to initiate new power policies, and once again Turkey is becoming not only the guardian of the state of Israel, but also the patron of the whole region.
One of the most prominent pieces of evidence of this profound change in Turkey's power policies regarding the region is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's “one minute” surge in Davos, which led all major players to reconsider and reconstruct their respective policies concerning the region. New rapprochement with Syria, Israel's number one enemy, had to be redesigned, but not without Turkey. With the politically failed invasion of Iraq, Washington's preference in the region changed, with Turkey taking on a central spot. The new US president, Barack Hussein Obama, became relatively more pro-Turkey as he saw Turkey as a model for other Muslim countries.
Turkey-Israel-US triangle
As mentioned before, the first move was in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2008. Mr. Erdoğan, addressing Israeli President Simon Peres personally, called Israel “a murderer of the Palestinian people.” After that, anti-Israel sentiment grew in Turkey. One example is when the Turkish TV series “Ayrılık” depicted Israeli soldiers as murderers of Palestinian children.
What is Ankara's reasoning for taking a position against Israel and perhaps the United States?
The answer may be that Turkey's new aspirations/ambitions in the long run will give it leverage in the world. Turkey walked away even more self-confident after Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon sparked a diplomatic clash between the two countries.
As Ankara's newly explored, independent foreign policy emerges and becomes ripe, Israel will not sit idly by. As in the 1960s-1970s and in the 1990s, Greece will pleasingly take Turkey's former role. Some say the grounds for a future Hellenic-Israeli defense figure are on the table [2]. Athens has since 1994 been looking forward to having Israel/the Jewish lobby work against Turkey. For example, in 2008 the Israeli Air Force used Greek military bases in the Aegean Sea to practice refueling and long range attacks. This is not a conspiracy, but seemingly a policy option that was entirely envisaged and inspired by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.
[1] Hilal means “crescent.” Members of the Committee of Union and Progress, a political party in the Ottoman Empire, used the term as a codeword, particularly when a courier would bring a message.
[2] The Israeli Navy, http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?107698-The-Israeli-Navy/page3
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