
The speed of change in Turkey’s agenda gained momentum, particularly after 2006. A friend of mine who is a communications expert and a sociologist says this is related to the Turgut Özal period of rapid urbanization and globalization in Turkey, which was isolated until the 1980s. As for my friend who is an academic and an expert on international policy, he says this is linked to the correct perception and implementation of the change that the world experienced in the aftermath of the Cold War.
Changes in Turkey’s foreign policy peaked as a result of the effective perception and implementation of the process that became symbolic with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Of course, shifting from a state of isolation to active foreign policy has implications for the international community. According to a foreign policy expert friend of mine, the events of the recent period are some of the implications of this inevitable process. He also said: “Turkey has undergone serious change in the area of democracy, law and human rights, and it has carried this excitement and dynamism to the international platform. It was a human rights and legal obligation to end the taboo on the international criticism of Israel. The same goes to breaking the US monopoly in the UN Security Council.”
Turkey is not only breaking its own taboos and walls with its neighbors but is also bringing up the taboos and walls of other countries.
Deciphering the judiciary’s codes The Ergenekon case and debates on judicial reform have uncovered many unknown facts in Turkey. While everyone knew about the military tutelage over the system, only experts on the subject knew about the much stronger tutelage in the higher judiciary. The debate, which got bigger as the higher judiciary showed its self-defensive reflex, made the caste system between the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State crystal clear. It then became clear that the foundation for the judicial caste system was laid with the May 27, 1960 coup and that it became institutionalized with the March 12, 1971 memorandum and the Sept. 12, 1980 coup. It became evident that the junta, which impaired the process of improving the quality of democracy, took its strength from the caste system within the judiciary. It also became clear that the last hope of the suspects in the Ergenekon case who are being tried for devising dozens of coup plans over the last 10 years was to be acquitted by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Evidence that names recommended or implied by former Justice Minister Seyfi Oktay were chosen as members of the higher judiciary were found, and both Oktay and the HSYK deputy chairman were forced to admit it. All of these show just how necessary it is to change the way members are appointed in the Constitutional Court and the HSYK and discredits claims of trying to “impair the judiciary’s independence and impartiality to create a judiciary full of cronies.” As the country prepares for a referendum that will to a large extent end the caste system in the judiciary, one that has lynched the law, the Constitutional Court is discussing the CHP’s petition seeking the annulment of the reform package. Even if the Constitutional Court rules in favor of allowing the judiciary, whose codes are being deciphered, to usurp the authority of the legislative and executive branches, this does not mean the caste system will survive. |
The insistence on solving problems through diplomatic means and negotiations is a method that humanity desperately needs.
If peace and stability become stronger, war and tension will become weaker. This will have major economic implications as well. We all know that those who produce power do not easily accept losing power. As a result, there are efforts to get Turkey to give up its role as a peacemaking leader.
I asked a Justice and Development Party (AK Party) executive if they would be changing their line. In the fashion of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he says: “Those who support instability and produce tension are those who need to change their line. Those who think they can undermine the government with axis debates and unjust accusations are wrong. We derive our strength from the people, and we are determined to maintain our line with the support of the people.”
We discussed with political analysts debates on whether Turkey was changing its axis in foreign policy. The opposition front reckons the government has gone too far with its rapprochement with Iran, Russia and the Arab world. But they also know that they cannot use this notion as a direct tool of propaganda. A friend of mine who is a deputy from the opposition said: “This form of pressure looks like it will undermine the government. But we can’t use it to strengthen our hand. What would we say to the voters? Are we supposed to say, ‘Vote for us so that we can stop the AK Party from moving away from the West and turning towards the East?’ Implying this, let alone voicing it, would mean another election victory for the AK Party.”
Executives from the ruling party believe they will have the upper hand in the election if they pursue foreign policy debates. Prepared to complain to the public about the impairment of the legal reform, the ruling party is going to ask the people, “Do you want friendship and peace, which is a guarantor of tranquility and prosperity, to become stronger?”
It is clear that foreign policy is going to be an effective argument in the general elections.
Israel is giving up its violent policy and becoming more and more isolated. There were many resignations in the Turkish-Israeli inter-parliamentary friendship group after Israel launched an attack on Gaza in December 2008. The group recently lost another three members. While prior to the massacre in Gaza the Turkish-Israeli friendship group was the biggest group in Parliament, it currently only has five CHP deputies.
When many people quit the group in January 2009, CHP Deputy Chairman Onur Öymen explained to Today’s Zaman why he did not resign, saying: “The resignation of the chairman and the majority of the members is a sufficient enough message for Israel. I am in favor of keeping my membership simply so the friendship group’s legal status remains as re-establishing it would not be easy.” But Öymen has now also quit the group.
After Israel attacked the Mavi Marmara, CHP İstanbul deputy İlhan Kesici, İzmir independent deputy Recai Birgün and Öymen quit from the Turkish-Israeli inter-parliamentary friendship group. The five CHP deputies who are still members of the group are Atilla Emek (Antalya) Nesrin Baytok (Ankara), Şahin Mengü (Manisa), Vahap Seçer (Mersin) and Ensar Öğüt (Ardahan).
So why are the CHP deputies the only ones left in the group? “I know it is only us CHP deputies who have not left. I did not quit out of sheer spite for the AK Party deputies who quit upon receiving an order to do so,” Şahin Mengü said, adding: “My membership means nothing. My heart is with Palestine’s freedom.”
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