The global economic crisis demonstrated two important things: the vulnerability not just of our financial systems, but of our international architecture. A fiscal crisis in one country cannot be contained any more than an oil spill can. His party is no longer in power in the UK, but when Tony Blair spoke in 1999 of a new “doctrine of international community,” his words were as relevant then as they are today.
But the challenges of an interdependent world have changed as well. The questions of climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and international terrorism are far more prescient in 2010 than they were 10 years earlier, when Blair outlined the Chicago doctrine.
Economic power has been shifting from the west to the east for years and is showing signs of accelerating. Smart investors know it and have been seeking new opportunities in countries like China, Turkey and India.
The question we face today is no longer are we interdependent, but do we have the political structures in place needed to meet the challenges of an interdependent and multi-polar world?
Global governance institutions are going through a gradual change reflective of this transformation. Such institutions are valuable because they create norms and policies that enable member states and other actors to coordinate their behavior to be mutually beneficial. However, an institution can only perform these functions if those to whom it addresses its rules regard those rules as binding and legitimate.
Much has been said of the shift from G8 to G20 and the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs), a term coined nearly a decade ago. We will need to answer serious questions about whether the G20 is the most efficient system for resolving global issues, though it is more inclusive and diverse than ever. But the danger we face today is that we enter a world of the “G2,” where the US and China seek not only to make bipolar decisions, but to divide the world into spheres of influence.
No one is suggesting that we are returning to the Cold War era, but many of the elements are there -- such as China's resource grab in Africa, Russia's “near abroad” in Eurasia or NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe.
The need for reform of our international architecture is urgent. We have a global structure that still represents the post-World War II world rather than the post-Sept. 11 world. Is it really justifiable that we have a UN Security Council that includes as permanent members China but not Japan; France but not Germany; Russia but not India; and has no representation from Africa, the Middle East and Latin America? Change will require difficult decisions on behalf of the keepers of the old order -- from France, Britain and others.
Facing collective challenges
For those who are resistant to such change, it is hard to see how we can tackle these collective challenges without having the tools and resources to meet them head on. Can we really address nuclear proliferation without a global architecture that includes India and Pakistan? Can we reduce our carbon emissions without an agreement from Brazil and China, whose growth is outstripping the West? And can we have a serious humanitarian agenda which implements the promises of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) framework without the major African states at the table?
The last year has been one of putting out fires -- responding to the unprecedented global economic crisis. But now we have the chance in 2010 to reflect and rebuild. To create the institutions and mechanisms which can ensure not just a global recovery but address many of the long-term challenges we face.
The difficulty in any approach to international affairs is to balance short-term expediency with long-term success. The benefit of hindsight shows us how misguided we were to support the Taliban against the Soviet Union, or to back Saddam against Iran. Many of those mistakes were the product of a Cold War ideology -- we can no longer have a bipolar approach to an interdependent world.
For the European Union, this will have to mean an end to navel gazing. We have had a period of internal reflection, and with the Lisbon Treaty we have settled our institutional questions for the next decade. It is now time for the EU to punch its weight internationally; to develop a common energy policy, to speak with one voice on the international stage, to complete its natural enlargement and to provide real value for the EU's substantial aid program. And crucially it will mean that more members need to take on the burden of responsibility. The fiscal bailout of Greece revealed that it was really only the larger member states, “Old Europe” if you will, that were prepared to provide substantial support for the euro.
For any country, and any institution, reputation is critical. One can only begin to quantify what the reputational impact of the last six months will have on Greece. But reputation management shouldn't be confused with public relations. Issuing a press release or paying for a glossy television advertisement will only get you so far.
Having the right leadership
It is about having the right leadership, the right strategies and making the right decisions during moments of crisis that will make the difference between the winners and losers in this age of uncertainty. The ability to be able to scan the horizon for upcoming threats and opportunities helps as well.
Turkey has a significant role to play in addressing our interdependent challenges and must be central in the multi-polar institutions that reflect it. As a European country with a majority Muslim population and membership in NATO and as an EU accession candidate Turkey has a unique insight into the global challenges we face and is in a position to serve as a major power in the making, particularly in its immediate region of the Middle East, Southeast Europe and Eurasia.
The modern Turkey is a transformed nation, with a GDP of $750 billion, and the largest military power in the region. Its democracy has made enormous strides, with relations between the civilian and military structures now transformed, despite lingering mutual tension.
The traditional Western policy of regarding Turkey as an “anchor” of the West is no longer applicable. It is necessary to move beyond this stereotype and recognize Turkey as a regional power to reckon with and who is in pursuit of its own interests. Simply because Turkey’s policies no longer automatically emulate those of the West does not imply that Turkey is turning its back on the West. It is taking the initiative to engage with all its neighbors on the basis of its “zero problems” approach. Greece is one of its closest partners. It has construction projects in Iraq, including the Kurdish region, and is trying to prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons.
The more sensible conclusion is to understand that Turkey is becoming more conscious of its own responsibilities in regional affairs. In an interdependent world, where the traditional power bloc is less effective, Turkey’s combination of hard and soft power make it one of the most interesting case studies in global politics and economics. A better understanding of Turkey’s driving forces and underlying strategic objectives in this new world will help in constructing appropriate policy responses and lead to exploring ways to create mutually beneficial political and economic engagement.
*Mehmet Öğütçü is a former Turkish diplomat and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) executive. Brad Staples is the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) CEO for APCO Worldwide, a global public affairs and strategic communication firm with its EMEA headquarters in Brussels.
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