Strategist Friedman: Turkey could play role reconciling Palestinians

“Once the Palestinians speak with one voice, Israel will not be able to avoid dealing with them seriously,” he told Today's Zaman for Monday Talk.

“Turkey is now helping the US and Iranians try to find solutions. Turkey has worked with the Israelis and the Syrians,” Friedman added, highlighting the roles Turkey has taken in the region.

We spoke last week with Friedman in İstanbul where he was invited by the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s cultural enterprise, Kültür A.Ş., for a conference on “Turkey and the Imbalance of US Foreign Policy.”

His most recent book, “The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century,” is a New York Times Best Seller, and in it Friedman has elaborated on Turkey’s position in the world where the country emerges as a major power.

Friedman first answered our questions regarding last Monday’s Israeli raid on a humanitarian aid ship carrying supplies to the Palestinians of Gaza.

Did you predict that the crisis in the waters near Israel would be of the proportion that it is right now?

No, we were very surprised by the type of action the Israelis took. We expected action. We thought that they were going to divert the ship, and we thought there was a possibility that they would decide not to divert the ship. But we never expected such a poorly planned military operation.

Foreigners and civilians protesting Israel’s Palestinian policies have been killed by Israel before, but this time there is worldwide outrage. What is different today?

Palestinians have killed Israelis, Israelis have killed Palestinians. This is not a one-sided war. The difference in this particular case is that in the other cases, for example, in Gaza in Operation Cast Lead, the Palestinians were firing rockets into Israel. There was a plausible military explanation. Here there was no clear military threat of any sort. In almost all the other cases Israel could point to some significant action by the Palestinians, and Palestinians could point to significant action by the Israelis. In this particular case, there were no physical threats to Israel or Israelis. And that’s what made this case different.

Why do you think Israel attacked the vessel in international waters?

First, we need to understand international law. International law recognizes the right of blockade. And under international law, if you declare a blockade, which Israel did, you have the right to intercept vessels that clearly have the intention to run the blockade. You don’t have to wait for them to come in. The problem with the Israeli position on this, however, is that when you normally blockade a country, you are in a state of war. Gaza is not a country from the Israeli point of view. If it’s a country, it’s part of Egypt. So what is Gaza? How do you under international law have a blockade? The Israeli argument is that it is legitimate to go after a ship in international waters under international law. It’s true, but the problem is you normally are in a state of war with a resisting political entity, and they don’t recognize Gaza as a political entity. So it’s not the international waters that are the crucial issue. Are they in a state of war with Gaza? Is Gaza a state? That’s the crucial thing.

Why did they do it, then?

It’s a great mystery. What we hear today is that the full Israeli Security Cabinet didn’t approve it, or they’re saying that they didn’t approve it. And when you look at the type of operation they carried out, this does not look like it was carefully planned and thought out. You don’t land commandos in the middle of a crowd because you can’t see who is armed. You are surrounded by people; you can’t tell where the threat is. So from a military point of view, that’s not what they should have done.

‘Israeli attack indicates breakdown in policy-making in Israel’

What about the political point of view?

What the political decision-making was, who made the decision, who planned it? All of this is very opaque. Normally the Israelis are very careful in planning their military operations. This was very badly planned. It indicates to me some sort of interesting breakdown in policy-making in Israel that we are going to find out more about in the next few weeks.

You think that there might have been disagreements in the Israeli government?

I clearly don’t know what happened, but there are some indications that we look at. Some people are saying that [Benjamin] Netanyahu acted without fully consulting with the Cabinet. The Cabinet believed that there was going to be an interception, but he [Netanyahu] did not inform them of the military steps that were taken. These are all rumors now, but it is very clear that inside Israel there is a great deal of tension. The head of Mossad, Meir Dagan, warned -- it is very important that he made this in public -- that the United States has had about enough and that the benefits of Israel to the United States had declined. As the head of Mossad he is very sensitive about what he is saying. He is really saying that whoever did this, he pushed behind the line.

Do you think this incident would lead to a new US-Israeli relationship that would be disadvantageous to Israel?

There is a new Israeli-American relationship emerging anyway. But there is one thing. It only takes one suicide bombing in Tel Aviv to kill 20 people to reverse it. The question whether this is going to change it, it’s really up to the Palestinians. If they resume terrorist attacks, the United States because of Sept. 11 will immediately feel solidarity with Israel. If the Palestinians refrain from restarting it and carry out this sort of non-violent process, the impact on the United States will be substantial. The other question, of course, is the tremendous division among the Arab countries. Egypt is hostile to Hamas, Jordan has never been comfortable with Fatah and the Palestinians are deeply divided among themselves. So this could have a definitive effect unless the Palestinians respond with actions that would draw sympathy to Israel. If there is violence by the Israelis, violence by the Palestinians, you can’t choose on that basis. But if there is violence only by the Israelis, then there could be a profound change.

Do you expect an end to violence by the Palestinians?

Over the past 60 years whenever the Palestinians could do something to hurt their cause they did it. Whether the Palestinians are united enough to make decisions to have a strategy to impose it is a great question. I don’t know if there is anyone who makes decisions for all Palestinians. But if the Fatah and Hamas factions actually pull together and understand the world they are in, this could be a defining moment. But it’s very hard looking at the history of the Palestinian movement and the actions they’ve taken; it’s very hard to be confident that they understand the way the world is reacting.

Dr. George FRIEDMAN Chief executive officer of STRATFOR, a US-based company he founded in 1996 that is now the leading publisher of global intelligence, Friedman guides STRATFOR’s strategic vision and shapes the firm’s long-range geopolitical forecasts. Friedman is also the author of numerous articles and books on international affairs, warfare and intelligence. His most recent book, “The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century,” is a New York Times Best Seller. In this book Friedman draws on an exploration of history and geopolitical patterns dating back hundreds of years to explain where and why future wars will erupt and how they will be fought, which nations will gain and lose economic and political power and how new technologies and cultural trends will alter the way we will live in the new century. Included among his previous books are “The Future of War,” “The Intelligence Edge” and “America’s Secret War.” Excerpt from ‘The Next 100 Years’ “By 2020, Turkey will have emerged as one of the top ten economies in the world. Already ranked seventeenth in 2007, and growing steadily, Turkey is not only an economically viable country but a strategically crucial one. In fact, Turkey enjoys one of the strongest geographic locations of any Eurasian country. Turkey has easy access to the Arab world, Iran, Europe, the former Soviet Union, and above all the Mediterranean. The Turkish economy grows in part because Turkey is a center of regional trade as well as a productive economic power in its own right.” Predictions of STRATFOR and reality In 2009, STRATFOR predicted that Russia would consolidate its influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and Poland. Soon thereafter, Moscow intimidated the Baltic states, destabilized the Georgian government, forged a closer relationship with Azerbaijan, formed a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus and deepened defense links in Central Asia and the Balkans. On April 30, STRATFOR predicted that attacks by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were expected in Turkish cities before the May 31 attack of the PKK in the southern city of İskenderun.

Do you think Turkey can have a role to play here? Do you think Turkish leadership could have an effective influence on both sides of the Palestinian factions?

To me, the key to a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem rests with the Palestinians uniting and speaking with one voice. They are currently drawn apart by competition and disagreement among other Arab countries. Turkey is now in a position where it can assert substantial influence on the Palestinians. Turkey is now helping the US and Iranians try to find solutions. Turkey has worked with the Israelis and Syrians. Turkey taking the role of reconciling Palestinians could set the stage for what is needed -- a serious negotiated settlement. Once the Palestinians speak with one voice Israel will not be able to avoid dealing with them seriously.

‘US questions whether Israel is rational and reliable partner’

Is it possible for the United States to pay more attention to the people of Gaza?

The view of the people of Gaza is that they have a relationship with Iran and al-Qaeda. The United States requires fundamental shifts on the part of Hamas toward countries that are enemies of the United States before re-evaluation takes place. This is a strategic moment for Hamas. Could it come to an understanding with the United States? Does it have to give up something for that? The expectation that the United States will shift its policy on Gaza while these other things are under way is just not going to happen.

Some analysts say that the nuclear swap deal among Turkey, Brazil and Iran made Israel uncomfortable and that’s why Israel chose to attack the Turkish vessel. Do you agree with that?

This does not improve Israel’s situation for attacking the vessel. First, the Israelis have accepted the idea that if there is going to be a nuclear weapon in Iran, there will be. The United States also is accepting the idea that they can’t be at war with Iran. So we are entering a period of negotiations with Iran, particularly through Turkey. This event [vessel attack] is a separate issue. It had to do with the fact the Israelis believed that if they begin to accept uncontrolled access to Gaza, then they would lose control of Gaza, and if they lost control of Gaza, then rockets would begin again, and that was something they didn’t want. There was consensus in Israel that the ships had to be stopped. I don’t think there was an expectation that there was going to be this sort of clumsy assault. Because there was this clumsy assault, now the United States looks at the Netanyahu regime, saying, “What’s wrong with you guys?” There was the same thing when Netanyahu announced 1,600 more settlements when [US Vice President] Joe Biden was in Israel. Why do you insult someone as pro-Israeli as Joe Biden? So the question that’s arising now in the United States is whether Israel is a rational and reliable partner. And one of the questions asked in Washington is, “Who is in charge of Israel?” And nothing makes the United States more nervous than an ally that’s out of control.

Don’t you think the response from the United States to the nuclear swap deal should have been warmer?

If you’re buying a car, you don’t say, “Yes, I want this car so whatever price you charge, give me that car.” When you are engaged in a negotiation, you search for the best deal you can get. And I think the Turkish government understands that. If the Turkish government is going to play the kind of role it is playing now -- which is a historic role for Turkey -- as a mediator between the United States and Iran, the Turks absolutely understand that the Iranians will say things that are incompatible with the negotiations and the Americans will, too. That’s the nature of the negotiation. We all have to be very mature and understand that a serious negotiation especially between two countries as hostile to each other as the United States and Iran is going to be long, difficult and painful.

How long do you think this situation will continue?

So far we know two things: There hasn’t been a war, and there hadn’t been peace. It’s a process that’s under way. Here is the problem that both countries have: For the Iranians to make peace with the United States, in terms of domestic politics, it’s a violation of what the revolution has built up. For the Americans to make peace with the Iranians would be a violation of 30 years of American policy. It’s very difficult to find two countries that are not at war, that dislike each other as much as the United States and Iran. But here is the American problem: If the United States withdraws from Iraq, that will make Iran the most powerful conventional power in the Persian Gulf. We can’t stay in Iraq. We don’t want to stay in Iraq, and if we leave, then countries such as Saudi Arabia will be very upset. And they’ve expressed their concern. In the US relationship with an Islamic country, there are also tensions between Islamic countries. When the United States negotiates and when Turkey participates in these negotiations, it’s not a simple one-on-one relationship. You have to look at what else you’re destabilizing. It’s going to be long, and it’s going to be very painful.