Six or seven years ago I could show you physically in Turkey how right Gramsci was in his analysis of state-civil society relations in the “East.” I would take you to the associations department of the Security General Directorate to see this phenomenon with your own eyes. A half-hour tour of this unit would be enough for you to understand how the Turkish state viewed “civil society” in Turkey. From the unit’s location it would be obvious that the Turkish state saw civil society as a potential threat to security in Turkey; the Kafkaesque atmosphere in the department would only heighten this observation. The manner of the police officers and all the bureaucratic paperwork required would make you feel yourself regarded as a potential criminal.
Perestroika and the EU
From 2003-2004 a serious reform process was launched by this government and the associations desk was taken from the police department and moved to a different location. During this transitional period I visited the department and to my amazement, I saw all these police officers from the old department in plainclothes now in the new department. It was so funny. They were trying to appear as civilian officials, but nothing had changed. After a while real change came and all the officials in this department really became civilian officers. To me, this was like witnessing a small-scale Perestroika in Turkey.
Both the department dealing with associations and the entirety of the Association Law and related regulations were changed in 2004 -- the amendment of the Law of Foundations followed these changes. This government made these changes with help and prodding from the EU.
If one considers how deep-rooted the Turkish state’s paranoia about civil society is, we could say these changes were a kind of revolution. After the 1980 coup all organizations, including political parties, associations and trade unions, were closed down. Under the old law, almost all civil society organization activities were limited and subjected to permissions and monitoring. If you wanted to have a general assembly you had to invite a government commissioner; if you wished to receive funds from foreign donors you had to obtain prior permission; if you wanted to participate in an international event you had to inform the state -- and the list continued. So to come from where we were to where we are now really deserves praise. In this endeavor we are much indebted to the EU; I am really grateful for the atmosphere in Turkey now. Of course we have still a long way to go, but the situation has already improved a lot. This is the positive aspect of the Turkey-EU process’ impact on Turkish civil society.
When the money started pouring in
There are, however, other dimensions with regard to the EU’s impact on civil society that we need to think on. With the funds it provides, the EU has changed the entire civil society climate here in Turkey. All of a sudden civil society organizations came across an opportunity to obtain funds from the EU and other donors, and as I’m sure you can appreciate, this new phenomenon created quite an impact in the sector. Please don’t misunderstand me; I am of course by no means against fundraising and quite aware of the need of financial backing for civil society organizations in Turkey. However when I look at the impact this process created I cannot be quite optimistic. Let me explain. With EU funds, I believe we have a tremendous artificial expansion at hand in Turkey’s civil society sector. One dimension of this expansion is “new players.” These funds motivated the creation of some new NGOs which otherwise may not have been started. Another dimension of the artificial expansion is that which happened within organizations. To carry out EU-supported projects, some organizations employed more and more staff. But employing so many staff created a vicious circle: They turned into fund monsters. To maintain their high administrative expenses they become funding addicts. They could not think of anything but finding new funds. In this way they lost their amateur side, their emotional motivation if you like -- which is vital to the proper function of civil society organizations.
This artificial increase in the number of staff also killed their amateur soul by triggering other dynamics. Ordinary members of organizations started to get away from their organizations. Because of the new professional staff, they started to feel that their contribution was no longer valued. And of course others thought, “If some people are paid for the work they do for the organization, what’s the point in working voluntarily?”
This artificial expansion reached the point where we have now some civil society organizations that only exist because of the EU’s financial support. As soon as these funds are withdrawn, some organizations will collapse.
Of course many good things were done with EU funds, but these funds could have been used in much more efficient ways: Instead of supporting projects, the EU could have supported the infrastructure of the organizations. Namely, EU funds could have supported civil society organizations to allow them to do what they had already been doing successfully, by giving financial assistance for rent, office expenditures and so on. EU funds did not do that. Instead they created organizations that will collapse as soon as these funds are withdrawn and in other cases only supported projects, not the institutions themselves.
In short, the EU process has impacted the civil society sector in Turkey tremendously, in both positive and negative ways. We need a fair and extensive assessment of this impact in order to benefit the most from this process.
Note: This article is a slightly altered version of a presentation that I gave at the “Turkey, Sweden and the European Union -- What does the future hold?” conference held on June 2 in Istanbul, which was organized by the Consulate General of Sweden, the Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation and the Olof Palme International Center. On this occasion I would like to thank to the organizers for their genuine interest in Turkey’s becoming a member of the EU and inviting me for this illuminating conference.
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