
The bitter truth that has been revealed 50 years later is that the pro-coup mentality has continued until the present day. How has the bureaucratic tutelage which began on May 27, 1960 managed to sustain its power for half a century?
While preparing a series on the effects May 27 has had on the present day, I had the opportunity to obtain information on the details of the matter from primary and secondary sources.
One of the main reasons is the delay in intellectual development. A substantial portion of intellectuals, writers and journalists defended May 27 in the name of leftism. The stance of “progressive-left” intellectuals also played a role in the lack of diversity in mass communication which continued until the 1990s.
Until the 1950s a large portion of the society was alienated and systematically intimidated. Alienation applied to five groups, namely villagers, religious people, Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims.
What was interesting is that these alienated groups could not unite on their common victimization. On the contrary, they were organized so successfully against each other that when polarizing into groups they did not realize that they were consolidating the ruling power of the junta.
The first to survive the alienation was villagers. With the migration from villages to cities, alienation deepened through fear. Violent attacks against religious people, Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims evolved into unresolved attacks against leftist intellectuals and journalists. Some of the attacks against the truth-seeking leftist intellectuals had two purposes. They criminalized and oppressed religious people and also intimidated intellectuals and journalists who were inclined to follow the truth.
In this file photo, former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who was executed after the May 27, 1960 coup, is seen in a courtroom in Yassıada. |
Another very critical action was accomplished through relentless social engineering.
For a very long time the public saw the army as the center of bureaucratic tutelage. That is because the junta originated from the army.
While in appearance the May 27 coup leaders left the administration to civilians, they quietly set up constitutional institutions that would maintain the power of the subversive mentality.
Among these institutions, the main one was the higher judiciary. This reality was not realized by the public until 2009. The information that the real patron of tutelage was the judiciary became publicly known on the 50th anniversary of the May 27 coup.
Those who did not share the same views and opinions as the junta were discharged from the army and judiciary. Anyone who refused to surrender to this secret power or had the potential to undermine was kept away from these institutions.
Precise measures were taken. The legislative and executive branches were prevented from having members in these institutions and while the higher judiciary was made autonomous the Supreme Court of Appeals was given absolute authority.
Those who served on the Yassıada Court, which terrorized people in the name of the law on May 27, were given positions in the higher judiciary. No civil administration was able to interfere in this structure.
The judiciary, which was the only remedy to the junta virus, had become its guardian.
The biggest debate today is based on this very matter. If the constitutional amendment is implemented, the higher judiciary will be open to all.
However maintaining the current order is necessary to release Ergenekon suspects.
A shocking voice recording posted on the Internet regarding the release of suspects put the Supreme Court of Appeals in a difficult position.
There’s an end to everything. The pro-status quo junta mentality is reaching the end of its life span.
Public opinion polls conducted in Turkey regarding sympathy for different countries contain important messages for Germany and France.
Two of the main reasons why the sympathy for these two countries has hit rock bottom is the cold messages and ambiguous policies of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
Factors that increased sympathy for Germany, such as it never having occupied Anatolia, had historical resonance. But narrow-minded politicians ruined this positive image.
France made a similar mistake.
Merkel and Sarkozy’s negative attitude towards Turkey played a determining role when Turkish consumers, who were heading to car dealerships due to the Private Consumption Tax (ÖTV) and the Value Added Tax (VAT) discounts at a time when the world was facing an economic crisis, were selecting cars.
I heard people checking out the prices and quality of cars at German and French car brand dealerships say: “If there isn’t a major difference in prices let’s check out the other cars. Merkel and Sarkozy should be punished for what they did.” I thus thought that Merkel and Sarkozy were responsible for preventing German and French car brands from making record-breaking sales.
Germany is now trying to improve its image in Turkey with the slogan, “We are together.” Germany needs to substantiate its image with sincerity and avoid double standards. Another requirement is that France needs to follow Germany.
Focus groups trying to prevent the constitutional amendments continue to put pressure on deputies. Now the higher judiciary is dealing with the constitutional amendments which were passed in Parliament after record-breaking hours of work despite the pressure imposed on deputies.
The constitutional amendment package, which the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Democratic Left Party (DSP) and independent deputies sent to the Constitutional Court, was first hindered by the Supreme Election Board (YSK).
The YSK decided that a new amendment which decreases the referendum waiting period from 120 days to 60 days would not apply. As a result, the referendum was delayed for an additional 60 days.
When reaching this decision, the YSK interpreted the referendum law as an election law. It based its decision on the related constitutional provision that states, “Amendments made to the electoral laws shall not be applied to the elections to be held within one year from when the amendments go into force.”
Legal expert friends of mine who note that the YSK made a grave mistake on the matter noted that the YSK is not incapable of differentiating between a referendum and election.
Noting that while elections are a means for representative democracy a referendum is a means for semi-direct democracy, a legal expert friend said, “Ascribing a sense of commitment to a norm beyond the Constitution makes law the focus of unrestricted chaos.”
The same legal expert also said: “An election is a competition that has a player -- a candidate. As for a referendum, it does not have a player or a candidate.”
The YSK did not do very well on the test. The reason for this poor assessment will surface one day with shocking details.
Now the Constitutional Court, which will start addressing the case, is going to pass through the same critical test.
The first meeting is going to be a review -- in other words it will be a routine meeting. The court will not make a decision in favor of the CHP-DSP and independent deputies at this meeting.
To the contrary, it may even make a surprise ruling such as rejecting the application on grounds that it exceeds the court’s jurisdiction. It is a very small possibility that this kind of surprise will happen, but it is still a possibility.
The highly expected outcome is that the court will decide to remove articles pertaining to the higher judiciary from the package. Legal expert friends of mine who don’t even want to think of this possibility say that this decision will harm the entire society, especially the Constitutional Court.
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