A general does not attend a trial despite being indicted for terrorism, but sends two warplanes instead. Western public opinion, apparently misinformed about the Ergenekon trial, should focus on this development as a start. Those who claim there is a battle between Islamists and secularists in Turkey should correctly read this picture. If such an event had occurred in a Western democracy, what would have happened? The army commander would immediately be impeached. So would perhaps the chief of general staff, who has a certain responsibility in this event. What is surprising in Turkey is not the political power pushing the army away from politics but this picture itself, isn't it? The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) can be criticized for still keeping that general in office. Any criticism going beyond this point would be unfair.
The only reason for such a bad picture is that time is accelerating. We will see no slowdown in Turkey's pace now that Parliament passed a package of constitutional amendments after midnight yesterday. Rather we will see increased acceleration. There is still a long way before a general appears before a court in Turkey. But, the time for this is approaching quickly. With a huge historical responsibility, the AK Party is putting its affairs in order. With the package of constitutional amendments that will be taken to referendum, it will acquire new outposts against the enemies of democracy and the rule of law.
A loss in the package
Article 8 of the package would have relegated the decision-making authority largely to Parliament with respect to party closures. A commission would have been set up, with five members from each party with a parliamentary group, and this commission would have endorsed any demand to launch a closure case against any political party. Only this article was unable to receive the required majority. But who won in the end?
Let us run through simple reasoning and focus on a single event. What was done regarding the Council of State attack? What is the value of learning the correct answer to this question for Turkey? If you can find the correct answer, no one will dare engage in similar conspiracies. No one will be able to organize plots or arrange assassinations in order to create a false threat of reactionaryism and the like. Do you not think this is so? This also applies to the Erzincan conspiracy, the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plan and the Cage (Kafes) action plan. Even tragic events from the past such as the Maraş, Çorum and Sivas massacres and the May Day of 1977 as well as an attack on the Nationalist Movement Party's (MHP) headquarters in 1979 can be analyzed with this same logic. Let us repeat our question. If we can solve the Council of State attack, won't we be able to end this tradition of conducting dirty, shady, illegal affairs?
How will we get the answer to this question? Who will give us the answer? Are members of the high judiciary meddling with the trial in order to cover up the Erzincan conspiracy and prevent the truth from resurfacing? Did the army order F-16 warplanes to fly over the courtroom in order to intimidate the judges and the general public? Does the General Staff engage in "confidential" affairs in order to prevent the 3rd Army commander from attending the trial? Does Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal, who rushes to champion Ergenekon at every opportunity? Or MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who has not said a word or made any demand about this matter so far? Is it the host of journals which serve the purposes of the masterminds behind the Council of State attack by running the most bizarre headlines in their papers?
Democracy as upheld by the AK Party
There is only one answer to questions such as "Who will give us the answer?" which we ask when it comes to the Council of State attack and other bloody schemes. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will answer them in his capacity as the prime minister of the Turkish Republic. The court will try the criminals and issue a judgment. The prime minister, on the other hand, will solve these shady conspiracies and help institute the rule of law in this country. He must give the same answer to the supporters of the CHP and the MHP as well as to his own supporters. No one other than the prime minister can get an answer to this question.
But, how will he do this? The answer will come bit by bit. The prime minister will give part of this answer by passing the current package of constitutional amendments. When the polls are opened for the referendum, we will give our bit of the answer. Let us repeat: To what? The Council of State attack.
Members of Parliament rejected a constitutional amendment that would give them the authority to close down a political party. After setting up the gallows on its own, putting the rope around its own neck and kicking the bucket by itself, how can the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) explain its unusual alliance with the MHP and the CHP to Kurds? After trying to suppress any expansion of the rule of law, what can the MHP protect the nation with? How can it advocate a nationalism that is not hinged upon the nation and its rights?
Our eyes are fixed on the leader of the AK Party. His capacity to mobilize his party's parliamentary group to amend Article 146 has refreshed our hopes for the clarification of the Council of State attack.
Is the CHP a fascist party?
When Prime Minister Erdoğan likened a former CHP leader, İsmet İnönü, who replaced the founding father of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to Adolf Hitler, his analogy was a criticism intended for the CHP's opposition to the reform package, not for the past. This criticism was particularly well made as it explains why Gen. Berk is not attending the hearing but sends warplanes instead. The current struggle between the AK Party and the CHP and Ergenekon is nothing but a battle between democracy and fascism.
At the risk of angering CHP members who used to exploit the legacy of Atatürk, I reiterate here: Atatürk was not an Atatürkist as he insisted that he did not leave any ideology behind. Kemalism, formulated while Atatürk was still alive, is the work of CHP theoreticians who had a strong admiration of Italian fascism. The Kemalist ideology, adopted at the CHP's party congress in 1931, is reminiscent of the eclectic nature of fascist ideology with emphasis on action. It is formulated as a set of principles, not as a system. There are two reasons why Kemalism was not translated into a tight-knit totalitarian ideology: the inability of senior CHP executives to do so and their opting to emphasize the cult of the leader at the expense of the ideology.
There is no need to go back to 70-80 years ago. We can still find practices that are alive today as "fascist emulations" of the time. The official ceremonies of May 19, which we unquestioningly repeat every year, are just one example of the fascist mass demonstrations of the time. Fascist governments and totalitarian ideologies would attach great importance to motivating masses and creating a collective spirit and solidarity riveted on common goals. The mass celebrations attended by many people who would repeat the same simple movements in harmony are the ritual practices invented by fascism. Our May 19 ceremonies started as primitive imitations of fascist Italy's ceremonies, which were admired by the Recep Peker-led CHP committee visiting Italy.
Time is accelerating. The May 19 Youth and Sports Day ceremonies, inherited from fascist Italy in the 1930s, will this time be overshadowed by the package of constitutional amendments passed by Parliament. Moreover, an army commander will not be able to send warplanes to the court hearing to which he was summoned as a defendant. This package evidences the defeat of fascism by democracy, not a conflict between Islamists and secularists.
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