However, Turkey, as a member of the UN Security Council, opposes, together with Brazil and China, any severe sanctions against Iran, and expressed its position directly in the words of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu shuttled between Tehran and Western capitals for a diplomatic solution.
Some tend to cite the Islamic roots of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to account for this policy. Some go even further to claim that the AK Party is warm to the idea of a nuclear Iran. However, Turkey has a state policy on this issue. This policy is frequently voiced by President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and several senior AK Party executives. Accordingly, Turkey seeks to have a nuclear-free Middle East. It is against Iran having nuclear weapons as it believes this will undermine the balances in the region, triggering an arms race.
The prime minister is also critical of the West raising hell about the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons but failing to say anything about nuclear Israel. As a matter of fact, Iran is already a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and fulfills its obligations under it, though with some delay, while Israel refrains from even signing it. Erdoğan believes it is a contradiction for countries with nuclear weapons to ban others from doing the same. As these criticisms grow harsher, this naturally gives the impression that Turkey is extending a protective wing over Iran.
Ankara has another concern. Imposing restrictions on peaceful nuclear energy technology as a roadblock for Iran might create dependence on certain countries: You can use nuclear energy, but we will build your plants; you have to buy raw materials from us. For this reason, Turkey sides with the West in terms of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons by resorting to peaceful methods. But it is against a nuclear energy monopoly. Moreover, Turkey is not like Canada or France with respect to the Iran issue. Iran is a historical neighbor in Turkey, with the two having a common border for about four centuries, and it is our second-biggest energy supplier after Russia. It is a major port opening to Central Asia, and a major trade partner, and it is particularly important with respect to critical issues such as the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the preservation of Iraq's integrity. Having pursued a policy of tension with its neighbors and having suffered from the bitter outcome of this policy, Turkey would not be eager to see Iran drift into instability.
Of course, this does not hide the fact that Iran, as a major player, has responsibilities toward Turkey and other countries in the region. Tehran has ominously adopted an erratic attitude toward the "nuclear swap" proposal, one of the most serious formulas offered to overcome the crisis through dialogue and which Turkey supports. According to the formula, Iran will give 1,200 kilograms of non-enriched uranium to Russia and France, which, in return, give 20 percent enriched uranium suitable for use in nuclear power plants back to Iran. It is impossible to even follow what Iran's response to this proposal is.
Although he said they rejected the proposal on Nov. 18, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki declared on Dec. 12 that the formula is on the table. He said that the Kish Island in the Persian Gulf could be the venue for the exchange.
Speaking to the IRNA news agency four days ago, Ali Akbar Velayati, a foreign policy adviser to spiritual leader Ali Khamanei, stated that they were against the swap. However, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, attending the NPT summit in New York on Monday, not only said that they are warm to the swap but also underlined that it was originally proposed by them, not the West.
Everyone, particularly Davutoğlu, will need plenty of patience to negotiate with Iran because they should not only become experts in such an abstruse matter as nuclear energy, but they must also be versed in bargaining a la Persia.
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