Some Western perceptions of Turkey (3)
by
Morton Abramowitz*

Looking ahead, I think our relations will remain close. Certainly the US wants to work together with a rising Turkey and so does Turkey. But the next few years can also be difficult. US-Turkey relations will be tested in Iraq and whether it stays together. Profound Iraqi internal problems must be overcome, and the end is not apparent. The manner of our leaving Iraq will be critical to Turkey. Iran may test our relations even sooner.

The most immediate problem, however, is the periodic Armenian genocide resolution. It is a mixture, inter alia, of different versions of history, deep feelings on both sides, domestic politics in both countries and the stability of bilateral relations. Turkey has been successful for many years in defeating such a resolution, mostly by mobilizing the executive branch and many members of the legislature to make sure it did not pass by threatening serious consequences in relations. Two weeks ago it passed the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by only one vote, with Turkish television covering every nook and cranny of the debate. Ankara was enormously angry over the committee passage, although that had happened before, and blamed it on the delay of the administration (and the American Jewish community, which Ankara thinks is monolithic) in coming to their aid. It has recalled its ambassador and is still threatening unspecified retribution. Administration intervention apparently will prevent the committee resolution from being voted upon in the full House.

It is not clear what further the Turkish government will actually do and they may be waiting to see whether it is really finished in Congress and what Mr. Barack Obama says on the April 24 commemoration day to the Armenian-American community. He used the term genocide in his election campaign but not as president. The Turkish government is also angry that its difficult and much welcomed efforts to normalize relations with Armenia were not sufficient to preclude introduction of a genocide resolution for a long time. However, many Americans believe Turkey failed to anticipate Azerbaijan’s anger over Turkey’s inability to make some progress on Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations and backed down on presenting the agreements worked out by the two sides to Parliament. Interestingly other nations have passed similar genocide resolutions, just recently Sweden. The Turkish reaction was not great nor much public attention paid to them.

Clearly the issue has roiled Turkish-American relations and bids likely to continue to do so. This is a deeply felt issue by Armenian Americans. It is hard to see them giving up. It is equally hard to see how it will be resolved any time soon.

Let me close with some personal reflections on bilateral relations. Both countries’ leadership incessantly talk of our close relations, our common values and our shared views, and they like to use the term “strategic relationship” to demonstrate the importance of our relations. Indeed there is much truth to that despite huge hiccups, such as Iraq. Turkey has been a real concern of the executive branch, which has worked hard to maintain strong ties and to facilitate Turkey’s entrance into Europe. Turks also want close relations. They are important politically even if most Turks dislike the US. A deterioration in relations with Washington would give any Turkish government domestic political headaches.

The fact, however, is that our relationship remains close but its substance is changing. The end of the Soviet Union has reduced Turkey’s dependence on the US for security and military ties -- Iraq hardly constitutes a Soviet threat. Turkey still relies on the US for defense modernization, but it is broadening its sources of arms. Nor does the present American economic situation inspire the respect of yore. Turkey’s increasing independence is reflected in the active diplomacy already described, where Turkey pursues its own interests, sometimes with political movements like Hamas or countries the US dislikes. The US has begun to recognize that change, notably with the arrival of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, and is adjusting to it -- there has been no serious division yet, although Iran is creeping close to it. Washington encourages Ankara where its activities are believed helpful and tries to mitigate differences.

The atmosphere has also been strained for another reason: the immense anti-Americanism in Turkey generated by the second Iraq war. According to recent polls, attitudes toward the US have been mired in the mid teens, the lowest for any American ally and most other nations. Not even the end of the Bush administration or Mr. Obama’s early visit to Turkey has changed that much. Public attitudes do not override national interests, but bad ones are not a good sustainable basis for relations. The Turkish government has shown little interest in trying to change public attitudes for an understandable reason -- it would not be politically popular. Furthermore, the economic underpinnings of our relations are weak and by and large that cannot be changed much by governments in private enterprise countries. Both governments have their work carved out, and hopefully they will step up to it. Turkey has a bright future, if it maintains internal stability and continues rapid growth. The growing democracy of an overwhelmingly Muslim country, one which can join the European Union, is a fundamental benefit to all. Turkey’s success will contribute to American interests and to world stability.

Indeed the most crucial issues are difficult internal ones, whether Turkey overcomes the polarization that now grips the country, allowing it to proceed with fundamental reforms and resume its rapid rate of growth. That will be crucial to determine whether Turkey becomes part of the EU and a far more influential player internationally.

(These remarks were made on Feb. 25, 2010 [subsequently slightly revised for this publication] at a joint meeting of the İstanbul Center of Atlanta and Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech.)