Some Western perceptions of Turkey (1)
by
MORTON ABRAMOWİTZ*

Turkey has taken off since the end of the Cold War: profound economic and social change and major strides in making the country more democratic. Nevertheless, it still has a long way to go to meet EU accession requirements. A good bit of Turkey remains third world. I have always believed, however simplistic, that as long as Turkey grows 5-6 percent a year it will get into the EU by the end of this decade. Unfortunately, given Europe's reticence and Turkey's development, it is not surprising that Turks increasingly wonder whether they really want to join the EU.

The country is far more vibrant and open, and public discussion is light years ahead of my time in Ankara 20 years ago. Some subjects such as the question of Armenian genocide in World War I and Kurds remain touchy issues, but they are openly discussed now, and in the case of Turkey's Kurds there is serious consideration of policy changes. Remarkably, the military, still the most respected institution in Turkey and the generator of effectively four coups, is being seriously criticized, and many retired officers this past year have been arrested or questioned over plotting against the government. A small newspaper -- Taraf -- repeatedly publishes the military's intimate secrets and gets away with it. Its editors would have been imprisoned for life a decade ago.

Indeed, the past few weeks have produced even greater tensions. The government seems to be pushing the military against the wall by bringing into custody some 50 retired officers; some of them are, remarkably, former top commanders. This is a unique situation, and all sorts of rumors have been flying around. The highest civilian and military officials urgently met in apparent efforts to contain the storm, and a little more quiet has descended. From here in Atlanta it is unclear where all this is going, but it appears to be an extraordinary moment in modern Turkish history.

In talking about Turkey today I will do it by responding to some current American discussion of Turkey and our bilateral relations and give you my take on that discussion.

Even though Turkey is a long-time ally, there is a growing perception, particularly among our conservative cognoscenti, that domestically the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is out to destroy the power of the military and make Turkey not an Islamic state but a more conservative, religiously oriented state with much greater public manifestations of Islam. Some fear more extreme internal religious developments and a very authoritarian government emerging if the military is completely defanged as the guardian of Turkish secularism. Many holding this view believe that on foreign policy the AKP is detaching Turkey from its Western moorings and focusing more on ties to the Muslim Middle East and Russia and showing less interest in joining the EU and maintaining close ties to the US.

For the moment let me say briefly that while the AKP government, of course, has made changes in domestic and foreign policy that might lend support to those views, such basic judgments are, I believe, overdone, and their concerns simply do not take into account the complexity of Turkey and its rapid development. I will focus on foreign policy, but a few more comments first on the domestic dimension

The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is due to the failure of Turkey's mainstream parties, but more fundamentally to Turkey's structural changes: the growth of the economy, an enlarged non-Istanbul entrepreneurship and the vast movement of poorer, more devout people from country to city. The AKP, which rose out of an older fundamentalist party, has given voice to these demographic elements that rarely had one and in doing so has done much to make Turkey an open, more vibrant and democratic country. They have severely reduced the ability of the military, their main political enemy, to intervene in politics through coups. This ongoing effort, however, has polarized the country, particularly those who believe the army is essential to preserving Turkey's traditional secularism and providing balance in a conflicted society. The events these past weeks will deepen the polarization. The AKP has gone far because it is a majority party, accelerating change and intent on making Turkey a bigger economic and political player in the world.

While surviving efforts so far by the military and the judiciary to bring the government down, the AKP's dynamism has diminished in the past two years, partly because of world recession but also because they have talked much but accomplished little on promised and certainly politically the most difficult fundamental reforms, like a new constitution to replace the authoritarian military-bestowed constitution and real measures to deal with its Kurds. Rather they have pulled back, fearing the political fallout of their controversial reform efforts.

One last point: Life changes. So do politics in Turkey, however ineffective Turkey's opposition parties have been. Yes, Prime Minister Erdogan dominates the scene like a colossus; he is an extraordinary dynamic politician, but he is also viewed as increasingly authoritarian and destructive of a free media, polemical and prone to risk-taking including now his defense establishment. The AKP's political position remains strong, but its popularity has been diminishing. Conceivably, the past weeks' events could spur Mr. Erdogan to early parliamentary elections, although he has denied it. Should he wait till the present parliament's time is up, economics could well play a bigger part in determining the outcome of the next elections, notably the great unemployment rate and the difficulty of changing that over the next year. The free ride opposition parties have given the AKP, partly on economic matters, is likely to end. More fundamentally the country seems increasingly at war with itself, and the public tone is acrimonious. Dominant as they now are, the AKP could well continue its drift downward, setting the stage for an election producing a coalition government. Political life in Turkey can turn fickle -- not unlike what we see in the US today.

Foreign policy under the AKP is vastly different and very lively, a far cry from the stagnancy of the Cold War. Both Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu are enormously active, incessantly travelling and trying to convey to the Turkish public and the world Turkey's new dynamism and importance. Turkish involvement and influence extends far these days besides NATO: over the last decade to the Caucasus, the Middle East, Iran, Central Asia and Afghanistan. Ankara's ambitions are limited by Turkey's internal weaknesses. But it remains the strongest power in the area.

Let me briefly discuss a few specifics of that diplomatic revolution that have caused heartburn among some of my countrymen. They are mostly in the Middle East -- Iran, Syria and Israel -- and in Russia. On the issue currently most important to both countries -- Iraq -- Turkey has made radical changes in policy helpful to American interests. Somehow that development seems to get little attention from conservatives, who remain still deeply interested in Iraq. So let me start with Iraq, which since the first Gulf War has been the most acrimonious issue in US-Turkey relations. The second Gulf War produced the biggest break in US-Turkey relations since the embargo and generated the vast decline in American popularity in Turkey.

The two wars produced a nightmare for Turkey -- the possibly huge impact on Kurdish nationalism and Turkey's own Kurds from the growth of a self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq and the possibility it could become independent if Iraq descended into chaos. This has been a fear of every Turkish government since the allies established a safe haven area in Iraq for Kurds after the first Gulf War. Turkey's fears seemed to come true after Saddam's fall and the inability to create an effective Iraq government. For seven years Turkey made believe that Iraqi Kurdistan did not exist except for trade, but over the past year they have changed course and developed a serious relationship. To a great extent that came from the realization that the Americans were leaving Iraq and Turkey would be better served by a good relationship with the Kurds in helping preserve Iraq's unity and their influence. The US works closely with Turkey to help preserve Iraq's unity. There are, of course, complex issues like the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and the future of Kirkuk, which continue to roil the waters in Iraq.

It is Turkey's greater involvement in the rest of the Middle East that has caused the biggest unhappiness here. Ankara has mounted a sustained and vigorous effort to improve relations with its neighbors (usually described as “zero problems” with neighbors) and, importantly, deepen economic ties with all Arab countries, the latter a focus of the prime minister's personal efforts. They built on Turkey's Muslim character to help advance relations with often unfriendly neighbors, and it sometimes seems that Islam has become a driving force in Turkish foreign policy.

(Remarks Feb. 25, 2010 [subsequently slightly revised for this publication] at a joint meeting of the İstanbul Center of Atlanta and Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, George Tech.)