A new civil constitution: sole antidote for Turkey’s political crisis?
by
Özgür Erkan*

The AK Party rightfully aims to put an end to this series of political crises through a new “civil” constitution that would limit the powers of the judicial branch and curtail the powers of the military through several measures, for example, by bringing its budget fully under the control of the legislative branch.

Although a new civil constitution may seem to be the ultimate panacea for solving this political deadlock created by the selected bureaucrats, Turkish politics in reality needs more than just a new constitution: It needs a culture of “consensus” and transformation in the mentality of bureaucrats.

The need for consensus in Turkish politics

A new civil constitution may curtail the powers of the “select” and increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the top judicial and military institutions; however, this does not necessarily mean that political deadlocks will be eliminated through the new constitution. To prevent these deadlocks, firstly, political parties should be working in harmony with each other. In order to ensure perfect cooperation between the various parties in Parliament, Turkish opposition parties need to adopt a culture of “political consensus,” just as was adopted in the era of democratic transition in Spain after 1975.

Spanish politics remained ideologically highly fragmented after Franco’s death, as numerous political groups envisaged a different form of a new Spanish republic. While the ultra-leftists (headed by the PCE) aimed for a communist state, the ultranationalists strived to continue the legacy of the Francoist Spanish kingdom. In between, the reformists and the openists (aperturistas) envisaged a major reform in the founding principles of the (Francoist) Spanish kingdom and wanted to replace the Francoist state with a democratic republic.

In spite of the aforementioned political fragmentation in Spain, Spanish politicians led by the prime minister of the time, Adolfo Suarez, and King Juan Carlos managed to cement a political consensus between the governing party (the UCD) and opposition parties and create a model of democratic transition by consensus.

Just like the opposition parties in Spain, the opposition parties in Turkey (Republican People’s Party [CHP], Nationalist Movement Party [MHP] but also Peace and Democracy Party [BDP]) should aim to cooperate with the governing party to ensure that democracy works smoothly and that political deadlocks will be avoided. The main opposition party, the CHP, has lacked a political culture of consensus throughout the multi-party era in particular, as it was not so long ago when the CHP opposed nearly every bill proposed by the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1950s and thus created political deadlocks and played a major part in the lead-up to the coup in May, 1960. The CHP has been pursuing the same strategy in the AK Party era, and as long as the CHP does not adopt (together with MHP and BDP) a culture of consensus and cooperate with the AK Party in these fragile times, a new constitution will not be enough to save the future of Turkish politics. It is worth noting that even in the US, the two major rival parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, cooperated in tailoring appropriate solutions to the global financial crisis when it peaked in the US, yet in Turkey the CHP (and the MHP) left the governing AK Party alone in its attempts to minimize the effects of the crisis. Hence, as long as the opposition declines to cooperate with the governing party, new political crises will be inevitable in Turkey.

Transforming the mentality of bureaucrats and generals

Creating a new constitution and forming a political consensus will not suffice to avoid political deadlocks in Turkish politics. In addition to these measures, the outlook of the army generals and high court judges on politics should profoundly change to limit their interference in politics and to ensure that the executive and legislative branches work effectively.

A new civil constitution may curtail the powers of the army and the judges but will also make these officials more accountable to the citizens. Yet an amendment to the constitution will not ensure that the generals and judges will suddenly stop interfering in the business of the governing party.

The mentality of education at military schools, for example, will not be affected by the stipulations of a new constitution. Young army officers will still be indoctrinated that they, rather than the citizens, are the gatekeepers of the secular republic and that a military intervention is just if the “elected” government does not pursue the policies deemed fit by the army. This doctrine in fact clashes with the central Kemalist principles the soldiers seem to respect, as Ataturk wanted the army generals to remain out of politics unless they took off their military uniforms and joined Parliament as civilian deputies. For the institutions to work in harmony with a new civil constitution, the army should reform its main principles as well as the doctrines taught to young army officers at the military school, just as the Spanish army principles were reformed in modern Spain by Gen. Mellado in the late 1970s and as the Spanish army was indoctrinated to respect democracy and the pre-eminence of citizens. Similarly, in Turkey army officers should be indoctrinated that their mission is to maintain national security against threats from the outside world, not to intervene in politics with the excuse of safeguarding the core principles of the secular republic.

Similarly, irrespective of a new civil constitution, there is a need for a transformation in the mentality of the judicial branch to ensure that the legislative-executive-judicial powers work in cooperation. Based on the current constitution, the top institutions of the judicial branch in Turkey, i.e. the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State, have a significant influence on the legislative arm. Certainly Turkey is not the only country where the judicial branch has extreme power -- the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) or the Supreme Court of the United States are also known to have a major impact on their legislative and executive branches. This power, however, does not grant the Turkish judicial branches the right to create deadlocks in politics. On top of a new civil constitution, the judicial authorities in Turkey should change their mentality and avoid creating deadlocks with the verdicts they pass. In reality, the judicial authorities should understand that creating deadlocks for the sake of defending Kemalist principles only creates stagnation in the system and undermines the stability of the republic.

In short, although Turkey desperately needs a new civil constitution, this new constitution alone will not be able to eliminate all major deadlocks. Unless a new civil constitution is complemented by a culture of political consensus in Parliament and a transformation in the outlook of judicial authorities and army officers on politics, political crises and deadlocks cannot be avoided.