Turkey, Cyprus and the EU: issues and hurdles (2)
by
Süha Bölükbaşı*

After the setback of the April 2004 referendum, UN Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari brokered a new initiative to start the Cypriot parties talking again. In July 2006, the recently elected KKTC President Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot hard-liner Tassos Papadopoulos began bilateral talks which ended in failure after 50 arduous rounds. The February 2008 presidential elections in the south brought to power Dimitris Christofias, who avowed his firm commitment to a negotiated settlement. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, he met with Talat on March 21, 2008, and both leaders opened a new crossing (Ledra Street) on the Green Line on April 3, 2008. On July 1, 2008, they agreed on single sovereignty, which Rauf Denktaş had earlier refused to accept.

After establishing six working groups and seven technical committees to work out outstanding differences in preliminary negotiations, Talat and Christofias began to hold bilateral talks on Sept. 3, 2008. As expected, there emerged differences of opinion on the issues of property, territory and security. On the issue of property, while Talat stressed compensation for Greek properties in the north and gave priority to the current (Turkish Cypriot) residents’ preferences, Christofias insisted on restitution, arguing that the absentee owner should have the first say on the fate of these properties. On the subject of territory, Talat seemed more flexible, suggesting that in return for restricting the right of return of Greek Cypriots to the north, the KKTC could give back more territory to Nicosia. On security, the parties seem still deadlocked on Turkey’s prerogative to intervene in the island’s affairs to preserve the constitutional order as provided by the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee and the 1960 Constitution. On governance and power sharing, the parties agree on rotating presidency, but disagree on powers of constituent states. Talat desires more, while Christofias prefers less power to be allocated to constituent states. Christofias, for his part, also made some concessions. He stated that 50,000 mainland Turks could remain after a settlement, and the right to settle could be separated from the right to vote: Voting rights of Greek Cypriots who would return to the north could be curtailed to preserve the Turkish Cypriot hold.

Nicosia’s EU membership has negatively influenced Ankara’s EU accession process. The Turkish government’s refusal to implement the Additional Protocol of its Association Agreement with regard to Nicosia led the latter to block eight chapters in Ankara’s accession negotiations with the EU. Together with France’s blocks, Turkey is barred from negotiating 14 out of 35 chapters. Ankara believes that providing Nicosia access to its ports and airports would mean recognition of the latter and would weaken Turkish Cypriots in the inter-communal talks. In January 2006 Ankara proposed to make its ports and airports accessible to Nicosia in return for the KKTC’s use of its ports and airport in its trade with the EU. While the EU, the UK and the US welcomed the proposal, Nicosia’s objection killed the initiative. Since 2007, the European Council has been annually reviewing Turkey’s non-compliance with the additional protocol and could adopt new measures against Turkey in the future.

The April 2010 presidential elections in the KKTC could mean a setback for inter-communal talks if Talat were to lose the election to hard-liner Derviş Eroğlu as some predict. The enthusiasm for reunification Turkish Cypriots had before the April 2004 referendum no longer exists. They already enjoy many benefits of a reunified Cyprus, including open crossings to the south, EU passports and access to health and education facilities in the Greek Cypriot zone. Hence, many are apprehensive about a settlement that could lead to Greek Cypriot hegemony. Greek Cypriots, likewise, do not seem thrilled about Talat’s demands, believing that if a settlement were to lead to a difficult-to-manage government, the status quo is preferable. Ankara, for its part, is worried about Nicosia undermining its accession process. Yet its strategy could backfire on Nicosia because prevention of Ankara’s EU accession would also mean that Nicosia would lose its leverage.