Turkey, Cyprus and the EU: issues and hurdles (1)
by
SÜHA BÖLÜKBAŞI*

Nicosia’s behavior since May 2004 is similar to its previous conduct, which consisted of alternating between collective legitimization and inter-communal talks with the KKTC. Often Nicosia saw no contradiction between relying on these two conflicting methods of settlement at the same time. Indeed, in the post-2004 period also, Nicosia relied on these two conflicting methods to pursue the same goal: a favorable settlement. The latter has very much been the consequence of Nicosia’s inclination not to identify with Cyprus as a multinational state and to become the dominant party in a reunified island. This, in turn, is probably related to the Greek Cypriots’ perception of the island’s cohabitants as violators of principles of democracy and justice by rejecting majority -- read: Greek Cypriot -- rule. As opposed to Nicosia’s emphasis on justice, Turkish Cypriots stress the importance of the equality of the communities and insist that Lefkoşa deserves respect not only from Nicosia but also from the international community.[3] Respect means that Turkish Cypriots should be recognized as equal partners in a to-be-established bi-communal state. Nicosia’s continued reliance on collective legitimization is only too obvious in showing that Nicosia considers Turkish Cypriots as a minority, but not as equals.

The differing views of the parties have characterized since the late 1970s their negotiating positions, and the latter remained more or less consistent. Lefkoşa desires powerful constituent states, while Nicosia prefers a strong federal administration. The KKTC and Nicosia have always disagreed on whether to restrict the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to the north. Lefkoşa’s preference has been restricted return; Nicosia has all along called for unrestricted return. Other issues of contention include Lefkoşa favoring wide veto powers in the to-be-established federal government and the continuation of Turkey’s -- and the other two guarantor states’ -- guaranteeing the constitutional order and keeping troops as provided by the 1960 Constitution. Nicosia has always refused to accept them.

Ankara’s costly steps

Although Ankara has always been -- rightly -- credited for standing by the KKTC, it nevertheless took some steps that proved to be costly. These include then-Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s 1995 acceptance of the start of EU membership talks with Nicosia in return for Greece’s lifting of its objections to Turkey’s forthcoming customs union with the EU. Çiller’s decision eliminated for all practical purposes the major bargaining chip Ankara held vis-à-vis Nicosia: the 1959 Cyprus Treaties and Cyprus’ 1960 Constitution entitled the three guarantor states to deny Cyprus from 1) joining international organizations of which Turkey or Greece were not members and 2) uniting with any other state. By giving up its veto power regarding Nicosia’s membership talks with the EU, Ankara not only contributed to Nicosia’s EU membership but also to its post-2004 capability to sabotage Ankara’s membership talks and Lefkoşa’s reaping some benefits from the island’s EU membership. Turkey tried to reassure Lefkoşa by signing an agreement with the latter in December 1995, promising that Ankara would make sure that Cyprus could join the EU only after reunification. As it turned out, this was a hollow commitment.

Nevertheless, during the early 2000s, Greek Cypriots for their part were not sure that a divided Cyprus would join the EU as smoothly as it did in May 2004. This is why many believed that the Greek Cypriot president at the time, Glafcos Clerides, would have accepted the December 2002 Annan plan had Rauf Denktaş agreed to it. Clerides’ successor, Tassos Papadopoulos, was less inclined to grant “privileges” to the fellow islanders in the north, but Greek Cypriots in general were still favorably disposed to the March 2003 Annan plan. It is, however, a moot point whether a settlement could have been accomplished because President Denktaş rejected the latter plan as well. Although the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Ankara was favorably disposed toward the plan, Denktaş’s behavior was identical with his traditional intransigence and Lefkoşa’s post-December 1997 consensus with the Mesut Yılmaz government. In December 1997, the European Commission recommended membership talks to start with Nicosia, while excluding Turkey from EU enlargement. In response, then-Prime Minister Yılmaz agreed to the signing of a treaty of integration between Ankara and Lefkoşa, after which Denktaş began to insist that the KKTC enjoyed sovereignty, implying that he could agree only to a confederal -- rather than a federal -- settlement with Nicosia.

Yet changes in Turkey-EU relations would soon lead to a parting of ways between Ankara and Lefkoşa. Making a U-turn, the European Council granted Turkey candidate status at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, and at its December 2002 Copenhagen summit, the European Council set December 2004 as the date to decide whether to start accession talks with Ankara. The AK Party, having come to power in November 2002, set about to find a formula that would show the EU that Ankara was sincerely trying to solve the Cyprus dispute. On Feb. 4, 2004, to give momentum to the peace process and to circumvent Denktaş’s uncompromising stance, the AK Party government proposed that the UN secretary-general should fill in the blanks if the Cypriot parties failed to reach an agreement and separate referendums to be held in both parts of the island on the final draft.

Kofi Annan lived up to the expectations, producing a rather balanced settlement plan by trying to cater to the desires of both parties. The Annan plan provided for political equality of the constituent states. It provided for a presidential council with four Greek Cypriot and two Turkish Cypriot members, which would serve like a collective presidency and at least one member from each community was required to cast an affirmative vote for resolutions to be carried. Likewise, in the federal senate, votes of one-fourth of each community’s members would be required to pass legislation. The Annan plan also provided for a supreme court whose membership would consist of three members from each community in addition to three international judges.

On the issues of the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to the north and the presence of mainland Turks in the Turkish north, the Annan plan provided for an incremental approach. About half of the Greek Cypriots would immediately return to the north, while the remainder would return later. Concerning Greek Cypriot-owned land, the plan provided that only one-third would be subject to restitution, while for the remaining two-thirds, compensation would be paid. The plan allowed 45,000 Turkish mainlanders -- a small fraction of their current population -- to remain. Turkey’s military forces would be withdrawn incrementally, while the treaties of alliance and guarantee would remain in force.

These very same clauses were cause for concern for Nicosia. Many Greek Cypriots thought that they violated three freedoms: freedoms of movement, property and settlement. The preservation of the Treaty of Guarantee and quasi veto rights to be granted to the Turkish Cypriot community were particularly difficult to digest for the Nicosia government led by hard-liner Papadopoulos. The latter was especially bothered by the stipulation of gradual withdrawal of Turkey’s armed forces while the Nicosia government would be required to dissolve immediately after the signing of an agreement.

Greek Cypriot disincentive

Another disincentive for Greek Cypriots was that the island -- represented by Nicosia -- was to join the EU irrespective of the results of the referendum on the Annan plan. Many in the south opposed the plan because they thought that after unilaterally joining the EU, Nicosia’s hand would be strengthened against Ankara and Lefkoşa. Another reason for the unpopularity of the plan was the fact that the “no camp” had campaigned against the plan for one-and-a-half years while the “yes camp” awaited the final version of the Annan plan to emerge. This reduced the “yes campaign” to just one month before the referendum on April 24, 2004. Clerides’ Democratic Rally (DISY) and George Vasiliou’s United Democrats (EDI) could only do so much in support of the plan. Papadopoulos’ coalition partner Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and socialist Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) joining the “no faction” did not help either. Greece, for its part, implemented its traditional policy of “Cyprus decides, Greece accepts,” which bolstered Papadopoulos’ stance. Hence, it was not surprising that while 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted “yes” for the plan, a resounding 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected it. Six days later, on May 1, 2004, Nicosia smoothly joined the EU, after which the acquis communautaire was suspended in the north. The irony was not lost on Turkish Cypriots who had approved reunification.

Reasons for strong Turkish Cypriot support for the plan include the incumbent AK Party’s effective support for it. Many islanders indicated that Ankara’s clout is such that many Turkish Cypriots take their cue from the latter on important issues. Hence many who opposed the plan voted in favor of it. The pro-plan campaign of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), which came to power as part of a coalition government with the Democrat Party (DP) after the December 2003 elections, also swayed many Turkish Cypriots’ voters into casting yes votes. The popularity of the Annan plan and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat was such that his CTP won the February 2005 general elections in a landslide, receiving 45 percent of the vote. The momentum gained before the general elections carried over to the presidential election, which Talat won easily in April 2005.

Yet, although the EU and the UN praised the Turkish Cypriot vote in favor of the Annan plan and promised various rewards, they delivered little. The UN secretary-general called for the lifting of economic sanctions on Lefkoşa, which fell on deaf ears. The European Council had promised 259 million euros to the KKTC in 2002 in the event of reunification and, after the latter’s favorable vote on the Annan plan, wanted to make this sum available to Lefkoşa anyway. Yet Nicosia’s objections led the council to restrict the use of the earmarked amount to Turkish Cypriot privately owned -- as opposed to public -- properties, thus effectively reducing the usable aid to 20 percent of 259 million euros.

As a token of its appreciation of the yes vote of Turkish Cypriots, the EU sanctioned the free movement throughout the island of native KKTC citizens. Although acquis communautaire was suspended in the KKTC, the latter’s citizens acquired EU passports as well. The KKTC citizens who originate from mainland Turkey were excluded from these arrangements. Yet the EU failed to approve Lefkoşa’s demand that KKTC goods should be exported through Turkish Cypriot ports. Instead the former stipulated that KKTC citizens should export goods to the EU through ports in the Greek Cypriot south after acquiring export certificates from the latter’s authorities. Since dependence on Greek Cypriot institutions is neither practical nor reliable, most KKTC businessmen avoid using southern ports.

Even though Turkish Cypriots failed to benefit nearly as much as the southerners from EU subsidies, economic growth in the KKTC in the mid-2000s averaged 10-12 percent due to the rapid expansion of the building sector and high economic growth rates in Turkey, with whose economy the KKTC is largely integrated. Many KKTC citizens work in southern Cyprus, augmenting the north’s economic growth with their income. Moreover, Nicosia chose to make universal health care and education facilities available to native Turkish Cypriots, which the latter began to take advantage of.

[1] For reasons of convenience, I refer to the Greek Cypriot government as “Nicosia” and the Turkish Cypriot government as “Lefkoşa.”

[2] See: Süha Bölükbaşı, “The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1954-1996,” International Journal of Middle East Studies,” Vol. 30 (1998).

[3] For justice and respect concepts see: Rebecca Bryant, “Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus,” (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 218-219.