
His distress stemmed from the fact that in his party’s parliamentary group’s previous meetings he had made far-reaching assurances about the “anti-reactionaryism action plan.” Actually, Baykal had avoided making any remarks about the plan for three days after it was exposed to the public on June 12 and he said he was waiting for things to become clearer.
Then, his first comment was, “If the document is authentic, it is much more scandalous,” further emphasizing that everything would be discussed when it became clear whether document was fake or authentic. However, the CHP leader opted to turn a deaf ear to the developments proving the authenticity of the document and he so obsessively believed it was fake that he made assertive remarks and challenges about it.
Noting that if the document is fake, this would prove the existence of the activities aiming to discredit the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), Baykal initially made the following assessment: “If somebody prepared such a harsh, cruel, destructive and hostile plan that is detached from reality, if its falsehood is substantiated, then we must ask who those who prepared it are. Where do they get their strength? Who gave them the opportunities and facilities that would enable them to set up such a big conspiracy, such great national disorder? We will discuss these questions if it is proved.”
Eventually, the TSK accepted that the document was authentic and all eyes turned on Baykal. He might not have spoken about the developments exhaustively, but he still might have made a short assessment. But he did not. Perhaps, he couldn’t. He left unanswered the questions voiced by journalists. Indeed, he failed to maintain his objectivity during the process. He associated “the new stage that the Turkish democracy may enter” with the falsity of the document and he failed to take into account the possibility of its authenticity.
Speaking about the anti-reactionaryism action plan, which the Taraf newspaper had brought to agenda, during his party’s parliamentary group meeting on June 16, 2009, referring to it as the “plan to finish off the AK Party [Justice and Development Party] and [Fethullah] Gülen,” Baykal had said: “If it is found out that such a document did not actually exist within or outside the General Staff and that it is fake, then it will serve as a big opportunity for the new stage that Turkish democracy may enter. But if it is found that it is authentic, then we must evaluate everything from the start. Everyone must be prepared for all possibilities. If this possibility is true, then we must question everything, including many incidents that happened in the past, the statements made, the relations established and the course set for the country. After this point, the games played in Turkey will be exposed with the utmost clarity. Those responsible for them can be called to account. Even if they are not called to account, then we and the whole world will know who did not call them to account and why.”
Since then he has made countless jokes about the action plan and has tried to send the message that this plan and those that were exposed later were all “fake.” Initially he asked, “Where are the originals of these plans?” and when their originals emerged, he questioned why the originals were not exposed four months ago. Everyone, including the whistle-blowing officers who leaked the documents, the Postal and Telecommunications General Directorate (PTT), the Council of Forensic Medicine (ATK) and forensic experts had their share of Baykal’s severe criticism. But, Baykal never asked, “How could such a document be prepared?” Finally, the worst happened for the CHP leader when the TSK admitted that the document is authentic. It was truly a rough day for Baykal.
It is almost certain that Turkey will hold a referendum this summer. The opposition parties are opposed to the referendum in which judicial reforms will be on voted and it is almost equally certain that they will try to use it as an opportunity to “get rid of the ruling AK Party.” The AK Party, on the other hand, calculates that the judicial reforms will be accepted by the majority of the electorate irrespective of their political preferences, and is sure that the CHP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) bloc will not be able to convince voters to say “no” to them.
The ruling party is only hesitant about whether the package will be able to secure the support of 330 deputies in Parliament. Relying only on its 336 deputies will naturally trigger debates about whether some AK Party deputies will refrain from supporting the package. In order to avert such a possibility, it is felt necessary to secure the support of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Still, as it has to avoid any attack that the CHP-MHP bloc might launch against it by saying that only the AK Party and the BDP, of which either they or their predecessors have been subject to closure cases in the past, supported the package, the AK Party held talks with the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and some independent deputies. There is now bargaining going on about the election threshold.
The AK Party does not want to lower it, citing considerations about political stability, and instead offers to introduce 100 seats to represent the whole country. The bargaining is hard, but the sides are close to an agreement. Meanwhile, a jurist, a scholarly friend of mine, made the following assessment about the leader oligarchy: “Turkey will surely be able to carry out the judicial reforms. There will be no problem during the parliamentary or referendum stage. My main concern is that this might further entrench the leader oligarchy. The current system ensures that political parties can identify who will be nominated to Parliament. None of the existing leaders are inclined to share this power. Otherwise, before the referendum, the Political Parties Law and the Election Law could be amended to give greater latitude to deputies. I hope that Turkish democracy will overcome this problem without much delay.”
It may be a simple matter in itself, but it may have important implications about which deputies from the ruling party may refrain from supporting the nearing judicial reform. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not want to risk anything as the party is slightly over the 330-deputy threshold required for taking the constitutional amendments to a referendum, and he may be more inclined than ever to giving the go-ahead for moves such as the lowering of the election threshold. Indeed, any calculation about the number of the AK Party deputies who might say “no” to the reform shows that it is very risky for the ruling party to rely solely on its own deputies. One of such deputy is AK Party Ankara Deputy Zekai Özcan. He is known to be a close friend of Interior Minister Beşir Atalay and a series of interesting developments has reduced his connection to the AK Party to almost none.
It all started with the traffic police conducting a check in Elmadağ district of Ankara. Özcan told the police officers that he did not want to waste much time and asked them to be quick. However, he forgot to mention that he is a deputy. One of the police officers replied, “Have you burst with impatience, man?” Özcan responded to the police office with the same harshness and he was taken to the police station on the grounds of insulting a police officer on duty. Özcan realized that this would waste much more time and revealed that he is a deputy. However, the police officers did not believe him and made fun of him. Özcan called Interior Minister Atalay and ask him to punish the police officers. Atalay transferred the police officers to different positions, but this was not enough to satisfy Özcan. He made insistent requests to Atalay, which went unanswered, and this eventually strained their friendship. Therefore, Özcan sided with the CHP and voted “yes” in a motion of censure.
He was actually also very close to the prime minister and he was even expected to become the labor minister, but he cooperated with the opposition, which is not a simple matter in today’s politics. It is a small development and it may put an end to one’s political life. Of course, he is likely to be forgiven or change his party.
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