In this piece, the accountability of military organizations will be investigated. Special attention will be given to the accountability of military organizations in Turkey. There are two main reasons for the choice of this topic. The first one is that the recent prosecution of some retired and active duty military personnel in Turkey has drawn great national and international concern. The second one is that there is ambiguity over whether the Turkish Parliament and government have any role in military accountability in Turkey.
Accountability is defined as “a concept of responsibility, answerability, blameworthiness, liability and other terms associated with the expectation of account-giving.” In short, accountability means holding the military responsible, answerable, accepting blame, liable and ready to give account. The military in any democratic society is held accountable for any of its actions.
When one investigates the accountability of the Turkish military, one will see that there is a system of accountability that is very much bureaucratic (administrative accountability) and internal. It does not provide any information to interested external observers. For example, the system has military courts, and their judges and prosecutors are also military personnel who are subject to the hierarchy of the military. There is an argument that this may prevent their judgment from being independent on certain issues. However, their spending is examined by the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) under the rules of their accounting system.
Obviously the court of accounts has limited authority on this particular issue, that is, merely approval. If one compares it with the Western system, one discovers there is a completely different mechanism. For example, in the US these mechanisms -- including oversight by congressional committees and political appointees in the executive branch, vigilance by interest groups, lobbying, investigative reporting by the news media, independent analysis by public-interest organizations and whistle-blowing -- provide additional avenues of accountability. Legislative oversight, in particular, provides an important means of extending broad discretion to organizational managers while maintaining public accountability. A similar system exists in the UK, which investigates in such high-visibility issues as weapon system acquisition, fratricidal combat casualties, aircraft-safety investigations, sexual-harassment investigations and flag officer promotions. These issues are investigated by external bodies including parliament, committees and other authorized people.
Why is it important to control the military? There are many reasons, and some of them will be highlighted here. One is that the main role of the military is to be ready for war and to be the guardian of the safety, security and protection of its citizens against external threats. Decisions on war are made by parliament. In the Turkish case, the government does not have enough knowledge of whether the military is adequately equipped, trained and ready for war. There is a member of the Cabinet who is supposedly responsible for the military but who has no authority to draw up policies for defense and the modernization of the military. This may not create a problem, but it also poses a great danger to the government and society as whole if its military forces do not share the same threat perceptions. In a democratic society this is of particular concern because the military represents the most physically destructive power of the state.
Secondly, a government should ensure that the main requirement of its military forces is obeying laws, regulations, rules, orders and instructions. If this is not the case, then the military is “weakened by a breakdown in discipline on every level in the chain of command.” It is assumed that lack of this kind of control in Turkey led some (now retired) generals from the Turkish military to engage in preparing a military coup against the government during their time in service. In a democratic society, there is the existence of a social contract which could be defined as “military personnel sign a contract with society and assume certain duties and accept the limitations of certain rights.” If there is a breach of this contract, this means that there is a lack of good governance on defense issues, [and] the degree of commitment will be affected. The recent prosecutions of retired and other military personnel clearly prove that the social contract between the military and society was violated a long time ago. The Turkish forces had been planning a military coup rather than preparing themselves for a war. Finally, governments are “accountable to their citizens to ensure that its armed forces are prepared to defend the community.” This forces any government to exercise its powers wisely and ensure that it's military has been adequately prepared; that is its duty. Otherwise, the country and its citizens are not protected against any enemy.
In light of the three military coups d'état against governments during the republic's history, there are three conclusions:
a) Turkish society has a right to expect its government to exercise its power and ensure that the military has been prepared and equipped according to society's demands and interests. In other words, the government should hold accountable its military personnel who have overall responsibility for the military. Otherwise, the nation holds the government accountable.
b) Lack of accountability in the Turkish military causes problems. They decide what is good or bad for the country without asking or consulting either the elected parliament or the government. How do they know what the best way of serving society and the country is? For example, is it necessary to recruit more than 1 million military personnel for Turkey's security? Other countries that have similar-sized populations to Turkey have 300,000 military members.
c) The Turkish Parliament and government should begin exercising their power on every action of the military, from recruitment to training, from drawing up strategy to buying equipment. Otherwise, the national resources of Turkey will continue to be wasted and some members of the military will continue preparing other plans for possible military coups against the government. It is assumed that the highlighted points will open the way to democracy.
*Dr. Bekir Çınar is a lecturer at Epoka University, Albania.
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