Wahhabism in the Balkans: threat to regional stability? (II)
by
Hajrudin Somun*

First, how did the expansion of such a backward ideology, totally alien to the traditional forms of Balkan Muslims religious observance, tolerance and pro-Western orientation happen so quickly in the region?

One of the reasons could be the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of communism as well as the social distress and calamity caused by war. In that regard, a similarity could be drawn with developments in Chechnya and the wider Caucasus area. Answers can also be found in the inadequate and irresolute reaction by the official Islamic communities to the appearance and activity of Wahhabism. These communities did not dare openly condemn Wahhabis, probably because both sides were provided financial and other kinds of help from the same sources (financial support through various charitable organizations, free pilgrimages to Mecca and, above all, free scholarships to study at Saudi universities). Instead, the official leadership of the Islamic communities condemns Muslim intellectuals who oppose the increasing activity of the Wahhabis.

Are all Wahhabis terrorists?

Second, is it fair to speak of all Wahhabis as terrorists? They are very easily lumped together with the al-Qaeda network and terrorism investigations everywhere in the world. Due to their image and way of life they are also easily denigrated and connected to completely distinct groups such as the Taliban. Wahhabis ideologically belong to the wider al-Qaeda movement, this much is obvious; but their practical aims and methods are different. First of all, their major targets are moderate and secular Muslims, and much less adherents to Christianity and other religions. This we can term the map of their activity. They sometimes refrain from contact with non-Muslims, even if cooperation would help other Muslims. For example, during the 1990s some Wahhabi mosques in America refused help from some local churches wanting to send aid to Bosnian Muslims. Their appearance and behavior sets Wahhabis totally apart from the executors of Osama bin Laden’s orders, and it would be unimaginable to see them participating in the worldwide sophisticated al-Qaeda operations.

The majority of Wahhabis aim to change Muslim societies through missionary preaching (da’wah), but a good part of them still want to do it through violence. Their violent acts mostly include physical disturbances and beating, as was the case in Macedonia and Kosovo or at a gathering of the gay community in Sarajevo. Even if only preaching, it is often charged with potential violence. “They express their convictions with violence, introduce anarchy in mosques and preach intolerance,” says Jasmin Merdan, a young Bosniak who, after abandoning a Wahhabi group a few years ago, wrote a book about them. The book was “warmly welcomed by imams who do not dare to speak,” but the author himself was exposed to pressure and death threats from Wahhabis. A 23-year-old Bosniak who was indoctrinated with Wahhabism killed his mother because she refused to join him for morning prayers. And Nusret Imamovic, the self-proclaimed leader of the Wahhabis in Gornja Maoca, said on his Web site that suicide attacks are not forbidden by Islam but that they should be used only in “exceptional circumstances.”

Third, did the Bosnian and other Balkan Muslims benefit by the Wahhabi influx to the region? Almost not at all, except for some financial support to poor families whose sons accepted Wahhabi teachings. Even during the war, the Wahhabis preferred to stay in the rear lines and, together with Bosniak ideologues, “drove into the faith” many secular and “not Muslim enough” fighters who joined the Bosnian army. They were doing the same in far-flung villages. Together with other foreign mujahideen soldiers they slaughtered several Serb prisoners of war and villagers, later distributing videos about their “jihadist heroism.” Gen. Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnian army at the time, is today paying for their crimes in The Hague tribunal’s prison. They also considerably contributed to the widespread notions in Western countries that the Bosnian army was fighting to establish an Islamic state in the heart of Europe.

Wahhabis continue to             harm Balkan Muslims

Such assumptions became even stronger after the war, assuming a new, terrorist aspect after Sept. 11. Wahhabis, as has been seen from their recent actions and behavior, continue to do great harm to Bosnian, Kosovar, Sandzak, Montenegrin and Macedonian Muslims as well as to their countries. They do it by their deeds and not by their long beards, short trousers and prayers because in a democratic civil society all citizens have the right to look different from others, to practice their faith and to express their ideas.

It is, however, most difficult to reply to the question does Wahhabism represent a real threat to the Balkans’ stability and future development?

Judging by Rasim Ljajic, the only Muslim member of the Serbian government, it does not. He might be right regarding Serbia because the Sandzak Muslims have been made a real minority in the country and are divided among themselves. At a seminar in Prishtinë the American segment of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) organized three years ago for high-ranking domestic police officers, a US representative said that “Wahhabism is on the rise in Kosovo and in five years Kosovo will become the most significant stronghold of this Islamic sect in Europe.” Kosovo still has a few years left before being “flooded” by that sect. Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, an expert on “radical Islam in the Balkans,” said in a recent interview, “In my opinion, the problem is currently worst in Macedonia, where Wahhabis have real control over the Islamic Community, while those who are not Wahhabis are mistreated and attacked.”

The situation in Macedonia could be a proper illustration of Balkan Wahhabism as “currency for the settling of accounts” of still unclear higher international interests. Darko Tanaskovic, the Serbian Orientalist and former ambassador to Turkey, was right when he asked why Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman only warned Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski in Skopje at the beginning of January that the Balkans, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, are a future breeding ground and stronghold for al-Qaeda. Alarmed by such a provocative statement, Bosnian Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj, himself a Jew, had to telephone his Israeli colleague to strongly deny his assessments in Skopje. Furthermore, Lieberman choose to shoot an arrow through the alleged Islamic terrorist threat in the Balkans at a time of worsening relations between Israel and Turkey, and just when Turkish conciliatory engagement in the region is being treated as neo-Ottomanism (which could also be read as neo-Islamism).

Due to its highly complicated political situation, Bosnia and Herzegovina might be observed from the broader international and regional angle and from its internal tensions and divisions. Dennis Blair, director of US National Intelligence, said on Feb. 2 that “events in the Balkans will again pose the principal challenges to stability in Europe in 2010” and that “violence could flare up in Bosnia and in the South Caucasus.”

The spectacular police raid on the small village of Gornja Maoca, conducted that same day, might thus have a wider meaning than the arrest of a handful of bearded Wahhabis. It might be a warning to Bosnian Serb leaders and to their foreign sponsors in Serbia and Russia to abandon their designs of making their entity, Republika Srpska, independent from Bosnia and Herzegovina or even a part of Serbia. 

For if that operation was aimed only at eradicating an alleged “terrorist cell of Islamic radicals,” leaving in the meantime Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to continue his destructive policy, Bosnians worried about the future of their country will be extremely disappointed. Or, as was stressed by Zija Dizdarevic in Oslobodjenje: “The systematic threats to the constitutional order and the territorial integrity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina have over the last four years been coming from its entity of Republika Srpska -- threats that have an immeasurably more dangerous potential than the salafi [Wahhabi] one.”

Finally, if I am to answer the question of whether Wahhabism represents a threat to the stability of the Balkans, I would agree with Kenneth Morrison, who studied the regional presence of that extremist Islamic branch much more deeply than myself and who said, “It is not a real, but an imagined threat.” And what is imagined might have various dimensions and possibilities. In any case, it should not be ignored, but neither should it be exaggerated.

*Hajrudin Somun is the former ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Turkey and a lecturer of the history of diplomacy at Philip Noel-Baker International University in Sarajevo.