
“It came too late. Believe me, I've been waiting for it for years. People who are involved in shady business always come together, but the victims' families do not,” she told Today's Zaman for Monday Talk, referring to the recent gathering of the “deep family” of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who was fatally shot by an ultranationalist teenager outside the Agos weekly in 2007. The Dink family's supporters are referencing the "deep state," which is believed to have played a role in Dink's murder. They demanded that no secrets remain.
‘People who are involved in shady business always come together, but the victims' families do not. The climate in Turkey is finally allowing solidarity among the families of such victims who were murdered for political motivation. This is a very positive process that allows us to feel each other's pain' |
“We are the ‘deep' family of Hrant Dink,” said Filiz Ali, daughter of the great Turkish poet Sabahattin Ali, who was murdered in 1948 while trying to flee the country after serving time in prison for insulting Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
İpekçi said all of these murders are connected and that denying this is not just a matter of having a different opinion. She said she dislikes attending ceremonies at the grave of her well-known uncle Abdi İpekçi, who was assassinated in 1979.
“The dynamics behind the extrajudicial killings are related to the dynamics that created Ergenekon. Not believing in this fact is not just a matter of having a different opinion, but it is somewhat about being involved in all that shady business, or not having enough knowledge about what’s going on. This act of denial makes me think that some people are shedding false tears for İpekçi,” she said.
Leyla İpekçi, a writer who questions peace, war and identity Having studied sociology at Boğaziçi University, she worked at various newspapers and magazines as a correspondent, an editor and a writer. She wrote columns for the Radikal and Zaman dailies and now writes for Taraf. She has also contributed to long screenplays. She received the Writers’ Union of Turkey 2007 award in the area of press-opinion. Her first novel, “Maya,” received its first award in 1998 from the Milliyet Arts Magazine. She released her latest novel, “Başkası Olduğun Yer” (The Place Where You Become the Other), in 2005. Apart from this, she has had essays published in 2007 and is now working on a new novel. |
The voices of the families of victims who were killed for political motivations are being heard today more than before. One demonstration of that was the 12th hearing of the trial related to Hrant Dink’s murder. We saw relatives of prominent figures who were assassinated stand in solidarity with the Dink family. What is your evaluation of that picture, which made it to the front pages of newspapers last week? You were not there, but were you there emotionally?
Of course. I usually go to the hearings of the Dink case, but could not make it this time. All of these murders are connected somehow. When you talk about extrajudicial killings, you cannot put the Kurdish issue aside; when you talk about the murder of Hrant Dink, you cannot ignore the Ergenekon case; and when you make mention of the Ergenekon case, you cannot leave political murders out. They run parallel and are interconnected.
Were you expecting such a show of solidarity?
It came too late. Believe me, I’ve been waiting for it for years. People who are involved in shady business always come together, but the victims’ families do not. The climate in Turkey finally allows for solidarity among the families of victims who were murdered for political motivations. This is a very positive process that allows us to feel each other’s pain.
What factors do you think allowed for this climate in the country?
There are a lot of factors, including different circumstances in the world, changing US policies, a changing class structure in Turkish society, a desire by this government to do a little more in that regard compared to past governments, and so on. But in summary, we can say that too many injustices have been swept under the rug in Turkey. However, crimes don’t stay under cover forever. A statute of limitations exists in law, but not in people’s desire to seek justice. This is a matter that pertains to one’s conscience. Too much blood has been shed based on injustice in this country. Some institutions did not reveal the facts behind those horrifying murders. It is wrong to blame all institutions in that regard, too, but some deep state elements in the military and state bureaucracy have long tried to do that and were not punished. Since the responsible people behind the cover-ups were not tried, their power has grown. The Ergenekon case is the first time that there is a trial in that regard. The Susurluk incident was also important for uncovering the truth.
You indicated in one of your articles that you have had first-hand experience when it comes to what has been going on in society and that this is how you understand the changes taking place. Can you please elaborate on that?
If I had not lived to see how Hrant Dink’s sentences were misrepresented in some publications, I could have said Dink should not have said terrible things. A reason was created for his murder to justify it. It was false and it was slander. People who are involved in shady business find justifications for such horrible acts. I can say that a similar maneuvering of the public opinion took place in the Feb. 28 period. I lived through it. And some retired officials started to admit that they had had plans for social engineering, such as the shameful ones that were put into practice during the Sept. 6-7 [1955] events. There have been several painful incidents in Turkey’s past, including the May 1 events of 1977, events in Çorum and Maraş in which Turkey’s Alevi and Sunni citizens were involved in bloody clashes. We knew that something shady was going on behind those incidents but were never able to prove it. Now the process which almost started with the murder of Hrant Dink and the Ergenekon trial have helped us put all of those incidents into context. This is natural because people need justice. But we are at the start of a long process, and we are suffering from not knowing each other’s pain.
‘Kurdish politicians of BDP need to have inclusive arguments’ Talking about confrontation and pain, the Kurdish issue comes to mind. There was an initiative by the government, but where is it going? It does not seem to be going anywhere. When the nationalist and staunchly Kemalist opposition was talking about the initiative, they accused the government of dividing the people into two groups: Turks and Kurds. They also accused the government of destroying the brotherhood between the two groups. But, unfortunately, this brotherhood was alive only under the condition that even the letter “K” for “Kurd” is not said out loud. How do you evaluate the closure of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP)? There were a lot of acts of the DTP that led to its closure, but it was still a political decision by the court, and it was unfair. They established another party [the Freedom and Democracy Party (BDP)]. Their language, which has remained almost the same for 30 years, will also change. Just as the Justice and Development Party [AK Party] has to be more democratic and the Republican People’s Party [CHP] has to understand the dynamics of society more, Kurdish politicians also need to have arguments that are more inclusive. |
What did you observe during the Feb. 28 process?
I was a journalist at the time and did not believe what some of the publications and officials were saying. They plotted to force the government to resign. For example, a group was created called the Aczimendis. I was working at Hürriyet at the time and saw how cameramen and photographers were arranged to follow the [radical Islamist] Aczimendi group on the streets [to inject fear in society as part of a plan to topple the government]. It turned out that they were paid by shady groups to act as radical Islamists. As a result of the Feb. 28 process, religious people have been victimized just as leftists were victimized in the Sept. 12, 1980 coup. We have not settled our past accounts in that regard.
You come from the Doğan Media Group. Do you think the mentality of some of the Doğan media bosses, who seemed to have collaborated with elements of the deep state to present a terrifying picture in the Feb. 28 process, is still same?
This is hard to know. There are people who changed their minds and there are people who did not. I engage in heated debates with people about these issues. This is a struggle. What I can do is witness and record them. Also, groups are not homogenous. For example, at the Aktüel magazine, I worked with intellectuals such as Alper Görmüş and Alev Er, both of whom are open minded and question information that is presented to them. I believe things will change in the long term even though I sometimes lose hope in the medium term.
What makes you lose hope?
I can give you an example from a recent conversation. Writer Elif Şafak and artist Teoman were discussing the attitude of Turkish youth on a television program. While the former was saying that youth is promising and inquiring, the latter was saying the opposite. Indeed, both are true. This is a dynamic society that has been going through different dimensions at the same time. But as I said, we have not settled our old accounts yet. We are at a stage at which we want to voice our thoughts on whatever issue we find ourselves to be correct on. But we have to go through that stage, too, though this will take a long time. This is a painful process. It was not easy in Italy or Spain, either.
In one of your recent articles you spoke about why you dislike attending the ceremonies at the grave of your uncle Abdi İpekçi, who was assassinated in 1979. Can you tell us a bit more about this?
Some of the people who repeatedly defended the idea in the media that Ergenekon was a lie, that this government cannot solve any problems and who oppose the Kurdish opening were there mourning. We cannot separate those issues from each other. The dynamics behind extrajudicial killings are related to the dynamics that created Ergenekon. Not believing in this fact is not just a matter of having a different opinion; it is about being somewhat involved in all that shady business or not having enough knowledge about what is going on. This act of denial makes me think that some people are shedding false tears for İpekçi.
As you point out, all these political murders were perceived as separate incidents that occurred independently of one other.
That’s why I consider those tears at the cemetery to be crocodile tears. People who mourn today did nothing to contribute to the revelation of facts and the discovery of who was responsible for İpekçi’s murder. As a result, the case exceeded the statute of limitations and was closed. The most important thing is justice. Filiz Ali [the daughter of assassinated writer Sabahattin Ali] made an interesting point when she said prior to the Dink trial that the society will talk much about how damaging it is to institutions whenever there are allegations of wrongdoing or documents revealing misconduct by state institutions.
You say that motivations for political murders are interrelated, but do you think there is enough support from the Kurdish people for the Ergenekon trial to resolve unsolved extrajudicial killings?
When I wrote my recent articles about the issue, most of the e-mails I got came from Kurds. They shared my thoughts on İpekçi’s murder. We may not be able to reach a conclusion from a sociological point of view regarding this, but I attach great importance to these acts of empathy because some writers who consider themselves leftists tried tirelessly to categorize the İpekçi family as white, secular and upper-class elite. They therefore thought the İpekçi family would have a strict secular, elitist and strict leftist stance. But it was not like that. We learn from Abdi İpekçi’s letters that he was accused and vilified by leftists because he was trying to present the views of the people of the right in the newspaper.
I personally have had to fight against this view, which was used to create enemies of the İpekçis. And İpekçi’s enemies tried to justify his murder by referring to his roots.
What do you think was the motivation behind this?
There was a need to develop an ideology to keep neo-nationalism alive among the economically rising religious class. We see that this was partly being done by so-called investigative journalists who might be involved in Ergenekon. They are now being tried as part of the Ergenekon case. The İpekçis were alone in the past when they were at the gates of the courts seeking justice. There were times when they did not have enough money to survive, but no one knew about it. It’s different now. We have public support. I don’t trust politics, but I do trust the public and its common sense. Some people ask me why I support religious women in their fight to be free to wear headscarves. My response is that only fighting for the rights of each other will free us.
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