Does Turkey want to open its common border with Armenia?
by
Aline Ozinian*

Under Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution, any international treaty or protocol that the Armenian Parliament ratifies should be in compliance with the Armenian Constitution, and it is the constitutional court that decides on this compliance. The constitutional court assessed the protocols based on the country’s constitution and decided that they comply with it. The procedure for sending the protocols to parliament is being implemented, and the protocols are not “annotated.” The points that are viewed as “annotations” are detailed explanations as to the court’s decision on constitutional compliance.

That constitution is the same constitution which has been in force since 1995, and it has not been amended “specifically” for the protocols. The Declaration of Independence of Armenia was the document signed by Levon Ter-Petrossian, who is loved by and known to the Turkish press as “a friend of Turkey,” on Aug. 23, 1990, before Turkey recognized Armenia’s independence in 1991. Well, what does Article 5 of the Armenian constitutional court’s decision say? “The protocols cannot contradict the Armenian Constitution and Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia.” Paragraph 11 provides for the Republic of Armenia to lend support to the efforts for the international recognition of the 1915 incidents in the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

Turkey obviously does not like this article, but was it added “secretly” to the Declaration of Independence after Oct. 10, or were Turkish Foreign Ministry and government officials not aware of this document when they went to Zurich? Or did they assume that after the signing of the protocols, the “poor” Armenians would forget about genocide or tear up the declaration since it is not liked by their neighbors? Those who can read diplomacy correctly know well that the process was not halted by the Armenian constitutional court’s decision on the protocol’s conformity with the constitution but by the Turkish government, which expects a “concrete” development with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Aside from the strangeness of the negative perception of the constitutional conformity decision, it is unfortunate for Turkey to try to gain time by ensuring its “unofficial” prerequisite -- which is actually official, but was not reflected in the protocols. Murat Mercan, a senior member of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the head of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, said: “It does not make any difference technically or politically to keep the protocols pending at a parliamentary commission or to withdraw them. We will continue to act in compliance with our responsibilities toward our country and the Azerbaijani people and with the prestige of Turkey.” I wonder if the protocols would not be kept pending at the commission if Armenia had not made such a decision? Was it that Turkey was playing well, but it was Armenia that first refused to play?

There are problems between the two countries, and this is the reason why these protocols “which everyone can interpret according to his or her own wishes” were signed under the supervision of “big brothers.” It was because the formula -- of opening the common border, establishing diplomatic relations, thereby automatically recognizing the common border and removing major concerns, preparing the general public for peace and solving other issues slowly -- was readily accepted.

If we ask why parliamentary approval was needed to open the common border between Turkey and Armenia or to establish diplomatic relations, we understand that it was needed just for this reason: to introduce delays to the process or find an excuse for our failure -- such as saying that we did everything but parliament had the final say. The Turkish side stresses their concern about the involvement of intermediary institutions -- referring to the constitutional court -- but there is no “intermediary institution,” and the court is part of the process of obtaining parliamentary ratification. The Turkish prime minister’s statements give the impression that he is not addressing a country with which dialogue has been started, but instead intends to bring the entire process to a halt. Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian phoned his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoğlu, asking: “I could not quite understand how you assessed the decision this way. Where is a prerequisite in this decision?” If only Nalbandian had made the call when Davutoğlu delivered a speech in Parliament in which he said, “The territorial integrity of Nagorno-Karabakh is as precious as our own land,” and asked, “So you said ‘There was no prerequisite’?”

Uneasy with the situation, Davutoğlu spoke with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by phone, and while the exact wording of the call is unknown, it appears that a request was made that some pressure be applied to Armenia by the US. Philip H. Gordon, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, on the other hand, said: “We see the court decision as a positive step toward the ratification of the protocols that seek reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. The court decision does not give the impression it limits the protocols or is legally binding.”

As part of a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev recently came together in Sochi. In this meeting, the first this year and the fourth held with the participation of Medvedev, the current status of negotiations for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and future plans were discussed. In this respect, one wonders if the prerequisite that Turkey so loudly voices, although it was not made part of the protocols, has already been met with a bilateral preliminary agreement. The sides have concluded negotiations for pulling out from five regions, but does Turkey still not feel ready to open the common border with Armenia? Is it time to voice new prerequisites? Will we wait for Turkey to throw in new conditions such as “Armenia should stop demanding the international recognition of the genocide” and “Armenia should declare that it recognizes the Treaty of Kars”? Or were these protocols never intended to solve these problems? Before Turkey ratifies these protocols in Parliament -- and Turkey stresses that a similar point will not be reached any time in the near future -- let us test our conscience. Does Turkey really want the common border to be opened?

*Aline Ozinian is a researcher in the field of Turkology.