Armenia tells diaspora:
We didn’t sell the country
by
SİNAN OĞAN*

Following the justified decision the Armenian Constitutional Court announced on Jan. 12, 2010, it became clear that the Yerevan administration was disinclined for real peace in the region and attempted to make a move and launch an operation against Turkey by way of the court. In an interesting “political” decision, the Armenian Constitutional Court determined that, in the final analysis, the protocols were compatible with the constitution; however, it issued a reasoned decision stating that the implementation of some items could not conflict with the Armenian Constitution and the 1991 Armenian Declaration of Independence.

With this decision, which cannot be appealed or revised by government decree, the Armenian Constitutional Court basically rewrote the protocols that were signed by Turkey and Armenia, with the US, Russia, France, the EU and Switzerland as witnesses during the signing ceremony. The reasoned decision not only abolished everything Turkey achieved in the protocols but also formalized some provisions against Turkey which the Armenian government did not have the courage to openly introduce.

First of all, Armenia turned its rejection of Turkey’s Nagorno-Karabakh condition to open borders into a constitutional court decision. Second, by noting that “genocide” is undisputable for Armenians, the court determined that the joint history commission mentioned in the “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and the “Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations” is against the Armenian Constitution and that a commission can therefore not be set up. Moreover, with this decision the court underlined that it will continue accusing Turkey of “genocide,” which is referred to in the Armenian Declaration of Independence. Third, by stating that the “March 16, 1921 Treaty of Moscow and the Oct. 13, 1921 Treaty of Kars is invalid,” it abolishes Turkey’s gains in these protocols as well. The decision also disregards agreements that affirm Turkey’s right as a guarantor of Nakhchivan’s status and Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Lastly, it stipulates that the fifth item in the protocols about Turkey’s eastern Anatolian region (and partially southeast Anatolia) cannot contradict provisions of the preamble to the Armenian Constitution and the requirements of paragraph 11 of its Declaration of Independence.

With this decision, the Armenian Constitutional Court is expressing that it does not recognize Turkey’s borders and is demanding land from Turkey. In the wake of this Armenian move, Ankara immediately showed its discontent and the Foreign Ministry made an announcement stating that “the decision in question has preconditions and restrictive provisions which are contrary to the letter and spirit of the protocols.” Turkey launched initiatives demanding assurances from the Armenian government and the international community that the Armenian Constitutional Court’s ruling is invalid. That said, it is clear that the court’s ruling that the protocols are “compatible with the constitution” and its efforts to make the same demands and classic accusations against Turkey by virtually rewriting the protocols in its reasoned decision are Yerevan’s attempts to make another move over Turkey.

Why and how did Armenia, which is in an economically difficult position in the region, which has suffered a major population decline (currently at 1.8 million people) and which faces a power balance that is working in favor of its biggest rival, Azerbaijan, enter this path? What does Armenia seek to achieve with this move? Until now, the lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was always shown as the biggest obstacle to the approval of the protocols. Turkey’s Nagorno-Karabakh precondition and the global pressure over Armenia to fulfill the condition placed Armenia in a tight spot. But with this move Armenia made via the constitutional court, the Nagorno-Karabakh precondition was instantly placed at the bottom of the agenda.

Furthermore, Armenia knows very well that Turkey is the first side that will be blamed if any problem arises during the process of normalizing relations and of opening Turkish-Armenian borders. As you will recall, the day the protocols were signed, on Oct. 10, Armenia changed its mind about a part of the text that was agreed upon by both sides in advance and a small-scale crisis erupted. Nevertheless, Armenia continued to chase after small plans, to put Turkey in a difficult position on the international arena and to push for the US Congress to approve accusations of genocide committed by Turkey despite Turkey’s peaceful efforts. Meanwhile, Yerevan is sending the message to the diaspora that it did not “sell the Armenian case” while the Sarksyan administration tries to protect itself from troublesome allegations.

Lastly, we need to focus on the increasing initiatives Turkey has launched on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. During his visit to the US and Russia, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asked both President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev to put pressure on Armenia. In the aftermath of these efforts, Russia, which holds the “key to Nagorno-Karabakh,” made a noticeable increase in the level of its efforts. Russia and Armenia are now trying to construct a “road map” with a general framework to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem during this period. But even if a road map to be signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in the short term, it will be an effective way for the international community to put pressure on Turkey to open its borders. It is for this reason that plans being made about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue today are more to ensure that Turkey opens its borders and not so much to find a lasting solution.