After Emasya
by
MÜMTAZ’ER TÜRKÖNE

This protocol was one of the four issues raised during any discussion about relations between the military and politics, or more correctly, the military’s tutelary influence on state administration. This protocol was brought to the agenda in particular by Yeni Şafak’s Ali Bayramoğlu, who drew attention to the risks it posed to the democratic regime. This infamous protocol was abolished on Thursday. Why should the cancellation of an administrative document signed by and between two bureaucrats -- the Interior Ministry undersecretary and the chief of general staff -- be so important? Actually, the protocols represent a relatively secondary source of rules for the administration. Protocols are weaker in terms of serving as a reference compared to other legal sources such as laws, by-laws and regulations. But this protocol was important because it was a symbol of the actual power of the military. Its removal should be seen as a major indicator of the decline of this power.

Changing army

There are strong signs of change. We must correctly identify who is changing what. Turkey is changing. This change is the result of diverse factors. The public is asserting its own will. The government is acting in line with the mandate given it by the public, which will hold it accountable for its performances. Integrated with the world, a society and its economy are moving towards an open and fair system of competition, thereby creating opportunities out of crises. Shadowy networks aiming to overthrow the government and their “treacherous” plots are urging Turkey to change. We are establishing an administrative order and rules that will never allow such madness.

There were two areas that serve as the basis of the military’s influence on politics. The first is the National Security Policy Document. While it should normally be drafted by the Cabinet, this document is prepared by the military and submitted to the government. The frenzy of perceptions of “internal threats” or “internal enemies” is embodied in this document. The second is the Internal Service Law, which is one of the main laws which governs the military’s tasks and authorities, and particularly Article 35 of this law. This article has come to be construed as allowing military intervention. The third is that the military is acquiring a sort of judicial immunity by creating a large military judicial sphere. When members of the army commit an offense, they are tried at military courts, which are not independent, and it is therefore not possible to punish the offending military personnel. The government amended this law and allowed military personnel to be tried in civilian courts. However, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) took this critical amendment to the Constitutional Court, which annulled it. The last one was EMASYA. The cancellation of EMASYA paved the way for change in the military. As he drew attention to the importance of this change, former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök pointed to these debates on the protocol. It now seems very likely that the remaining three areas will change just as EMASYA did.

Withdrawal of the military

There is a retreat in question from the perspective of the military. After EMASYA was abolished, the chief of general staff said he had no objection to the move. He underlined that the military does not like the idea of being deployed in cases of social unrest. He also stressed that it is difficult to draw a clear line between social unrest and incidents of terrorism. He objected to confrontation between the army and the public. This vision is purely military. Commanders who ponder on military affairs should adopt a military perspective, not a political one. EMASYA was a tool to keep the army within the political sphere. Professionalism gives priority to military rather than political aspects. True, the military should not confront the public. Only this way can the prestige and power of the army be preserved.

The chief of general staff says EMASYA is not important because the law referenced on this matter is sufficient. What he says is true. Even if the protocol is canceled, Article 11 of the Provincial Administration Law is sufficient to employ the military for purposes of protecting public order, and thereby, a potential actor for meddling with the civilian administration. Therefore, paragraph D of Article 11 of this law should be abolished as well. Those talking about this article argue that since military troops can only act with an explicit order from the governor or the interior minister, this eliminates the potential risks. However, this is not the case. The said article transforms the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) into a force that conducts internal security services and that can meddle with the civilian administration. Indeed, this article provides justification for the army to conduct certain preparations in order to be ready for their potential use as a police force such as collecting intelligence, training soldiers to deal with social unrest, establishing EMASYA battalions in cities and, most importantly, keeping all civilian bureaucrats in a city under military supervision and hierarchy at EMASYA meetings, held at regular intervals. The agendas of these EMASYA meetings, which I heard about from governors and district governors, were proof that there is a military regime in force in Turkey.

Article 9 of this secret protocol was a complete scandal. The protocol was published although it is confidential. Under Article 9, the army is entitled to interfere in cases of internal security affairs without consulting civilian authorities, i.e., governors. Article 9 alone is sufficient to show that the entire state structure is essentially a military one. Investigations conducted in some provinces show that the military has conducted numerous internal security operations without consulting civilian authorities.

Paragraph D of Article 11 of the Provincial Administration Law, which served as the basis of EMASYA, was added on Aug. 29, 1996, i.e., six months before the Feb. 28 process. It should be noted that this paragraph was prepared by former Naval Forces Commander Güven Erkaya. This amendment was passed by Parliament upon instructions from then-Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan during a coalition government of the Welfare Party (RP) and the True Path Party (DYP). At that time, several bills drafted by the military were passed in the same way. Erbakan believed that he might get along well with the military by giving such concessions. In contrast, the process progressed as the government showed no resistance, culminating in the Feb. 28 process and the eventual removal of the government from office in June.