Constitution lies at heart of military supremacy in Turkey

In fact, the last two constitutions, drafted in 1960 and 1982, were written under military tutelage and aimed at restricting the power of democratic institutions while preserving the influence of the military over state agencies. Military rulers at the time also developed schemes to keep accountability out of the barracks as the defense budget was not subjected to general audit rules and military contracts were governed under sui generis principles. The National Security Council (MGK) has been the main tool of exerting military influence on the setting of government policy on a variety of matters which are not limited to only security.

“A serious constitutional reform is needed in this country” Hasan Celal Güzel, a prominent writer on military matters, told Sunday’s Zaman. “Only then can we think about trying coup plotters in a court of law,” he added. Güzel further pointed out that the mentality and thought process which exclude public involvement also ought to drastically be changed. “Jacobean elites, military and judicial elites, even political parties should concede the fact that they cannot achieve their objectives through military intervention in this country,” he said.

Many intellectuals recognize the fact that the ongoing process in asserting the supremacy of civilian rule over military affairs is proving to be very difficult in Turkey. The Turkish army has its own distinct legal and judicial system, and civilian courts have almost no jurisdiction over active service members. With each military coup, generals solidified their position in the state apparatus and created new structures to ensure the perpetuity of heavy military influence. A law allowing civilian courts to try military officers if they commit certain high crimes was annulled by the top court just last week, dealing a big blow to government efforts to bring the country’s standards in line with European Union norms.

As it now stands, the military judiciary is not independent because military prosecutors receive their orders from garrison commanders. Military judges do not enjoy the guarantees or protection afforded to civilian judges; therefore, accusations have often claimed that the military justice system favors the choices of top commanders.

Laws existing in the Constitution and on the books continue to provide a pretext for the military to occupy the civilian domain. The military justified schemes involving social engineering based on these laws. Take, for example, the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order (EMASYA), a product of the Feb. 28, 1997 post-modern coup. The protocol, still valid, allows military operations and intelligence gathering activity in the country without the approval of the civilian administration.

Education reform needed

Another reason why the military continues to engage in the coup tradition from one generation to the next is the strict military education during which cadets are taught that they are the masters and saviors of the country. They are to be the first ones to respond to the call to stop existential threats to the regime. The definition of a threat, however, mostly focuses on domestic groups, whether they are minorities, faith-based movements or communists. Ahmet Altan wrote in his column in Taraf last week that the coup tradition is passed to the next generation like chromosomes. “The revelation of coup attempts since 2002, codenamed Ayışığı [Moonlight], Sarıkız [Blonde Girl], Eldiven [Gloves] and the latest Balyoz [Sledgehammer], shows that the appetite for military intervention was never lost,” he said.

 (Above) The front page of Milliyet on Sept. 12, 1980, announcing the recently staged coup. (Left) Col. Talat Aydemir was the only military officer ever tried in the history of Turkey for attempting to organize a military takeover.

Until the Ergenekon case, in which a network of people including military officers was charged with a plot to overthrow the government, there was only one incident where Turkey successfully tried coup plotters. That was Col. Talat Aydemir’s trial, the only previous military coup trial in Turkey. Aydemir tried to replace the military junta that ousted the government in 1960 with his own group. He was unsuccessful, and the government and General Staff decided to arrest him instead. After the coup attempt was suppressed, Aydemir, three colonels, 69 commissioned officers and four noncommissioned officers were dismissed from the military. He tried to stage a coup for a second time but was arrested and condemned to capital punishment. Hundreds of military officers and War Academy cadets were subjected to various penalties and discharged from the military.

MGK still functional

The MGK, a product of the 1960 military coup, has continued to serve as an important venue at which force commanders can shape national policy. In the face of criticism from the EU, Turkey has tried to revamp this overly militaristic institution. The position of the MGK secretary was transferred to a civilian in 2006, but the structure remains a platform at which the military imposes its own set of policies on the government.

Another problem reinforcing the military supremacy in Turkey is the position of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), whose decisions cannot be appealed. The council convenes twice a year to decide on promotions and retirements within the TSK. The YAŞ meetings are where officers suspected of engaging in anti-secular activities are expelled from the TSK. Officers discharged from the military do not have the chance to appeal or demand a review of the decision for dismissal. Rights groups often criticize YAŞ decisions, saying the meeting denies anyone who stands accused the opportunity to defend himself or to have a fair trial because the TSK does not state what the accused are charged with.

Auditing the military budget

Auditing military expenditures is another major problem that needs to be addressed. It does not make any sense why financial audits cannot be conducted on military units as they are on other public institutions. Problems preventing audits by the Supreme Court of Accounts remain unresolved. What is more, Parliament does not debate the defense budget as it does when it comes to other institutions. The budget is approved by Parliament without even being discussed. The defense minister is charged with monitoring the budget prepared by the military in Parliament.

Large funds, in addition to the defense budget, fall into the cracks and away from public scrutiny. The public does not know the exact figures earmarked for defense since the extra-budgetary sources for defense are kept secret even from public institutions, including the Court of Auditors. A bill, drafted after the EU raised the issue with the government, is still sitting on the shelf in Parliament after facing heavy resistance from the military.

Last but not least, a multi-billion dollar business empire associated with the Turkish military gives more clout to the military’s already existing influence. Through the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Center (OYAK), a type of pension fund, the military plays a huge role in business activity, ranging from finance to insurance and from construction to communications. Many argue that OYAK is not compatible with fair business practices espoused by the EU and needs to be privatized once Turkey becomes a full member.

In an interview with Sunday’s Zaman, Mehmet Altan, a columnist at the Star daily, summed up the whole problem in civilian-military relations as following: “Unfortunately, soldiers drew up plans for everything except their own military duties. They talk about anything and everything. They organize panels on a variety of issues. The only thing they do not do is submit a comprehensive military strategy for review.”