The new face of Turkish foreign policy (II)
by
Özer Sencar & Ünal Bilir*

Maturation and ripening

We know that the new Turkish foreign policy, introduced by Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Foreign Ministry, has undergone a long process of maturation and ripening from the time of Abdullah Gül to Ahmet Davutoğlu. Having proven its effectiveness and concrete achievements whilst holding a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, this foreign policy can be said to have taken major initiatives compared to the established policies of the country. These initiatives correspond to the renewal of the Turkish foreign service, both inside and outside. This new approach aims to ensure that Turkey, as a regional power and a successful model country, can develop relations independently of the West’s influence and focus on solutions and mutual gains in bilateral relations. Improving relations with Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Iran and other countries that are typically viewed negatively by Western countries is a salient indicator of the change in Turkey’s long-established strategy and of its new political approach. No doubt the results of the relations established with these countries and their conformity with the principles of democracy and human rights can be questioned, but the self-confidence Turkey had acquired in this process with its own initiatives in the face of disapproval from the US and the EU deserves to be underlined.

There is a widely held conviction that Turkey’s foreign policy during the last 50-60 years and its membership in international organizations (especially NATO) has been determined, shaped and maintained under US influence. According to the proponents of this view, all developments, particularly the diplomatic relations established with Armenia and northern Iraq, with the exception of the Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow US troops to launch attacks on Iraq from Turkey in 2003 -- which is widely believed to have been an accident attributable to the government’s failure to manage the process well -- came about due to US pressure and guidance. The government, on the other hand, insists that these steps were taken for the sake of Turkish interests and shaped not by external pressures but by mutual interests.

One of the concrete signs of an axial shift in Turkish foreign policy has been the disturbance in its relations with Israel.The first country to recognize Israeli independence, Turkey has long maintained friendly relations with the country and has also allied with it in military and strategic terms. This alliance and the friendly relations have been maintained despite the reaction of the Turkish people concerning the Palestine issue. However, the “one minute” crisis between Erdoğan and Israeli President Shimon Peres that occurred in Davos created a salient fracture in the bilateral relations. A survey conducted just after the said crisis found that 81.7 percent of the people supported Erdoğan’s attitude and the government’s Israel policy. Erdoğan’s reaction to Israeli President Peres and the panel moderator was endorsed by 78.3 percent of the Turkish public, while 55.7 percent said this attitude was in Turkey’s interest compared to 21 percent who said it was against the country’s interests. While 41.6 percent said this incident would adversely affect Turkish-Israeli ties, a considerably large portion (22 percent) noted that it was necessary and positive, even if Erdoğan’s walkout was not in Turkey’s interest. This incident was so significant in the mind of the public that the people interviewed listed the Davos crisis as one of the “most important developments in 2009,” the only time a foreign policy development had been ranked within the top 10, coming in at sixth place.

The internal initiative that was influential in the context of restructuring Turkish foreign policy consists of turning the foreign service into a more transparent, more effective and more people-oriented structure. It seems that Turkish embassies and consulates have started to become more sensitive to the problems and expectations of Turkish citizens living abroad, and they have shifted from being “a state within the state” to being “a representative of the state.” The Turkish diplomatic missions have long been regarded as structures that do not trust their own citizens and refrain from expressing solidarity with them in the face of their problems, even having to be forced to carry out their bureaucratic tasks and categorizing them according to their political actions. We can say that today these offices are working selflessly to help Turkish citizens abroad instead of scrutinizing their political orientation.

Another aspect of the internal change is that foreign policy decisions are being explained to the people. It’s hard to say that past governments had such concerns. This new approach, epitomized by Foreign Minister Davutoğlu when he said, “The discourse in Ankara should have repercussions in Mardin and Tokyo,” and the recent gathering in Mardin are concrete indications of this tendency. The fact that the people interviewed listed Davutoğlu as the Cabinet’s most successful minister as of January 2010 implies that this approach -- which aims to ensure that the people have a greater say about foreign policy decisions -- has been supported by the people.