Iran: At the Crossroads?

There were four factors that limited the effectiveness of these protests. First, dissidents were protesting against the election results and in some cases to the strict nature of the Islamic Republic, they did not target the regime and made this clear from the beginning. Their recognition of the existing regime, but not the election results, as legitimate placed them in a position where by accepting the regime as legitimate they, though indirectly, recognized in advance the decisions resulted from its established procedures and the regime’s representatives. As a result when they completed the official procedures and did not obtain a result that supported their view the movement started to lose steam. Second, and related to the first, a large portion of religious authorities backed Ahmedinejad, despite certain problems they had with him, as the lesser of two evils. Third, Ahmedinejad’s supporters ran an effective campaign claiming that the opposition was supported by external powers, namely the United States. Despite their best efforts, the dissidents failed to change this perception costing them the support of more conservative portions of the society. Finally, even though Mir Hussein Mosavi appeared to be the leader of the movement from the outside he categorically rejected the idea of becoming the leader of a united front. Groups forming the opposition came from various views around the claim that the election results were not legitimate. The absence of a single strong leader that protesters could follow caused certain organization problems.

However, the drop in the scale and intensity of the protests did not mean by any means that things had turned to normal Iran. Even though news about Iran ceased to occupy the front page of our newspapers various groups continued to oppose the President. Especially, as it has been the tradition in all Iranian opposition movements, memorial services for those who lost their lives during the violent events of the summer and fall continued regularly often despite security forces’ violent repression. Until two weeks ago we could say that the ongoing low-level protests in Iran had the potential of expanding once again to a large opposition movement, but that the government, through the use of force, kept them effectively under control.

What I mean by a potential of expansion is the fact that none of the demands put forth by the opposition has been addressed so far. The Islamic Republic always had an authoritarian flavor to it, but this did not cause as much problem in its early days due to the revolutionary excitement and Ayetollah Khomeini’s presence. Following Khomeini’s death many of the leaders lacked the charisma to obtain the support of large crowds and sustain the existing regime. Instead, they used certain powers used by Khomeini to make the system increasingly authoritarian. Naturally this behavior created a certain degree of dissent in the society and some claimed that the Islamic Republic had become too authoritarian. Not even these opponents questioned the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Their criticism was limited to claiming that even though an authoritarian phase was needed immediately after the Revolution, now that the regime was strong and stable, there was no longer need for such measures and it was time for a more moderate Republic. These demands have not been addressed yet and the dissatisfaction is still present regardless of the fact that we have been seeing less violent protests until couple of weeks ago.

Like we have observed over and over again in similar situations, repressed dissent often needs a catalyst to resurface. Such an event took place on December 20, 2009, when the Grand Ayetollah Hussein Ali Montasari died. Since Khomeini’s death Montasari had been a vocal critique of the regime claiming that the Islamic Republic was moving away from its targets and becoming more and more authoritarian. He had also supported the protestors, displaying a crack in the religious authority’s support for Ahmedinejad. Montasari’s support was one of the main factors that lent the opposition some degree of legitimacy. His death became the fuel protests lacked for months. During the week following his funeral Iranian opposition and their violent repression in the hands of the security forces became the focal point of international news once again.

This time government did not change its strategy and used as much force as it deemed necessary to crush the opposition resulting in a much larger deaths per day of protests than the previous cycle. This initially led to more protests, but after a period of time we saw a new slowing down. The strategy of violent repression when faced with opposition is not new in Iran. The last example was the Shah whose attempts at violent repression only caused the protests to escalate, resulting in a revolution forcing him to flee. I think it would be overly optimistic to expect these protests could have the same impact on Iran. Nevertheless the Islamic Revolution seems to be a good example of how protests may get out of hand when the demands are not properly addressed.     

Last few months’ events in Iran remind some of the country’s past experiences with protests and dissent, leading them to make comparisons with the past and claiming that the regime is under threat. Although it is ironic that a President who was actively involved in protests thirty years ago would use repression he knows to be ineffective in the long run, it is still too early to claim the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the opposition claims loyalty towards the Islamic Republic and limits its goals to reducing the authoritarian streak in it. It is not unheard of that similar reform efforts bring down regimes they initially intended to improve. This seems unlikely at this point because in order to be successful protestors will need at least one wing of the power structure to support them which in turn will have vested interest in keeping the process limited. Second, and more importantly, Iran’s parallel state structure that splits the power between religious authorities and elected representatives of the people allows for some degree of accommodation without the government losing face by appearing to accommodate the protesters. Especially considering the cracks between a portion of the religious authorities and Ahmedinejad Government, a degree of accommodation seems more likely in case the protests continue.

»» Kürşat Turan, ORSAM Middle East Advisor