Book traces the making of modern Turkey ‘From the Sultan to Atatürk’

The Little Sisters of the Poor are popular figures at charitable events such as the International Women of İstanbul’s Christmas Bazaar, where they sell handcrafts to support their charitable work, much of it medical services provided by La Paix and Saint Georges hospitals. When the pope said the Turkish Catholic community is “rightly proud of the assistance provided for the poor,” I thought of these humble and gentle ladies.

Ayşe Karabat’s report in Today’s Zaman quoted the pope as saying, “The Catholic Church in Turkey is waiting for civil judicial recognition [to help the Turkish Catholic Community] to enjoy full religious freedom and to make an even greater contribution to society.” Karabat explained that as the Treaty of Lausanne recognized only Jews, Armenians and Greek Orthodox as minorities, the Roman Catholic, Syrian Orthodox and Protestant communities were not afforded such status.

Lausanne: the treaty of 1923, signed between the new Republic of Turkey and many foreign powers, brought an end to foreign aspirations on Turkish soil and recognized the sovereignty of the new nation within its borders. It was a name often referred to by lawyers when we were establishing the İstanbul Protestan Kilisesi Vakfı to meet the religious needs of Protestants who live in Turkey. Quite apart from the fact that Lausanne did not specify Protestants as a religious minority to be recognized by the Turkish state, most of the members of the vakıf do not see themselves as a minority, as this term in Turkey is also used ethnically, and they are not from an ethnic minority, but are Turks.

The provisions of Lausanne still shape Turkish law today. It may seem amazing in international law that the effects of a treaty signed in the aftermath of the “war to end all wars” are still felt keenly in society nearly 90 years later.

World War I may have been fought to end all war, but sadly since the peace treaties signed in France were based on punishment of the losers, and retribution by the victors, they were really the “peace to end all peace.” In school when we studied the rise of fascism in Europe and the factors that led to the outbreak of World War II, our history teacher passionately laid the blame on the attitudes that shaped the peace treaties a decade earlier.

By demanding that Germany cede part of its industrial territory to France and then insisting on punitive payments, the victorious Allies ensured that Germany stayed weak and economically bankrupt. The ensuing unemployment, poverty and hunger created a nation willing to follow a leader who instilled in them some national pride and offered the hope of success and prosperity once more. A similar story applied in Italy, creating conditions perfect for Mussolini to mirror Hitler’s policies.

The Treaty of Versailles led to war 20 years later. The Treaty of Sèvres, which dealt with the Ottoman Empire, led to war almost immediately. The difference being one man: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

“Makers of the Modern World” is a series of studies published by Haus Publishing that focus on the peacemaking that followed World War I. The series’ subtitle is “The Peace Conferences of 1919-1923 and Their Aftermath.” Separate volumes cover a wide range of legacies such as the League of Nations and the Zionist dream. The victors are represented: Australia, Canada, United States and France. So are a wealth of other countries that were reborn out of the conflict: Poland, Hungary, the Baltic States and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Also covered are those further afield who were nevertheless affected by the peace treaties: China, Japan and South Africa.

The volume concerning Turkey is penned by Andrew Mango, the great expert on Atatürk and the founding and development of the Turkish Republic. Mango’s earlier books have tried to reconcile the paradigm that Turkey has an avowedly secular Constitution and an overwhelmingly Islamic population.

Here he turns his attention to the issue of peacemaking and how the legacy of war was to pave the way for the end of the Ottoman sultans’ dynasty and usher in the age of a secular republic. Mango presents the facts of Turkey’s involvement in World War I and also the details of the War of Independence fairly succinctly. These topics are, after all, covered in detail elsewhere.

In “From the Sultan to Atatürk,” he focuses on the diplomacy of peacemaking. Calling the Treaty of Sèvres “illusions of power” and a time of “broken promises,” he deals with the intricacies surrounding the armistice that ended World War I and the subsequent political maneuverings. “When the war ended, Britain, France, Italy and the United States -- known as the Principal Allies -- thought they could dispose as they wished of the fates and possessions of their enemies. This illusion of omnipotence was disproved first in Russia, then in Turkey and finally and catastrophically in Germany.”

The weak Ottoman state had an urgent desire for peace. They were encouraged by Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points, in which the American president set out the terms for how the peace was to be run. Point 12 said, “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty”; it indicated that the other parts of the empire should be given independence, but allowed for the Ottoman sultan to keep the lands of Turkey.

Within a few months, this was reversed. Negotiations started in Mondros on Oct. 27, 1918. The armistice agreement signed on Oct. 30 contained Article 7 stating that the Allies could occupy Turkey. On Dec. 21, the French were first, entering Adana. On Nov. 13 the British followed, marching into Constantinople. The Italians delayed till 1919 before landing in Antalya, and finally the Greeks entered İzmir harbor on May 15, 1919.

Mango points out that “as the Allies tried to hammer out a common position on the Turkish peace treaty they became progressively less capable of enforcing it.” The final plan to partition Turkey was agreed at San Remo. The text of this agreement is both uncompromising and insulting to Turkish readers. On Aug. 10, 1920, the treaty was formally signed at Sèvres. It left a legacy of bitterness that persists today.

While World War I took the Allies four years to win, Mango notes that it took them only three years to lose the peace settlement.

Most treatments of the rise to prominence of Atatürk, the War of Independence and then the renegotiated peace at Lausanne leave the reader thinking that the war was won and then negotiated. In “From the Sultan to Atatürk,” Mango paints a picture of Atatürk fighting two wars at the same time. On the one hand, the War of Independence -- his military war. On the other, a whole host of official and unofficial meetings, negotiations and jostling for position -- his diplomatic war.

Atatürk’s success lies in the fact that he was successful at both. He knew that failure against the Greeks would have military and diplomatic consequences, and he guarded against both. He also pushed hard diplomatically immediately after he won a military battle, exploiting his advantage to the full. The result: the borders of modern Turkey and his new secular republic won international recognition.