Germany key country in the negotiation process
by
ALİ YURTTAGÜL*

Anyway, the readers who read the foregoing carefully and who are keen on arithmetic should have realized that the “opponents of Turkey” are becoming marginalized in Germany, which seems to be utterly confused or perplexed about Turkey’s membership in the EU. In Germany, the opposition parties as well as the coalition member Free Democratic Party (FDP) led by Westerwelle are in favor of maintaining negotiations with Turkey while only a regional party, the CSU, from Bavaria, is against this. Even if we assume that those who lend support to Westerwelle’s policy are in a minority in Merkel’s CDU, we can still talk about an overwhelming majority in Parliament that is supportive of the negotiation process. For this reason, if Westerwelle had said that he was “representing Germany” instead of “representing the entire government,” the dissident voice of Wildbad Kreuth -- a town that represents calls coming from the depths of Bavaria -- would not have been heeded. The purpose of this essay is not only to discuss the underlying transformation happening beneath Berlin’s confusion but also to assert that Germany is the key country in the negotiation process. We believe that the major obstacles to the membership process cannot be eliminated if Berlin does not give decisive support to it as it did in the Helsinki summit in 1999 and the Brussels summit in December 2004. Let us first discuss why Germany is the “key” before dealing with the questions, “Where is Germany heading?” and “What is changing in its policy on Turkey?”

Why is Germany the key to the membership process?

We can say that the European Union has had two contradictory political dynamics since its establishment: integration and enlargement. For the political movements that are dreaming of establishing the United States of Europe (USE) and are striving to attain a profound union, the enlargement of the EU is a sort of nightmare or a process diluting their dreams. If we are to identify the boundaries of the USE, dreamed up by these political movements, with some latitude, we would most likely talk about France, Germany, Benelux -- Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg -- as well as northern Italy. Southern Italy, including Rome, the UK and the like would most probably be left outside. However, since its establishment, the EU has never been a “dream” of the masses, and also, it has never been a “cultural project” as it is frequently advocated with reference to Turkey’s membership. If the dynamics that established the EU have real political and economic foundations, the four enlargement waves it saw during the last 30 years are the product of the same political and economic dynamics. There is not a single reasonable politician who has opposed the EU’s enlargement into Central Europe after the breaking down of the Berlin Wall due to the fear of weakening Europe’s deep integration.

But a closer examination of the latest 12 new members will reveal that the “package” was not quite homogeneous and did not follow a common logic. For Germany, Central European countries, i.e., Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, were important. If it were not for Finland or Sweden as members, the membership of the three Baltic countries was not likely. Germany and France would not give the green light to these three small countries in order not to cast a shadow over their relations with Russia. The rest of the “package” -- Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus -- is much more interesting. Lagging behind Turkey in terms of institutional and economic development, Romania became a member upon France’s insistence while Bulgaria was sponsored -- not understandably -- by Denmark. Today, many believe that the membership of these two countries was “premature.” Cyprus became part of the package in breach of the main principles of the EU, only because Greece insisted. The general agreement in Brussels is that the membership of Cyprus was an “error.” This process is still under way. If Bulgaria had not been a member, Greece would have never given the green light to the negotiations with Macedonia, which it does not even wish to discuss.

To cut a long story short, it was no different with the start of negotiations with Turkey. Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the originator of the term “privileged partnership” was eyeing the far right vote as Nicolas Sarkozy is doing today through xenophobia, particularly fear of Turks/Muslims, and was opposed to Turkey’s EU membership. For this reason, while Eastern European countries got on the membership train at the Luxembourg summit in 1997, they wanted to leave Turkey on the platform at the “European Conference.” Since Turkey did not enter this envisioned platform, the European Conference could only meet once before being discarded all together and naturally Turkey could not be part of the membership process either. Neither could pressure from countries such as the US, the UK or Italy start the negotiation process for Turkey. This changed when Kohl lost the elections and the Schröder/Fischer-led SPD/Greens coalition took office in Germany. These two politicians were the most important factors in the decisions made at the Helsinki summit in December 1999 and the Brussels summit in December 2004 concerning Turkey’s membership. This does not only result from the fact that many countries turn to Berlin with respect to Turkey policy. Germany has also covered the greatest part of the budget since the start, and it is the decisive factor in major budgetary decisions such as Turkey’s membership with its resulting burden on the budget. Moreover, there are about 3 million Turkish expats in Germany, and this fact cannot be denied by other EU countries.

Germany’s policy on Turkey is becoming clearer

Even though it seems like a plethora of voices ring out among the coalition partners, Germany’s policy on Turkey is becoming much clearer. The message Westerwelle delivered during his visit to Ankara disturbed Turkey’s opponents not because it contained a different view about negotiations but because it praised Turkey’s initiative policy and emphasized Turkey’s importance in international relations. That is why coalition partner Mißfelder says Turkey is regressing, not progressing and points out the problems related to freedom of the press. As this contradiction reveals, the problem doesn’t stem from the fact that the coalition partners are using different information sources. The problem stems from the fact that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to say “no” in the EU process to a Turkey that has implemented democratic reforms, obtained internal peace, evolved into a stability factor in the region and in international relations and has achieved economic development. The biggest fear of these conservative politicians who think Turkey’s membership will endanger the EU which they essentially see as being shaped on the basis of “Christian values,” is Turkey’s position as a completely democratic country. But important developments are taking place in the CDU and Germany’s foreign policy on Turkey. The “historical Turkish-German” friendship that has been on the agenda since the 19th century lost importance in the 1970s and 1980s, and in the 1990s, during Kohl’s chancellorship, relations had become quiet strained. The first factor effecting Kohl’s policy on Turkey partially began with the Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik and abandonment of Cold War policy.” Then-opposition leader Kohl had vehemently opposed this initiative, which in today’s popular language could be called an axis shift in Germany’s foreign policy. As the chancellor, Kohl not only backed the process that started the breach of the Berlin Wall but in a sense reaped the fruits of the Ostpolitik. Following World War II, Germany launched a peace and democratization process in Central and Eastern Europe and became one of the most important political actors in Europe. Those who follow German politics will know that Kohl was against Turkey’s membership not because he was against Turkey but because Central Europe was more important for Germany and he wanted to shift EU financial resources to countries in that region. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, all of Germany’s financial resources had already shifted to East Germany. Perhaps the second critical factor was that as the Russian threat decreased, Turkey became less significant in Germany’s defense policy.

We can say the Ostpolitik, which was the most important factor of the 1990s, concluded with Central Europe’s membership of the EU and NATO and is no longer a policy to be developed. Germany is now striving to become an international actor beyond the EU borders of England and France. Without going into depth about Germany’s “new” foreign policy dynamics we can say that Germany is displaying a policy that is more and more peculiar to itself in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As Westerwelle’s speech also shows, Turkey’s new initiative policy and increasing influence in the region is attracting attention in Berlin as well. There is a high probability that in the next couple of years there will be a rapprochement between Germany and Turkey similar to that of the 1960s and the CDU will develop an attitude that is in favor of Turkey’s membership. Another important internal policy factor affecting Germany’s Turkey policy was immigrant workers and xenophobia. The governing CDU at the time insisted on the “Gastarbeiter” policy, but like many current CDU politicians, Kohl believed it was a “historical mistake” to bring guest workers from Turkey because of increasing unemployment and the integration problems of Turks. One of the first projects Kohl implemented after coming to power in 1982 was “return policies” for Turks.

This initiative which we can describe as an initiative to mend the “historical mistake” did not receive much credit and did not last too long. But just like Sarkozy, Kohl used widespread xenophobia and Turkish enmity as a tool during every election campaign to win the support of far right voters. But this policy seems to have been abandoned after the last Hessen regional elections. The last parliamentary election was the first time in which the CDU did not use Turks and Turkey as a political factor. There are two important reasons behind this. The first is that even the governing CDU no longer applies the Gastarbeiter policy. Every sensible German politician knows that Turks are not going to go back. Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who was the former interior minister, are the two politicians that started social dialogue with Turks. I believe there is a benefit in underlining another important factor in this regard. Xenophobic election campaigns not only scare constituents of Turkish-origin who are becoming increasingly more important, but also spark concern among German constituents. German society, in which Scandinavian culture is becoming more active, is starting to realize the deep contradiction between the search for social peace and dialogue and xenophobia and is not giving any regard to these kinds of campaigns, as was the case in the Hessen elections.

Anyway, to wrap up, it will not be a surprise if Germany revisits its policy on Turkey in the next couple of years, if Merkel backs Schröder’s Turkish policy the way Kohl supported Brandt’s Ostpolitik and if Germany starts to support Turkey’s EU membership.

The only precondition is that Turkey continues its initiative in foreign policy and its democratization process in domestic policy with determination. Let us not forget that Turkey might be able to become a member despite Sarkozy, but without Germany’s support, it is very unlikely that Turkey can become a member of the EU.