Military’s political status no longer sustainable, says Laçiner

He said the military has lost credibility as there have been more revelations about illegal connections within it.

“For example, the Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon network, and there were reports that security flaws played a large role in the deaths of many soldiers in the Dağlıca and Aktütün attacks [by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)],” he told Today's Zaman for our Monday Talk interview, referring to the ongoing probe into the Ergenekon criminal network accused of plotting to overthrow the government.

The 2006 Council of State attack left a senior judge dead. Although it was initially presented as an attack by a religious fundamentalist, the gunman's links to Ergenekon were later confirmed during the investigation. The PKK's attack on Dağlıca in 2007 and on Aktütün in 2008, in which dozens of soldiers died, raised serious questions about how and why the respective military units were slow to act and take the necessary precautions to prevent the attacks in time despite the existence of intelligence reports warning of the terrorists' plans.

“These have left big blemishes on the military; therefore, some forces in the military realize that its current political status is not sustainable,” he added. He was referring to the ongoing civilian search of a Special Forces Command facility in Ankara where the military's top-secret documents are archived.

The search started about two weeks ago as part of a probe into a potential assassination plot against Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç allegedly devised by a group in the military.

Regarding repeated messages from the president and the prime minister about harmony among state institutions, Laçiner said it is impossible not to have conflict.

“Indeed, conflict is required in this process,” he said.

You wrote an article in mid-2008 saying the Turkish military acts like a political party. Has this changed at all?

This is what I have been saying for years. A military force acting like a political party does not occur easily, and it is hard to maintain. Political parties in Turkey try to live with this fact. This also goes for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), despite its apparent support for a legal investigation into the strike forces of shady mechanisms inside the military such as the Special Forces.”

Are you referring to the Ergenekon investigation and the ongoing search at the Special Forces Command?

The role of the Special Forces was clear even in the first Ergenekon indictment. But the prosecutor was unable to move forward to further investigate it. The fact is that this approach has been a part of the policies of the government, which has a certain strategy. They had to choose their fights.

Ömer Laçiner, editor-in-chief of socialist monthly Birikim A graduate of the 1966 class of the Military Academy, he was arrested in 1971 because of his connections with the Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C). He was expelled from the military for political reasons. Upon his release from prison in 1975, he was among the founding members of Birikim, a socialist cultural periodical. Following the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, he was in exile in France.

What fights do you think the government was able to undertake?

We have to go back in time to revisit the environment that brought the AK Party to power. They saw an unprecedented rise from the ashes of the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed for becoming a “focus of anti-secular activities.” AK Party politicians did not even know if they could pass the 10 percent election barrier. But they received the votes of the pious Muslims -- more than even the center-right, which was fragmented. It had two goals: to alleviate or eliminate fears (stemming centrally from the military in addition to other forces) about the party’s intentions toward secularism and to consolidate its center-right votes. In order to consolidate its center-right votes, the government left some issues out of its agenda, such as the headscarf ban and religious education, after some initiatives in that regard, but stepped back as those issues were not central to center-right voters. The government also had knowledge of the military’s role in Turkey.

Please elaborate.

The military’s social engineering plans were revealed on several occasions. Examples include the “postmodern” Feb. 28, 1997 military coup, the West Study Group (BÇG) and others like “The Plan to Shape Turkey.” There were also a number of attacks, such as the one on the Council of State [that left a senior judge dead and seriously injured four others in 2006] and assassinations, such as that of Hrant Dink [a Turkish-Armenian editor murdered by an ultranationalist youth in January 2007], through which status quo forces intended to create an impression that the government was unable to lead the country. When did the government start to investigate these issues?

When?

When the status quo forces tried to prevent the election of Abdullah Gül to the presidency. It was then that the government started to fight. During the Ergenekon investigation, the government realized that standing firm against status quo forces, and especially the military, works. The government was able to get even more votes from supporters of center-right parties -- the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), both of which had seen decreasing support and were finally eliminated from the political arena -- because of its firm stance. As a result, the government had to face a counter-attack: a closure case against it. This was a demonstration of how the judiciary was used by status quo forces in that fierce battle [the Constitutional Court declared the party a “focal point of anti-secular activity” but fell short of closing it].

‘There is conflict among institutions’

With an investigation currently going deeper into the military’s secret files, what is the status of military-civilian relations now?

The AK Party’s recent operations are about having the military on its side. I don’t think the government is trying to make the military conform with the standards of developed democracies where militaries are silent on political issues.

Do you think the chief of General Staff supports these operations?

It is not something that the chief of General Staff can support all alone. There is no doubt that the upper echelons of the military support the Ergenekon operation. Some forces in the military are aware of the fact that the military’s politicization cannot go on like this. In 2002, they were able to have some people believe the AK Party had a “hidden agenda,” that it was promoting radical Islamization in Turkey, that Shariah was the end goal. But it has become harder for the military to push for that view seven years after the AK Party came to power. This argument no longer has much credibility.

What else? What makes the military more prone to lose its highly respected status?

Additionally, the military lost more credibility as increased revelations showed there were some illegal connections within it. For example, the Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon network, and there were credible reports that security flaws played a large role in the deaths of many soldiers in the Dağlıca and Aktütün attacks [by the PKK]. All that did not give the military the upper hand. On the contrary, it left big blemishes on the military. Therefore, some circles in the military realize that its current political status is not sustainable. But even as those circles desire to normalize the military, they do not want to give up all of their financial privileges and status.

President Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insistently say that there is no conflict among state institutions. Is this possible? How can this process of normalization be completed without conflict?

It is impossible not to have conflict. Indeed, conflict is required in this process. The status quo -- pro-republican and staunch secularist forces -- was clearly defeated in the 2007 elections. But it does not want to leave the arena without putting up a fight. And one of the fiercest battles is going on at the level of the high judiciary. There are government operations at this level, too -- some through new appointments. So at some point the judiciary will have to become accountable. But we do not yet know if the judiciary will turn out to be a pro-AK Party force or a clean, impartial one. The AK Party is not very clear and straightforward in that regard.

What makes you say that?

One example in that regard is how the media sector operates. Instead of having rules to make the sector a diverse, free, independent and reliable one, the AK Party uses its power to bring the media in line with the government. There is no effort by the government to make the media fall in line with the media ethics standards of the European Union.

If we go back to our former discussion about civilian-military relations, do you think the period of military coups is over in Turkey?

In Turkey, the military and judiciary are still state institutions. The majority of society still has the mentality that these institutions should protect the state. On the other hand, it would be hard for the military to stage coups because it has lost some prestige. If the military stages a coup at this time, it would not have the support it had in the past. But society unfortunately still has a pro-military mindset rather than a democratic approach. And this mindset will be seen clearly if society is in chaos. People would say the military should come and correct the situation.

‘Feelings of jealousy and degradation toward new bourgeoisie’

Where does the Republican People’s Party (CHP) stand in this debate?

The CHP is in a position to protect the military’s political role, which became institutionalized in the 1980s. At the end of the 1990s, the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), which played the role of the CHP at the time, had a leading role in the democratization of society. It was a party of change until shortly before the rise of the RP. When the AK Party became a party of change, the CHP became resistant to change. The CHP could have chosen to become more radical in its stance and said that the AK Party’s democratization moves were not enough. But it did not.

In your opinion, why did it not do so?

Apparently, its traditional middle-class urban supporters in western Anatolia have felt jealous and degraded by the new bourgeoisie class represented by the AK Party. The CHP gave in to that. Today’s debate of secularism versus anti-secularism is indeed a class conflict between the two middle-class segments of society.

Do you believe the Turkish left will have a say in society any time soon?

The main problem is about finding an answer to society’s demand for equality. Socialism should be remade. I don’t think people who accept the old definitions of socialism would be able to play a role on the left. There needs to be a new approach taking into account all inequalities in the lives of humans, not only in the area of profit sharing. Right now, the left does not have anything new or exciting to say in that regard. But I am hopeful that it will in the near future.