[What is Plan B, if there is one?]
The nuclear menace looming over Turkey’s neighborhood
by
MEHMET KALYONCU*

Yet, in line with the UN-chartered Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ankara tacitly acknowledged Tehran’s legitimate right to develop and acquire nuclear technology for civilian and non-military purposes, while at the same time becoming increasingly vocal about Israel’s getting away unchecked with its nuclear arsenal.

In the meantime, the opposition to the Iranian nuclear program, namely the loud criticism by the US, UN, EU-3 (UK, France, and Germany) and Israel, and somewhat silent worries of the other regional Arab states (mainly Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia) have been largely characterized as much talk and little, if any, action. The current Iranian nuclear debate began in August 2002, when an Iranian dissident group (National Council of Resistance of Iran) publicly revealed that two nuclear sites were under construction in the country. The only real progress since then seems to be the progress in the construction of these nuclear facilities and the overall progress in Iran’s nuclear program. As of today, the debate is at a point where the US refuses to hold talks with Iranian officials any time before January 2010, Iranian leaders clearly assert that the nuclear debate is over and Iran continues its nuclear program.

From a realpolitik perspective, whether Iran’s nuclear program is legitimate or not and whether Iran will use its nuclear technology to produce weapons or not are, and should be viewed by Ankara as, a secondary concern for Turkey. Instead, Ankara should be primarily concerned about the fact that Tehran has already made substantial progress in acquiring nuclear technology. If it does reach the point where transforming that technology is no longer a matter of ability but of choice, then it will certainly strike the regional balance of power in favor of Tehran and thereby create a region with new nuclear realities. Then, Ankara would hardly be in a position to deter a possible nuclear conflict (i.e., between Iran and Israel) or counter any deterrence imposed on Turkey. Such a scenario is not far from possibility. After all, as many would argue, both Iran and Israel are somewhat equally crazy enough to use nuclear weapons against each other, and both have somewhat similar views that their long-sought end days mentioned in their respective religious doctrines will come only after apocalyptic clashes. Similarly, Ankara may fall short of matching Tehran’s growing influence across the region.

Then, the questions are whether Turkey is prepared for the new nuclear realities in the region, whether it can afford not to have nuclear weapons and finally what Ankara can do in order to benefit from the changing dynamics in its neighborhood.

Iran’s word not very convincing

The Iranian leaders, most notably President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, have time and again repeated that Iran is not interested in developing nuclear weapons, but in acquiring nuclear fuel-cycle ability for civilian purposes. Apparently, the Iranian leadership’s word is not very convincing for its Western counterparts in the debate, and certainly not for Israel. Even if Tehran has some convincing way to guarantee that it will not produce nuclear weapons, the very fact that it has been actively pursuing a nuclear program, which is conducive to giving Iran an ability to produce nuclear weapons, will sooner or later induce the neighboring nuclear and non-nuclear states into a nuclear arms race. Such a vivid possibility will eventually and understandably lead Iran as well to develop nuclear weapons even if it has not yet contemplated doing so. Moreover, it will give the neighboring Arab states a raison d’être to acquire nuclear weapons against a possible threat, which the US and the EU-3 can empathize with and which they have hitherto lacked vis-à-vis the West in their opposition to Israel’s nuclear arsenal.

A Taoist anecdote in “Journey to the West,” one of the four great novels of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), presents a unique analogy as to what to expect regarding Iran’s course of action on the nuclear matter and that of the neighboring and the Western capitals in response: “A magical monkey founds a monkey civilization and becomes its leader by establishing a territory for the monkeys. Subsequently the monkey king overcomes a ‘devil confusing the world’ and steals the devil’s sword. Returning to his own land with the devil’s sword, the monkey king takes up the practice of swordsmanship. He even teaches his monkey subjects to make toy weapons and regalia to play at war. Unfortunately, though ruler of a nation, the monkey king is not yet ruler of himself. In eminently logical backward reasoning, the monkey reflects that if neighboring nations note the monkeys’ play, they might assume the monkeys were preparing for war. In that case, they might therefore take pre-emptive action against the monkeys, who would then be faced with real warfare armed only with toy weapons. Thus, the monkey king thoughtfully initiates the arms race, ordering pre-pre-emptive stockpiling of real weapons.”

As far as Turkey’s interests are concerned, not only its national security in the face of a possible nuclear threat (not necessarily posed by Iran), but also the diminishing of its diplomatic clout in the face of Iran’s growing regional influence is at stake.

Nuclear Iran vs. non-nuclear Turkey: What is the game plan?

Iran is hardly likely to pose a direct nuclear security threat to Turkey, for several reasons. First, both Iran and Turkey pride themselves on having the most stable border in the region since the 17th century. Second, the two have increasingly lucrative commercial ties, mostly based on oil and gas, and in many ways Turkey is a gateway for Iran to the world, from which it has long been forcibly isolated. Third, Iran’s security doctrine is mainly based on defense, and as such, Tehran is very unlikely to use the military card in its relations with Turkey unless in an ultra-hypothetical scenario it decides to lead an all-out Shiite uprising against the Sunnis. Fourth, Iran would not want to alienate the rest of the Muslim world by militarily threatening another Muslim country such as Turkey, which is increasingly popular and influential. At this point, it is worth remembering that it was not Iran which started the eight-year war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1980, but the other way around. Finally, Iran already has a legitimate adversary with a heavy nuclear arsenal in the region, toward which Tehran may want to make use of its prospective nuclear weapons for most likely defensive and less likely offensive purposes. There is no need to mention that engaging in such a military confrontation with Israel would rapidly boost Iran’s popularity throughout the Muslim world as well. So, Turkey is hardly in a position to be worried about Iran’s prospective nuclear weapons as a national security threat. In this line, recently asked about Iran’s nuclear program, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Turkey does not perceive any of its neighbors, including Iran, as a security threat. 

Nevertheless, Turkey should be concerned about the potential growth of Iran’s diplomatic influence throughout the region once the latter acquires nuclear weapons capabilities on top of its already increased economic and political influence. The last eight years has witnessed an unprecedented increase in Iran’s regional influence thanks to the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Israel’s never-ending aggression against Lebanon and Gaza.

Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami notes, “Regardless of where the United States changes regimes, it is our [Iran’s] friends who will come to power.” (Vali Nasr, “Forces of Fortune,” 2009) It looks like it has just been so. The US invasions have ousted Iran’s enduring adversaries, respectively, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party in Iraq. Similarly, Israel’s aggressions toward Lebanon and Gaza have again enabled Iran to increase its influence and popularity in these parts of the region through its support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine. It is obvious that Iran will follow bolder policies in its support of such groups once it gains the protective shield of nuclear weapons against any possible threat either from Israel or from its Western allies. In addition, Iran will be admired by the masses throughout the region for its not bowing to the demands and pressures of the West, in general, and of the US, in particular.

In the final analysis, Iran’s nuclear program presents dangers for some and opportunities for others. Turkey is in a unique position to be presented with both. As Davutoğlu reiterated recently, Iran’s nuclear program does not pose a military threat to Turkish national security. However, it does threaten Turkey’s diplomatic influence across the Middle East. As such, it is the problem of not only Turkey, but also the West. At the end of the day, Turkey may have to consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons capability as a Plan B in order to counterbalance the new nuclear realities in its neighborhood.