Turkey’s expanded presence in the foreign policy arena has long been visible to many, with some commentators suggesting that this signified a shift in foreign policy orientation, with Ankara turning its back to the Western alliance and moving toward a closer and institutionalized cooperation with the Islamic world instead.
Having already refuted such statements, Ankara is now moving to become a more-equipped capital in regards to both its qualitative and quantitative needs.
Back in October, when asked about concerns over the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Burak Özügergin said foreign policy should not be regarded as “a zero-sum game.”
“Turkey is expanding its relations; it’s not changing its direction. Our axis is obvious. I guess people can’t get rid of the Cold War mentality. Turkey may be extremely good friends with Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Georgia and Armenia, with Greece and Bulgaria as well. This is neither against NATO nor can it be considered a stance against any other country or a group of countries. We have to get rid of such limiting paradigms,” Özügergin said, rejecting any shift of axis.
Change in static relations
As a matter of fact, the emphasis on the Cold War mentality by the spokesperson, a member of Davutoğlu’s “cabinet,” also reflects why Turkey needs a more expanded foreign policy staff when compared to the Cold War era. While moving from the bipolar Cold War system toward the multi-polar post-Cold War era, Turkey’s needs in the foreign policy arena have inevitably diversified in line with this international transition.
A recent policy change at the Foreign Ministry, requiring young diplomatic officers to learn at least one of the languages of neighboring countries such as Arabic, Armenian or Persian, is the best example of such inevitability. While Turkey’s relations with its neighborhood were rather static during the Cold War era, today’s picture is entirely different under the guidance of the “zero-problem and maximum cooperation” policy for the country’s relations with its neighbors.
Sources involved in the issue describe the ongoing efforts at the ministry as “a comprehensive reconstruction push.” A detailed report showing the current course of affairs in figures has already been prepared and was presented to Davutoğlu this week.
In mid-November, during deliberations over the Foreign Ministry’s budget at Parliament’s Planning and Budget Commission, Davutoğlu ruled out claims that the budget allocated to the Foreign Ministry has been decreased during the term of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which came to power in 2002 and was re-elected in July 2007.
In 2007, the budget allocated to the ministry was TL 690 million, and it increased to TL 707 million in 2008 and to TL 802 million in 2009, Davutoğlu explained at the time, noting that the ministry’s budget for 2010 was set at TL 920 million.
Dedication and sustainability
Still, as far as was reflected in articles penned by journalists accompanying him during his recent visits abroad, Davutoğlu, who was the chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2002 until he was appointed to his current post in May, doesn’t deny an urgent need for fully equipping the Foreign Ministry with a more expanded staff strengthened by expert members.
Figures showing the increase in the number of Turkey’s missions abroad in the last few years may be more helpful in showing the urgency of this need. The number of Turkey’s missions abroad was 136 in 1991, when the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union; it increased to 160 in 1999 and stands at 198 as of 2009.
The number of administrative officers was 403 in 1991; it increased to 524 in 1999 and is currently 493. The number of diplomatic officers was 712 in 1991; it increased to 875 in 1999 and it is currently 970.
Out of those 198 missions, 114 are embassies, 11 are permanent representative offices and 73 are consulates. At present, 177 of those 198 missions are functioning. By 2010, the number is expected to increase to 203.
When compared to other countries such as Britain, France and Germany, both the size of the budget allocated to the foreign service in proportion to the gross national income and its proportion compared to other ministries’ allocations, as well as the number of diplomatic officers employed, do not seem to be on par with Turkey’s ongoing hectic activities in this area.
Particularly taking into account the fact that Turkey’s agenda is currently broader than those countries’ due to both its geographic location and its foreign policy understanding, one can easily infer that the selflessly devoted work by the current Foreign Ministry staff, working a 24/7 shift schedule, is not sustainable without being supported by more colleagues.
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