This fluctuation originates from the intermittent nature of such relationships and the changing conditions that create cooperation. Thus, it will be beneficial to remind ourselves of the major dynamics and reasons that condition these relations before evaluating the most recent crisis.
Even though there were military, economic and political relations between Turkey before the 1990s, these relations turned into strategic cooperation due to the influence of end of the Cold War on international relations and the influence of Gulf War on the Middle East regional system. This effect, especially during the mid-1990s, was perceived as a common threat by two countries. The relationship achieved a certain internal dynamic as a result of the struggle with the PKK and military cooperation. The United States played a role in both creating the foundation and facilitating the conduct of these relations.
Dynamics in relations can be summarized as following;
1. The Establishment of the International System and Common Threat Assessments after 1990:
In the early 1990s, on one hand, the rise of problems between Turkey, Iran, Syria and Greece and the understanding that Turkey cannot handle these problems within the framework of NATO as in the Cold War, increased problems with Russia and Iran in the Middle East and the Caucasus created some difficulties for Turkey; on the other hand, Israel’s being threatened by Syria and Iran led to the perception of a common threat. Moreover, improved Israeli-Palestinian relations after the Gulf War and developments following the Oslo Declaration of Principles during the Middle East peace process prevented Turkey from turning its back on Israel due to Turkish sensitivity about the Palestinian issue.
2. The PKK Effect
This reason, valid in Turkey, was seen as a good reason for Israel to establish relations. In conditions where terrorist organizations were supported intensely by regional countries and especially European countries and the US were not supplying military material for the struggle with terrorism, this factor had an important role in developing relations between the two nations.
3. Military Affairs
Perhaps the most important reason for perceiving and defining the relation as strategic is that it includes the modernization of military training, intelligence sharing and military marketing, including high tech military weapons systems. In addition, although the relations between two countries have never foreseen their alliance against a third country, it is certain that both countries use each other as a psychological factor against regional rivals perceived as a threat.
4. The Effect of the US
The US was an integral part of the relationship by providing assurance in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East and by engaging at necessary points.
Turkey-Israel relations were one of the most powerful relationships in the Middle East, but have begun to decline since 2000. However, the main period of decline and cooling came after 2003. Here a basic point should be remembered. Recent Israeli comments point out that cooling Turkish-Israeli relations originate with the current Turkish government, but this is not correct. During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit criticized Israel harshly. Also, just as some of the factors below are directly related to foreign policy of Turkey, the main point is about changes in structural factors as was also the case in the beginning of the relationship. The reasons for the decline and cooling of bilateral relations can be listed as follows:
1. Changes in the International and Regional System Effecting Cooperation
a. The benefits of cooperation reduced shared threats. Turkey was able to eliminate the threats by its neighbors to a large extent before the Iraq war occurred.
b. Expectations that did not happen. The ambience of the mid-1990s led to expectations in Central Asia and the Caucasus that would alter the balance of cooperation between the two countries, creating a huge economic potential and strategic projects such as the Water of Peace project. However, these expectations and projects were not realized.
c. The Effects of the Iraq War: The US invasion of Iraq, radically changing balances of power in the Middle East, placed Turkey and Israel on separate sides. While Turkey was one of the most important defenders of the regional status quo and against the partition of Iraq, Israel became the most important defender of sanctions against Syria and Iran after the Bush administration's Iraq intervention. Moreover, while the fragmentation of Iraq and establishment of a new state in the north of Iraq caused Iran and Syria and Turkey to draw closer to each other, Israel's activities in northern Iraq and relations with Iraqi Kurds has created suspicion. Particularly, relations between Turkey and Israel were seriously strained by Israel's activities in northern Iraq in 2005. In a sense, poor relations with Iran and Syria played a crucial role in strengthening of relations between the two countries in the past, but the Iraq War has had the opposite effect.
d. The Effects of the Palestinian problem: The conflict that began with the Al-Aqsa Intifada and continued with Israel's West Bank operations has more influence over the relations between the two countries. Along with the Turkish public’s sensitivity to the Palestinian issue, the dilemma of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the impact of Israel's predicament in Lebanon on the regional equation played a major role.
2. New Concepts in Turkey's Foreign Policy and Changing Strategic Perceptions
Both Turkey's economic policy and foreign policy have created a new strategic perception because of its desire to develop relations with neighbors and to be a model for regional development. A transition based on mutual interests and threat assessments has substantially changed Turkey's relations with countries such as Iran, Syria and Iraq. In addition, although Israel has the potential to play an important role in increasing Turkey's attempt to wield "soft power" in Middle East, its failure to do so caused disappointment. For example, such factors as the collapse of Turkey's mediation in the negotiations between Israel and Syria, the continuous deterioration of conditions in Palestine and civilian casualties at the hands of Israel’s military operations have increased Turkey’s negative reaction to Israel. In particular, Israel’s operations at the end of the 2008 in Gaza had a large impact.
The last event that helped to rupture relations between Turkey and Israel was the international military exercise called Anatolian Eagle. According to the statements of Israeli authorities, the Turkish Armed Forces asked Israel not to participate in this exercise. There is no clear explanation about the cancellation of Israeli participation in Israel’s newspapers or the Turkish press. The Turkish Armed Forces’ statement on its website says: “The Turkish Armed Forces planned annual exercise is the Anatolian Eagle (AE-09 / 3). It will be conducted without international participation as a result of contacts between the Foreign Ministry and related countries on 10-23 October 2009 in Konya.” In the statement, no reason is specified, and it is understood that the decision was made by by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Turkish Foreign Ministry’s statement emphases that the decision should not be judged to have a political meaning: “The regular Turkish Anatolian Eagle exercise is held according to the Turkish Air Force's operational plans with international participation and successive exercises stages in different periods of the year since 2001. The first two phases of the exercise were successfully performed.
However, the international section of third phase with other participating nations planned for 12-23 October 2009 has been postponed. However, the exercise will be held as a national activity. This was announced to the public by the website of the General Staff. Therefore, the alteration of the international phase cannot be assigned political meaning and consequences. In this context, it is not possible to give credence to press assessments and comments that refer to Israeli officials. Israeli officials are invited to make their own description and assess the attitude.” However, Israeli officials specifically emphasize that postponement was at the request of the government. They indicated as evidence the statement given by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on CNN television. Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu stated that he hopes the situation in Gaza will be improved and affect Turkish-Israeli relations positively.
In Turkey this development did not cause strong reactions; however, in Israel, Turkey's agenda became the number one current issue. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged and held a meeting about it on Sunday, October 11. After the issues were considered written evaluations appeared in the Israel's most important press organs based on mostly unnamed Israeli officials. These assessments show that Israel (at least in some circles) has interpreted the issue as a major crisis. Remarkably, although no statement from Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Lieberman directly names names related to this issue and despite soothing words from Defense Minister Barak, protest in other circles increased. At this point, considering what academicians, analysts, journalists and politicians interested in this issue have to say may help to understand the Israeli reaction, since these groups actually did react to this development and have a significant impact in creating public opinion and policy in Israel.
The reasons for Israeli reactions to recent events can be grouped under three main headings:
1. There is the military aspect of this issue. The most important reason for calling the Turkey-Israel relationship a strategic relationship is its military dimension. There is no important reaction among people who are interested in this issue because there was no military dimension to the recent tensions in Israel. The economic and cultural dimension of the relationship is not as well developed as was expected and its political dimension was also limited. The progress experienced at the time of most developed Turkey-Israel relations and the minimal risk of Israel's suffering harm strengthened the idea that Turkey is really against Israel.
2. Some circles in Israel evaluated the recent alienation of Turkey and Israel as a temporary affair based on domestic political moves. Large numbers of people even associate domestic political developments with the Davos incident, which caused the peak of tension between the two countries in 2009. However, with the latest development, the idea that the problem is not related to reactionary or domestic politics began to strengthen. Therefore, comments on Turkey’s critical stance regarding Israel’s policies referring to "Islamism" or change in foreign policy axis began to dominate the Israeli press.
3. The idea that alienation between the two countries was caused by the current government and that military relations between the two countries would not be affected by intergovernmental issues was strong for a while. In some estimates, the idea of developing military relations was supported with examples from the period of the Welfare Party’s coalition government. However, with the latest development two new ideas began to take over the discussions in Israel.
Some authors believe that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) also caused this strong reaction in Israel. Otherwise, this event could not have occurred. Although they cannot show any reason or evidence for this, Israel’s understanding of the role of armed forces in Turkey’s internal affairs may explain the basis for this assessment. Comments saying that the TAF cannot resist pressure from the government and that its role in domestic politics was decreased have been seen in some articles.
The most important reasons for Israel to evaluate the issue in this way, as stated above, originates from the predominantly military dimension of relations in the period which bilateral relations become strategic cooperation and strong perception of relation which was founded upon the request and inducement of Turkish Armed Forces. Unfortunately, recent comments, analysis and academic research show that Israel cannot fully comprehend Turkey’s perspective on bilateral relations or the reasons for recent tension. Since Israel does not recognize the structural and cyclical reasons that constitute the relationship, and military relations between two countries are seen as an economic relationship, Israel is unable to comprehend the change in Turkey’s perspective. Thus, it may be said that Israel sees Turkey’s reactions to the Iraqi and Palestinian issues as temporary, specific to a political movement and elements of domestic politics. On the other hand, some writers claim that by magnifying the issues Turkey has changed its side in foreign policy. Recent events may push Israel to handle its relations with Turkey in a realistic way.
»» Assist. Prof. Dr. Serhat Erkmen, ORSAM Political Advisor, Ahi Evran University
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