Syria, Israel and Sarkozy
by
ALİ YURTTAGÜL*

Not only did conditions for peace in the Middle East worsen with the elections in Israel but the Olmert-Erdoğan crisis evolved into an Israel-Turkey crisis. Relations between Turkey and Israel became even more strained when the Israeli government prohibited Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who wanted to visit Israel to pick up the pieces, from visiting Gaza and prohibited the delivery of construction material provided by Turkey to Gaza. In the midst of this dark atmosphere, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has attempted to carry these talks to Paris and is seeking Turkey’s support in this endeavor. Paris’ move can be considered a positive attempt that should be supported, even if there is a small chance that it will yield a result, but one Turkey should be distant towards because conditions are not very appropriate to restart the İstanbul process

To bring clarity to the subject I want to first debate the chances of the Syria-Israel talks restarting and achieving success, then address the role of Sarkozy’s expectations followed by Turkey’s attitude and contribution to the process.

Israel searching for doors

There may not be a high chance that the discontinued talks between Israel and Syria will restart in Paris, but there is a chance. Israel is not only experiencing trouble with its international relations in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis but it is also searching for doors from which it can send peace signals. Moreover, there are cold winds blowing between Benjamin Netanyahu and his close “allies” because he continues the policy of occupying Palestinian territories by opening them to new settlements and for keeping the doors closed on the Palestine issue.

While the entry of Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Palestine alongside the two-state thesis during the Swedish term presidency at the latest EU summit and Swedish Foreign Minister Karl Bildt’s announcement of the cancellation of the Mediterranean Union summit slated to take place in İstanbul due to Arabs’ refusal to attend the event alongside Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman are not coincidences, they both showcase Israel’s increasing isolation in the West.

Thus, by starting talks with Syria it wants to give positive messages to sway world opinion, make a diplomatic breakthrough and appear to be actively working towards the “peace” process. The second and perhaps the most important factor is that the ingredient keeping the Netanyahu-Barak-Lieberman coalition in place is a common Iran policy. By engaging in dialogue with Syria, this government, which has nothing in common except an Iran policy, also aims to integrate Syria into the West and distance it from Iran. France could be a facilitator in achieving this goal. Another reality is that a crushing majority of the Israeli people essentially approve of a “two state” solution for the sake of peace and do not want to lose the hope of peace. Netanyahu is aware of this reality. We will return to this topic later, but first let us briefly look at Syria.

There is only one reason why Syria approves of a potential meeting in Paris. The rapprochement between Syria and Turkey was essentially always one-sided and was always considered Turkey’s achievement. While this fact isn’t incorrect, Syria has wanted to expand to the West for a very long time. Paris is a good address for its expansion to the West. Even if talks do not yield a result, Syria’s openness to dialogue and approval of France’s mediation is a positive approach for this country.

Syria redefines perspective of peace

Another fact that perhaps makes Syria more convincing is that it no longer associates peace with Israel with the Palestinian issue. I suppose there is no purpose in making the Palestinian problem, which has become like a Gordian knot, even more unsolvable. Of course this does not mean that the Palestinian problem and Syria-Israel talks are independent from each other. It was no coincidence that the İstanbul process stopped when the Gaza crisis broke out. There is a very low chance that Syria and Israel will achieve peace without a peace perspective in Palestine, but be careful though, as I said a peace perspective, not peace. This is where the problem lies. Today, there is a coalition in Israel that is against the idea of an independent state in Palestine and that is unable to offer a peace project.

Although it appears difficult for a government that relies on a politician like Foreign Minister Lieberman, who Europeans describe as “anti-Arab” because they are hesitant to call him “racist,” to achieve peace with Arabs, the basic problem stems from Likud. It is estimated that there are at least 20 deputies in this party that are strictly against the two state thesis which is the only feasible solution on the table. Even if Netanyahu makes an unexpected return to the peace process, he does not have a political base within his own party. It is for this reason that it must enter into coalition with the Kadima party, which is the largest party and one that adamantly defends the two state thesis; in other words it must give up the prime ministry. This has a fairly low probability of occurring and would mean another division of Likud.

The situation is not very pleasant for the Labor Party, either. This party, which was the founder of Israel, is shadow of its history. As a party with votes plunging to 13 percent and its decline from the biggest to the fourth-largest party, the coalition problem will be on the agenda of the party’s general assembly in two months. It seems that if it decides to withdraw from the coalition, the government will enter a period of crisis, and if it decides to remain, the party will enter a deep crisis period. It is for this reason that there is benefit in closely following the debates in the Labor Party. The case we’re trying to underline by pointing to these facts is that Israel’s policy is fairly distant from the stability, sustainability and peace perspective. If the Labor Party decided to withdraw from the coalition, either early elections will be held or Netanyahu will try to continue his government by opening up to the extreme right and extremist parties. Unfortunately a government that relies on Lieberman plus extremist parties does not offer a very pleasant perspective.

The only source of hope for peace, Kadima, which defends the two state idea, has been hurt by Olmert. Perhaps Olmert, who did not learn a lesson from the Lebanon War and was responsible for the Gaza disaster, was telling the truth when he said “I did not know” about the Gaza offensive during discussions with Erdoğan about arranging direct talks with Syria.

I highly doubt that, but let’s suppose that he was telling the truth. Then I guess Kadima was a victim of the Israeli deep state and instead of making peace with Syria it was pushed into war in Gaza and lost the elections. We hope they have learned a lesson from their “deep state” experience. If they want to acquire historical and in-depth knowledge about the deep state issue, then I believe if they were to take a closer look at the history of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, their horizons would broaden. If we were to wrap up without losing focus of the main theme then the point is that Israel currently does not have the political groundwork needed for the Paris talks to be successful and for a peace perspective in Palestine. Palestine aside, the Netanyahu government does not even have the power to withdraw the approximately 20,000 Israeli citizens that have settled on the Golan Heights. It is for this reason that the Netanyahu government wants to sit at the same table with Syria -- not for peace, but to win some time.

Turkey to profit most from Syria-Israel peace

Unfortunately Paris is not a more appealing city than İstanbul for talks. If we look at the factors that make İstanbul appealing without examining Paris, the previous sentence can be understood better. The only reason Syria-Israel talks began in İstanbul is not because Turkey has a smart and active foreign minister like Davutoğlu, who knows the region very well. While the Davutoğlu factor is a matter that should not be disregarded in the least, the reason Turkey has a positive and constructive relationship with these two countries stems from both Syria and Israel’s trust in Turkey’s sincerity in wanting peace, for one of the countries that will benefit the most from peace between Syria and Israel is Turkey. The second factor that makes İstanbul appealing is that Turkey has a lot to offer to ensure that the process concludes successfully. The Ceyhan-Red Sea oil pipeline planned by Turkey, India and Israel will not only have become cheaper after peace with Syria but could make these three countries involved in a common economic fate. Water is one of the most important issues in the Golan Heights problem. Turkey is also a country that has the means to facilitate the water issue for peace between Syria and Israel. A peace process developed by these three countries would mean Israeli citizens getting into their cars and expanding towards Turkey and Europe, just as it is for Syria right now. The İstanbul talks offered a perspective that not even the US or France could offer for Israel’s integration with the region.

It is not possible for Paris to offer all this. The only matter that makes Paris more appealing than İstanbul is that France can use “EU opportunities” more effectively than Turkey. However, Paris cannot guarantee Syria that it will make EU opportunities available until a potential agreement is ensured. If the talks are blocked by the Israeli side like they were during the İstanbul process, Syria will not be able to find any “support” inside the EU except a simple “bravo.” This “advantage” for Paris isn’t quite considered “strategic,” either. For the EU is obliged to open its doors to a Syria that makes peace with Israel regardless of which country was the mediator. But despite all this, Paris’ attempt to contribute to the peace process should not be undermined. No matter how the negotiations continue in Paris, Syria will have made progress towards the West. This kind of a process is to the advantage of Turkey. It is for this reason that if bilateral talks begin in Paris, the process should be supported even if the expectation of a result is low.

The problem for Turkey isn’t the issue of supporting it. The problem is France’s expectation to be able to use Turkey’s “assistance” and contributive and facilitative opportunities in the Paris process in order for it to be successful. In essence, this would not have been a problem, either, if the potential Paris talks truly had a chance of being successful or if Turkey and France had good relations. But the problem is essentially much deeper. The problem is not France but Sarkozy. Sarkozy’s shadow makes it necessary for Turkey to be cautious from two perspectives.

Sarkozy’s policy on Turkey is not shaped on the basis of the EU framework or his self-planned “Mediterranean Union” framework, and neither is it shaped around his foreign policy principles or France’s interests. France’s policy on Turkey is not shaped by “Quai d’Orsay” or the minister for EU Affairs and neither is it shaped by its close advisor staff at the Presidential Palace at “Elysée.” Sarkozy’s Turkey policy is strictly shaped around the aim of having the French right win the presidential elections. Sarkozy opposes Turkey’s EU membership not due to EU policies but to be able to include the French extreme right into his campaign. It is for this reason that even if Turkey were to mobilize all its resources for the Paris talks, it is impossible for Sarkozy to evaluate Turkey’s sacrifices positively on the level of the EU and other international levels. Not only will Sarkozy probably want to make Turkey’s contributions invisible but also blame Turkey for any potential failures.

The second problem stems from Sarkozy’s personality. Sarkozy is not dependable from many perspectives. It did not go unnoticed when Obama decided to have dinner alone with his wife instead of dinner with the Sarkozy couple (no one can argue that they aren’t an attractive couple) during his visit to Paris. According to French media, this diplomatic “scandal” was caused by the US’s anger with Sarkozy. According to rumors, when Sarkozy was getting ready to tackle the Georgia crisis, Obama’s predecessor, George Bush, called him and said: “This is a good move. I support you till the very end.” Sarkozy must have wanted to share his diplomatic success with those around him and the press because he relayed the conversation as if Bush had said, “Don’t go, the Russians are determined, they are going to enter Tbilisi, you won’t be able to achieve anything.”

In addition to this matter, it is claimed that Sarkozy’s Turkey policy and his stern stance against the headscarf is a cause of the cold breeze between Sarkozy and Obama at a time when French-US relations are in their golden days. In other words, according to French media, the US finds Sarkozy unreliable. Leaders in the EU are also having problems with Sarkozy. Everyone knows the tension between Sarkozy and London after Barnier’s appointment. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who incurred a financial burden to convince Poland to sign the Lisbon Treaty, is also quite cold towards Sarkozy, who is an audacious politician who claims he was the one that convinced Poland. Is there a single reason that can be presented for why Turkey should find Sarkozy dependable?