The Constitutional Court and the DTP
by
MÜMTAZ’ER TÜRKÖNE

The climate that democracy has developed is turning the DTP and the PKK into the antithesis of each other. Both are virtually sharing the same pie on the same narrow ground. When one’s share increases, the other one’s share decreases. The pie consists of solutions. The PKK has weapons in its hand, the DTP has access to the parliamentary podium. The PKK gets its strength from searching for a “solution” with arms while the DTP has weight over the Kurds -- although it pushes it a bit too far from time to time -- by struggling within the frame of law and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by democracy. The basic question is which “solution” will be chosen? Deep down, this scuffle continues in the Kurdish political movement. If the Constitutional Court decides to close down the DTP while this polarization remains, it will mark the victory of those who “search for a solution with arms.” Just visualize it. You buy a weapon, you set up its mechanism, you open its safety lock and then you hand it over to the terrorist. This is what closing the DTP means.

What is the DTP to the PKK?

It covers up the unproductive details that heated slogans, hatred and anger lead up to. The DTP is not exactly the PKK’s political representative or mouthpiece. The relationship between the PKK and the DTP is an armed tutelage relationship, which is similar to the military tutelage relationship that existed between the military junta and the three party coalition Anasol-D government during the Feb. 28, 1997 process. Visualize DTP leader Ahmet Türk as Mesut Yılmaz. Visualize the way he tapped his shoulder with his four fingers and then made the “one” gesture with his index finger. Then you will be able to understand how Türk’s soft and peaceful messages instantly changed and how his attitude toughened after the complaint from İmralı about the prison’s conditions.

Fundamentally, the DTP is a bilateral coalition. The doves led by Türk consist of the Kurdish aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The hawks are from the lower classes. The continuation of the feudal structure in the region has enabled a local aristocracy to carry on. While aristocracy has never existed among Turks, it continues to exist among Kurds. Türk himself is a Kurdish aristocrat. The battle between the doves and hawks is actually denominational. It is a denominational conflict that even transcends the Kurdish ethnic identity. The main reason “Kurdish Kemalism” is in demand among Kurdish elites is because it has the power to eliminate this conflict. As it is known, Kemalism offers the elite the privilege of leading society. Professor Ümit Özdağ, the Chairman of the 21st Century Turkey Institute, wrote a short report titled “Why the DTP shouldn’t be closed down.” As it can be understood from the title, Professor Özdağ, who is a leading figure in Turkish nationalism, is strongly against DTP’s closure. Özdağ bases his analysis on the crisis the “Democratic Initiative” has created in the DTP/PKK lines. Roughly speaking, the PKK saw the “initiative” as an opportunity to have Öcalan seen as a part of the process. Now it is planning to eliminate the initiative and re-escalate violence. As for closing down the DTP, it will reveal the restraint of democratic politics and legitimize the thesis that there is no other solution but to turn to arms.

The dissolution of PKK

The argument that the PKK wants to end the initiative is correct. The DTP’s closure is a wonderful opportunity for the PKK to abdicate the responsibility for ending the initiative. The argument that the DTP wants to be closed down is not completely correct. But it is correct that the PKK strongly wants the DTP to be shut down. The efforts within the DTP to have the party banned are directly related to PKK plans. Molotov cocktail attacks are the PKK’s stunts. Defending these life-threatening and property-harming actions as a “democratic mass demonstration” means deserving to be closed down. What kind of thoughtlessness is it for the DTP to “apologize” for the death of Serap who was burned by Molotov cocktails while continuing to defend throwing Molotov cocktails as a “democratic demonstration?”

The democratic initiative is moving along in its own course. But the Kurdish leg of the initiative has started to stall. The reason for this is the PKK. Preceding the fact that the PKK is an illegal political organization is the fact that it is an organization that bases its existence and strength on arms; it thrives on weapons. It is this situation that brings the DTP and the PKK up against each other on the same narrow platform.

Let’s specify the problem. If the democratic initiative reaches its goal, will there still be an area where the PKK or those who live on arms can sustain their existence? Can Turkey’s Kurdish problem be solved while armed tutelage over Kurdish politics continues? Can those who thrive on arms accept a solution that will destroy them? Will there be progress if those who have armed men waiting for orders make the decisions on the steps to be taken about the democratic initiative, instead of Türk?

The issue is not the inclusion of arms and the arms threats in the negotiation process. The issue is the end result of armed power. How can the democratic initiative eliminate all the conditions that keep the PKK alive; in other words, how can it manage to solve the Kurdish problem if the PKK continues to exist? PKK members are opposing the democratic initiative, calling it a “dissolution project.” This initiative is, of course, a dissolution project against the PKK. How can you solve the Kurdish problem and allow an armed organization to keep control over Kurds? In other words, if armed tutelage over democratic Kurdish politics is going to persist, how can that be a solution? The PKK needs to dissolve on its own, not through the way of others. In other words, the dissolution of the PKK means the rejections of an “armed solution.” The PKK’s declaration that it is giving up this option is a precondition for Kurdish politics.

There is no counterpart to the PKK’s strategy of armed action. The international conjuncture is not allowing the PKK to reach any of its goals through arms. Turkey is obliged to be a safe country. Even the Kurdish presence in northern Iraq is linked to the PKK’s dissolution. On the other hand, there is nothing the Kurds can gain from internal PKK violence. The 25 years of blood-shed has shown that progress is impossible with violent methods. If the PKK continues to use violence it will not achieve a political result but will, instead, foster a blood feud, which will be of no benefit to the PKK or the Kurds. The only advantageous methods for everyone are peaceful means. That said, neither the PKK’s threats nor violence has a political counterpart.

The chaotic atmosphere that will ensue in Turkey because of PKK violence will also have no benefit for anyone. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) will bear the responsibility of the cost to be paid the moment the initiative process ends. Because they insistently wanted the process to stop. This time around the public will learn by experience that a halted process means increasing violence. The AK Party was being worn down and the MHP and CHP were increasing their votes while the process was still in progress, but now the complete opposite is going to happen.

The DTP should not be shut down. In fact, it should not be shut down in spite of the DTP. The Constitutional Court should contribute to the dissolution of the PKK with the decision it is going to reach. It is the same segment of society that keeps alive the DTP, in other words democratic politics, and the PKK, in other words political violence. And we should be able to continue to search for a solution by standing on the same common ground.