The New Turkish Lexicon

There can be few countries where the gap between established images and the actual extent of change is so pronounced. Uneasiness prevails on all sides as observers look back with nostalgia to more certain times in Turkish domestic and foreign policy—or press for an acceleration of change. A recent visit to participate in the Istanbul Forum offered a window into the prevailing discourse and an opportunity to reflect on Turkey’s new regional choices and new foreign policy vocabulary.

Parallel elites

The religious-secular divide no longer appears to be the real center of gravity in Turkish politics. To be sure, Islam is still part of the equation, and more overt religiosity alongside populist discourse has been emblematic of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) approach. But religious politics has

acquired a recessed quality and has been overtaken by a more overt competition along class lines. After almost a decade of AKP-led government in a country where the state remains the leading economic arbiter, it is not surprising that business-government relations have emerged as the new front line in Turkish politics. The ongoing tax case involving the Doğan group, Turkey’s largest media conglomerate, has become a cause célèbre, complicated by the lack of any effective parliamentary opposition to AKP rule and the increasingly personalized character of Turkish politics.

The early stages of AKP’s rise to power might reasonably have been described as a populist, socially conservative revolt against Turkey’s secular establishment. Today, the environment is more accurately characterized as a competition between two parallel elites occupying adjacent, commanding heights of the Turkish economy. This is the vision Cengiz Candar very perceptively described as “two-Turkey” a few years ago. Many analysts inside and outside the country regard this duality as unstable and likely to be resolved in favor of more popular forces. Yet, examples of societies with sustained parallel elites (e.g., India, Russia, the United States) exist on the international scene, and the increasing globalization of the Turkish economy could well serve as an ameliorating factor. Significant changes affecting the role of the state, attitudes toward religion, civil-military relations, and other key aspects of the society have certainly taken place. For the most part, these have been gradual rather than revolutionary, even if the net effect has been substantial over time. As one keen observer put it when describing the social and political changes of recent years, “we have just gotten used to it.”

A new foreign policy vocabulary

Something similar might be said of the changes underway in Turkey’s international policy. Taken as a whole, the transformation under AKP government has been substantial, and much of it has been positive from the perspective of transatlantic interests. A decade ago, Turkey had troubled relations with most of its neighbors, not least Syria, Armenia, and Greece (where an opening started prior to the advent of AKP rule). Today, Turkish foreign policy is defined by an explicit policy of “zero problems” with neighbors and multiple détentes. At the same time, Ankara has acquired closer ties with Russia, Turkey’s leading economic partner, Iran, and a host of countries across Asia, Africa, and Eurasia. Much of this new activism has been driven by commercial interest. It has also been driven by the affinities of the AKP leadership and its supporters.

In the wake of the Gaza crisis, Turkish-Israeli relations have gone from bad to worse, and few would now characterize the relationship as “strategic” in any meaningful sense. Joint exercises have been cancelled, defense industrial cooperation is stalled, and frictions abound at the cultural and political levels. In truth, a recalibration of Turkish-Israeli relations was probably inevitable. Public opinion has become an increasingly important factor in Turkish foreign policy, and this opinion is starkly negative with regard to Israel and deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister, has been highly outspoken on this issue, and his views reflect and reinforce public sentiment. In geopolitical terms, the close bilateral cooperation of the late 1990s was the product of specific strategic conditions, above all a shared concern about Syria and Iran. With the tremendous improvement in Turkish relations with Damascus and Tehran, these conditions no longer exist. So too, Ankara is less concerned with the perceived benefits of closer ties to Israel when it comes to relations with Washington. The effect was never as automatic as many on the Turkish side assumed. The question now is not whether a strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel can be re-established, but rather how far the deterioration is likely to go, and what can be salvaged.

Beyond the shift in Turkey’s relations with key neighbors, several broader tendencies are observable. These were clearly on display in remarks by Erdoğan and others at the Istanbul Forum, where the inaugural theme was “Turkey’s Neighborhood Policy and the Middle East.” First, Turkey’s foreign policy discourse is increasingly self-referential, when not openly nationalistic. Turkey’s recent overtures on multiple fronts, from accords with Armenia to a broad range of economic and political initiatives involving Russia, Syria, and Iran, have fueled a sense of Turkish capacity and centrality. Overtures toward Baghdad, the Kurdish regional government, and Turkey’s own Kurds have contributed to the perception of a “Turkish moment,” in which new ground is being broken on virtually a daily basis. Turkey’s leadership seems unconcerned by the potential risks of dilution and overstretch inherent in this continental equivalent of making the ocean boil; so far, there has been little to check Ankara’s momentum.

Second, the foreign policy vocabulary of the AKP leadership reflects a growing attachment to third world and non-aligned perspectives. The prime minister’s remarks at the Istanbul Forum included numerous references to the need for a new global order and anticipated a rebalancing of international priorities and policies. Non-alignment may strike many observers as an archaic, Cold War-era notion. But seen through the lens of the constant pressure to choose between Turkey’s Western, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern vocations, the non-aligned option starts to look attractive from the perspective of a leadership without an automatic preference for ties with Washington and Brussels. Troubled relations with Europe and a relationship with the United States that has yet to fully recover from the stresses of the Bush years reinforce this inclination. In an otherwise restrained atmosphere, only two subjects provoked strong reaction from the largely Turkish audience at the opening of the Forum—the situation in Gaza and the negative attitude of key European states toward Turkey’s EU candidacy.

Third, in terms of regional policy, AKP discourse implicitly favors the idea of a “Middle East for the Middle Easterners.” This concept fits uneasily with the desire for stronger American leadership in the Middle East peace process but is fully compatible with the new Turkish activism and desire to serve as broker or, at least, a facilitator of regional dialogues. Is this new? It is not that far from the inclinations of the Ecevit and Ozal leaderships. The crucial difference is that Turkey is now a much more significant actor in both economic and political terms, and Turkey’s Middle Eastern choices are, rightly or wrongly, seen as linked to the country’s own identity crisis. The question is not so much whether Turkey’s Middle Eastern engagement is a good thing or a bad thing—it is an unsurprising response to prevailing economic and strategic requirements—but whether greater attention to the south and east will enhance or foreclose options elsewhere.

Is Turkey’s neighborhood policy sustainable?

Over the last few years, Turkey’s foreign policy has been one of the bright spots in the country’s EU candidacy, with Ankara within the European (if not always American) mainstream on most issues. The Turkish position on Iran’s nuclear program, an issue on which Erdoğan has been outspoken and inclined to draw comparisons with Israel’s nuclear posture, holds the potential for a damaging departure. With Iran’s rejection of the latest fuel cycle deal, the stage will be set for a sharp debate within the UN Security Council, in which Turkey may be forced to choose between the Euroatlantic and Sino-Russian positions. Here, some of Turkey’s new partners in the Gulf and elsewhere, concerned about the implications of a nuclear Iran, may actually lobby for Turkey to adopt a tough line—a harbinger of difficult and unpredictable pressures to come as Ankara seeks to balance multiple relationships, to the East as well as to the West. The new look in Turkish policy will compel Turkey and its transatlantic partners to think in new ways about what is “strategic,” what is “tactical,” and the implications of an increasingly ambitious, affinity-based approach to regional relationships. This will be the critical backdrop for Erdoğan’s planned visit to Washington in December, where Iran is sure to be at the top of the agenda.

* Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF

Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was vice president of the Pacific Council on International Policy and spent over a decade at the RAND Corporation. From 1994 to 1995, Dr. Lesser was a member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff.

About GMF

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting

greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, as a permanent

memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

About the On Turkey Series

GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals,with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.gmfus.org/reaction.