Behind the rhetoric: Why Turkey wants to keep Iran engaged
by
GÜLNUR AYBET*

While dismissing Western concerns over Iran’s intentions to build a nuclear weapon as mere “gossip” may seem at odds coming from a NATO member aspiring to become an EU member, much lies behind the theatricals of populism.

The prime minister’s visit to Iran raises two questions. First, it highlights Western concerns that Turkey, a traditional ally of the West, may be shifting its foreign policy orientation towards the Islamic world and the Middle East. Second, the timing of the visit, close on the heels of Turkey’s refusal to participate in a military exercise with Israel and the recent mending of relations with Syria, also coincides with the arrival of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Iran’s recently disclosed nuclear facility in Qom. There is no doubt that Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric coupled with the Israeli rift is a powerful softener as Iran prepares to engage once again with the West over its nuclear program. No matter how “non Western” the prime minister’s public stance may seem, Turkey’s interests in engaging Iran, in fact run parallel with those of the West.

Turkey’s primary purpose in this visit is not to act as a mediator between Iran and the West but to deliver an independent Turkish message to the Iranian authorities that Iran is not being convincing about the civilian intentions of its nuclear program to the international community. However, Turkey insists it will engage Iran on this issue as a country which empathizes with Iranian sensitivities.

Here, Turkey’s most valuable asset in keeping Iran engaged is its independence from the West, and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric against Israel and criticism of Western handling of the Iranian issue no doubt helps in this respect. But Turkish interests in this matter are also strongly driven by its objection to further new sanctions on Iran. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Turkey’s stance on future sanctions could have a considerable impact. Also in a speech at the UN last month, Erdoğan voiced his particular opposition to further sanctions on Iran’s gas industry.

This is linked to the second purpose of this visit -- Turkey’s interest to diversify its energy supply options in the region. Turkey would like to keep the door open for Iran’s possible involvement as a supplier to the Nabucco gas pipeline, which will run through Turkey to Europe.

Turkey also has a vested interest to develop three phases of the world’s largest gas field -- the South Pars field in the Gulf, in a joint venture with Iran. Although the energy deals are in the shape of a memorandum of understanding between the two governments and have not yet materialized as contracts, the US envoy for Eurasian Energy, Richard Morningstar, sent a clear warning in July, stating that the US opposed Iranian involvement in Nabucco. Despite the US’s consternation in the matter, Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız recently said he hopes to finalize a deal over the development of South Pars with Iran.

It is interesting that Turkey is ready to pursue these energy deals with Iran at the risk of deteriorating relations with the US just as the healing process has started after the damaging Bush era in Turkish-American relations. Under a 1996 deal, Turkey already receives some of its gas supply from Iran. But in recent years, the quantity and quality of supply has been disappointing for Turkey, in contrast to Russia, which Turkey does view as a reliable energy supplier. However, filling the Nabucco pipeline with an adequate supply is crucial for long-term Turkish interests to become a major energy hub linking Europe to Asia. As it is doubtful that Azeri gas, the main supplier to Nabucco, will be sufficient to fill the pipeline, other alternative suppliers such as Turkmen gas, which is presently dependent on Russia as the only outlet to Europe, and Iraqi gas, which depends on the security situation improving in that country, look uncertain at best.

Turkey is right to court all options for future suppliers for the pipeline. Turkey’s interest in an energy deal with Iran should therefore not be seen in the context of an “Islamist” empathy, whatever the prime minister’s rhetoric, but a pure realpolitik matter in diversifying its energy options.

This visit is not about deepening relations with a neighboring state on the basis of identity politics. It is about maintaining the status quo by keeping Iran engaged with Turkey and the West without closing the door on Iran’s gas supply to Nabucco as one option out of many. While the West, and in particular the US, may object to Turkey’s energy overtures with Iran, Turkey’s Iranian engagement as an independent player in the region is no doubt an important asset.

When it comes to Turkish-Iranian relations, the West should let Turkey do what it does best -- be an independent player in the region with interests parallel to the West.

*Gülnur Aybet is a Southeast Europe policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a lecturer at the University of Kent.