In America’s best interest
by
JASON KATZ*

On the other hand, the focus on Iran’s short- and medium-range threat once again highlighted the importance of the Caucasus/Caspian region. There are new speculations about basing the elements of the missile shield in the pro-Western Caucasus nations of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Yes, the same very Georgia that was the victim of a brutal and illegal Russian invasion in August 2008 strategically timed for the US presidential campaign (the coincidence of John Edwards’ cheating with the invasion being another bonus) and the Beijing Olympics. Russia went on to de facto annex Georgia’s territories with little tangible consequences for itself. This sent a chilling signal throughout Russia’s neighborhood, reminding all that the bully is back and that the US commitment isn’t always what it seems to be.

This perception that Georgia had been shortchanged by Washington is now being compounded by the fears of a weakened US commitment to East-Central Europe. It is worth mentioning that the republics of the former USSR share many similarities, perceptions and aspirations with those in East-Central Europe. Therefore, disappointment of America’s once most enthusiastic European allies could be infectious throughout. Moreover, they did not seem to see America’s commitment as a function of a specific administration, so what seems as a natural turnaround in Washington politics may reflect on the perceptions of the US as a whole. Yes, by shifting its focus away from East-Central Europe toward an allegedly more sound system in technical terms, the US might need its Caucasus allies more than ever. Given the abovementioned perceptions, the Georgians, who were invaded by the Russians, and the Azerbaijanis, who neighbor Iran and who watched the Russian invasion of Georgia and the international reaction closely, are likely to think twice. And who can blame them!

Still, there is a silver lining to all of this. Should the US be seriously interested in strengthening its relations with Azerbaijan and reinvigorating its once picture-perfect relations with Georgia, it can do that by backing its verbal commitments with tangible measures. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia will surely reciprocate. After all, both Azerbaijani and Georgian troops served in Iraq, with Azerbaijan being the only Muslim member of the US-led coalition, and both are now in Afghanistan. Folks in the Caucasus value committed friendship. Take Azerbaijan’s growing ties with Israel. This predominantly Shiite nation’s president, İlham Aliyev, courageously hosted Israeli President Shimon Peres in July 2009 in spite of neighboring Iran’s extremely menacing rhetoric.

America’s real commitment and, this time, bilateral commitment to the future of its friends in the Caucasus can be a focused effort that can turn things around. One lesson can be taken from Bill Clinton’s playbook. In the 1990s, the US scored a major strategic victory by working with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to build a key oil pipeline from the energy-rich Azerbaijani capital of Baku through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Today this pipeline contributes to global energy security, among other things, by supplying a major chunk of Israel’s oil, about 24 percent. The US can do this again by focusing its efforts on helping its friends build a natural gas pipeline and diversifying Europe’s energy market, heavily dependent on Russia. Azerbaijan and Georgia are eager to participate; the US needs to talk to the Turks and Western Europeans to get their act together.

The US is also a co-mediator in the territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Currently, Armenia occupies nearly 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories, having displaced a million Azerbaijanis. Throughout the war, Armenia has been aided by Russia, which still has a heavy military presence on the former’s territory, and Iran, which fears secular Muslim Azerbaijan’s influence on many millions of ethnic Azeris within its own borders. As a result, Armenia, dependant on Russia and Iran, remains an isolated and underdeveloped part of the otherwise dynamic region. Recently, Turkey has been reaching out to Armenia in an effort to pull it away from Russia. However important such symbolic steps are, only a sustainable solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict can assure the integration of the region and Armenia’s own future. And this is one area where Washington can make a difference.

By demonstrating a real engagement with its partners in the Caucasus, the United States can address its own reassessed security needs and reverse the decay of confidence among its friends. The shared perceptions and aspirations between East-Central Europe can be a two-way street. Should America’s East-Central European friends see a tangible and lasting US commitment in the Caucasus, they can feel more confident about Washington’s loyalty to its allies in general.