Is it possible to execute the protocols?
by
BİROL AKGÜN*

The foreign ministers of the US, Russia, France and Switzerland, as well as EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, attended the meeting to extend support for the Turkish and Armenian ministers, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Edward Nalbandian, increasing the value and prestige of this political move, which symbolizes something well beyond normalization of relations between the two countries. The basic questions to be asked at this stage include the following: Despite historical developments so significant as to have determinative impact over the formation of the national identities of both countries and nations, what are the primary factors that forced the Turkish and Armenian leaders to take such a radical step? What are the probable reflections and influences of this historic step in international and national politics? Is it possible that the bilateral relations between the parties will be as smooth as envisaged in the protocols despite strong internal opposition in both countries?

Why normalization?

Leaving aside pessimistic realists who argue that interstate relations are inherently anarchical in the international system and that a power struggle constitutes the core of foreign policy, what is normal between two countries sharing the same borders is the development of economic and commercial ties and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the same two countries. Despite the emotional burden of history and the mutual distrust between the two nations, Turkey and Armenia could not have resisted this crude fact dictated by geopolitics. There were two reasons and factors for Turkey to cultivate ties with Armenia: the accusation by the Armenian diaspora against the Turkish nation and Turkey arguing that the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against Armenians in 1915 and bitter and aggressive political propaganda spread to force Turkey to accept the genocide claims. The Armenian allegations have caused serious troubles for Turkey in the international arena.

Improved relations with the Middle East and Caucasus

Secondly, Armenia has occupied about 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory since 1993. Turkey closed its borders with Armenia to protest this aggression. However, Turkey has developed and improved its ties with all other countries in the Middle East and the Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. Rapprochement with Greece, led by İsmail Cem, served as an initial move for other bold steps taken by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to achieve lasting peace and stability with nearby countries. This is an approach summarized by a motto of Davutoğlu’s: “zero problems with neighbors.” Armenia has been the only exception to the policy of improving ties with nearby countries including Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Syria and Iraq. For Turkey, which has stood out as a protector of peace in the region and assumed a crucial role as the speaker and representative of underdeveloped countries in the UN and the G-20, it would be only natural to enhance its relations with Armenia for the sake of consistency and compatibility with the policy briefly outlined above. Turkey has aborted the only trump card held by the Armenian diaspora by signing the protocols. When the process finishes, Armenia will be rid of its economic and geopolitical isolation. However, it will have to deal with growing pressure from the international community on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Most probably, Turkey and Armenia will be two good friends and neighbors in a few years at most.

Two axes emerged in the Caucasus after 1991: the axis of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, supported by the US, and the axis of Russia, Armenia and Iran. The Georgian war in the summer of 2008 and the election of Obama as the US president dramatically changed the balance in the region. Subsequently, Turkey proposed the creation of a Caucasian stability pact, an offer strongly supported by many countries in the region. Actually, the Georgian war affected Armenia most considering that Russia was left as the only option for this country to open up with the world. It could be argued that what convinced Armenia to start the process of normalization, beginning with soccer diplomacy and continuing with the road map declared in April 2009, was its worsening isolation and the lure of Western policies to take it away from the Russian axis; the adoption of a series of international endeavors and agreements including the Nabucco project should also be noted in this respect. In case of the successful completion of the process, Armenia will have access to global markets via Turkey and be included in energy projects; this will end its isolation. In the medium term, it is also probable that relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan will be normalized. I should also note that it could be expected that the Armenian diaspora may turn into a lobby promoting Turkey’s interests in the EU, US and Russia despite their strong opposition to the current protocols. The economic development of Armenia depends on its successful integration with European markets through Turkey. The Armenian diaspora, eager to promote Armenian interests all over the world, will encourage commerce and trade with Turkey in the long term. Paradoxically, this process may lead to observation of clear support from the Armenian diaspora for Turkey’s membership in the EU. The goal in foreign policy is to draw conclusions, and if Turkey keeps thinking big, this scenario is pretty realistic. All parties, including Azerbaijan, will win in this process.

Pleasing Azerbaijan is important

All these optimistic predictions are based on the assumption that the global, regional and internal dynamics will remain the same. The unwritten condition for the implementation of the protocols for Turkey is a lasting and just solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Sadly, Turkey is a passive actor in this matter. For progress in the issue, the pressures of big powers including the EU, US and Russia over Armenia will be determinative. Turkey has gained leverage with respect to the Armenian question vis-à-vis the US, EU and the international community by signing the protocols. The approaching elections may delay full implementation of the protocols for a few years; however, the natural course of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia will lead to the normalization of relations. Neither Ankara nor Yerevan is able to resist the weight of political vectors inclusive of history, geography and international power balances as well as the interests of the nations. Turkey will grow further as it resolves its issues. We have to focus on the future with hope and caution by stripping off the burden of the past.