Taking into consideration the tendencies prevalent among the party's voter base as voiced by the local branches of the party, the CHP management is discussing whether or how they should lend support to the Kurdish initiative.
CHP management has identified three red lines, or conditions, for its support. These three "don'ts" are: Do not allow education in the mother tongue; do not allow the unitary structure of the nation to be undermined; and do not pass a general pardon that applies to Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). As a matter of fact, these red lines align perfectly with recent statements from the government. The other part of the left wing, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), lends major support to the initiative.
CHP leader Deniz Baykal is working on the scope of his party's support as he waits for the letter which Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had said he will send to him regarding his government's reform plans in connection with the Kurdish initiative.
Speaking to reporters on Wednesday ahead of a party meeting, Baykal said he still has not received a letter from Erdoğan. Baykal also signaled a thaw in his party's stance towards the initiative, saying the CHP could agree to legal changes to save some deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) who now face the risk of being forcibly taken to court to testify in a case against them.
Gürsel Tekin, the head of the CHP's İstanbul branch, as well as the CHP's leading mayors, İzmir Mayor Aziz Kocaoğlu and Mersin Mayor Macit Özcan, came to Ankara to lobby for their party's support for the initiative. In the light of these warnings from the local branches, the CHP management has decided to change its strict opposition to the Kurdish initiative.
Speaking to Today's Zaman, CHP Deputy Chairman Onur Öymen indicated that after receiving Prime Minister Erdoğan's letter, they will respond to it in writing and if the government has created the main framework of the Kurdish initiative, they might discuss it. "After receiving the letter, we will decide on our course of action depending on its content. If the letter is no different from what he has been saying, then they will get a reply accordingly. If they tell us different things, then we will notify them of our response in writing," he said.
The change of heart with the CHP seems to have made things easier for the government to decide on what may be included within the Kurdish initiative package. Next week, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay is expected to hold a press conference to disclose the government's basic targets concerning the initiative.
There are four reasons why the CHP management has decided to steer away from its previous strict opposition to the Kurdish initiative. First, the party's local organizations have expressed reactions and warnings. Many polls have shown that the CHP's voter base largely backs the Kurdish initiative. Second, the military has given its backing to the Kurdish initiative. The fact that the General Staff lends its support to the initiative as a state policy has discouraged the CHP from maintaining its unrelenting position.
Third, the CHP does want to be perceived as closer to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has been voicing the harshest reaction to the initiative. Finally, the European Union and international circles have been criticizing the CHP's position. Most of this criticism was conveyed to him during the recent lunch hosted in Ankara by the ambassadors of the EU member countries in Turkey in honor of Baykal.
What has really urged the CHP management to change its position was Baykal's meeting with several leading figures of the party. "The name of the leader who solves the Kurdish issue will be etched in history. If moves are made for a settlement, these moves should be supported or at least, the responsibility should be shared," Tekin said.
Tekin's statements were followed by similar statements from some dissident deputies within the CHP. Ankara deputy Eşref Erdem has made harsh remarks, noting that he could not understand why his party, which once pioneered the settlement of the Kurdish issue, has come to side with the MHP in recent remarks. "I have trouble recognizing the CHP and its ideology. A social democrat party is supposed to be the driving force of the progressive powers in Turkey in such a conjuncture.
However, the CHP has become the mouthpiece of chauvinist, ultranationalist, closed groups," he said.
While party management seems to be offended by Erdem's remarks, another statement came from Kocaoğlu, who argued that the Kurdish and Armenian issues, as two major issues in the country, must be resolved, otherwise they will grow gangrenous.
Mersin Mayor Özcan, too, notified the voters' tendencies in his constituency to the party management, advising them to back the initiative. Furthermore, former CHP Tunceli deputy Sinan Yerlikaya described the democratic initiative as a historic opportunity and said that those who oppose this process will be held accountable in future.
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