[Breaking the vicious cycle]
Time to change the course on Cyprus
by
MEHMET KALYONCU*

According to news reports, the Greek Cypriot leadership “postponed” the second-round negotiations on the pretext that some dozen Greek-Cypriots were denied entry into the north, and that, according to Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias, it apparently demonstrated the Turkish Cypriot's ill will to block the progress of the negotiations.

On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu remarked that the Greek-Cypriots had deliberately set up the row over the entry by sending individuals without the proper documentation, so that they could withdraw from, or at least stall, the negotiations. Similarly, frustrated by his Greek Cypriot counterpart's last-minute step back, the Turkish Cypriot president, Mehmet Ali Talat, stated that the negotiations would not last forever and that the Turkish Cypriots would resort to alternative solutions if the Greek Cypriots rejected the solution to be proposed in the second-round negotiations. Talat implied that these alternative solutions might lead to a permanent partition of the island.

Under the shadow of such tense remarks, the second-round negotiations began on Sept. 10. Given the historical characteristics of the relationship between the two communities, and more so the leaderships, the negotiations are not likely to yield any substantial solutions, or if any, one that will soon be shattered by yet another row between the two sides of the island on a trivial issue.

The recent disruption in the negotiations is just more of the same in the general course of the Turkish-Greek Cypriot relationship. However, it raises a question critical to the possibility of achieving a long-term solution to the Cyprus problem: Under the current circumstance of disparity in political power between the two sides of the island, is a long-term solution even possible? If not, what is the step to take to break the vicious cycle of endless negotiations?

Is a long-term solution even possible on the island?

During a seminar on peacemaking and preventive diplomacy in Oslo, I was asked by a prominent Greek-American expert/professor of diplomatic negotiations whether a long-term solution in Cyprus is possible now, given that the political leaderships on both sides of the island and in the guarantor states (Greece and Turkey) have changed and that they all seem resolved to move on. My answer was “no, it's not possible” under the current circumstances, because the partition of the island itself was illegitimate and unjustified in the first place, the Turkish Cypriots had had legitimate territorial claims over the south, from where they had been ethnically cleansed and forcefully evicted to the north and because neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots seem to be interested in a conclusive solution to the Cyprus problem.

The professor's explanation of why the Greek Cypriot leadership had rejected the Annan plan in 2004 has only reinforced that under the current circumstances of the unjustified partition of the island, the prospect for a sustainable solution is quite low. She argued that the Greek Cypriots were economically much better off compared to the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot government was internationally recognized as the sole representative of the whole of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot side would have been accepted into the European Union anyway, with or without their acceptance of the Annan plan. So, she contended, there was no incentive for the Greek Cypriot leadership to accept a plan that would substantially transform the political structure and the balance of power on the island.

Moreover, the current position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership suggests that there is no sustainable solution to the problem in sight in the foreseeable future, at least with the current leaders. During his interview with the Turkish daily Milliyet, Turkish-Cypriot leader Talat noted that the prospects of a permanent partition of the island were becoming ever greater, the discussions with the Greek Cypriots would not last forever and the international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) was just a pipedream. With his apparently diminishing faith in the possibility of international recognition of the nation he presides, Talat is increasingly reminiscent of his predecessor, Rauf Denktaş, who infamously commented that “the non-solution is the solution on the island,” and as such raises questions, once again, about the Turkish Cypriot leadership's resolve and ability to achieve an amenable long-term solution to the Cyprus problem.

 The futility of the mere talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaderships is nothing new. In his “The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus,” Pierre Oberling reminds us that starting in 1968 at the initiative of then-President Archbishop Makarios, and representing, respectively, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, Glafkos Klerides and Denktaş met on a weekly basis for six years to discuss a settlement. However, argues Oberling, there were many on both sides who wanted the talks to fail. For the Greek Cypriots, the establishment of a bi-communal government for the entire island would lead to the dismissal of hundreds of Greek Cypriots from the government and bureaucratic posts and would bring back what they called Turkish Cypriot “obstructionism.” It was a kind of obstructionism which they accused the Turkish Cypriots of for using their veto power within the framework of the 1960 Constitution to prevent legislation that would marginalize the Turkish Cypriot presence in the national and local governments. Similarly, argues Oberling, the Turkish Cypriots were content to have achieved a de-facto separation, thanks to Turkey, which spared their lives from the ensuing Greek Cypriot terrorism. In addition, Ankara's aid for food and protection against a would-be aggressor was sufficient for the Turkish Cypriots not venture into another round of duels with the Greek Cypriots.

So, after some 40 years, there is not much change in the dynamics of the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots of the island. According to the apparent mindset of the Greek Cypriots, now as a member of the European Union, they have much more to lose with a solution that requires them to share the government with the Turkish Cypriots. However, the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot leadership and the inability of its Turkish Cypriot counterpart to solve the problem once and for all are only one part of the reason for the absence of a solution on the island. It appears that the bitter memories of the 1960s and 1970s entrenched in the psyche of the Turkish Cypriots may well engender a major impediment to a solution that does not address the issue of reparation for their losses.

    The necessity of addressing the losses of the past has recently become clear once again as the Turks and Armenians have sought ways to settle their relations. It would probably take some time for both sides to figure out the extent of the tragedies they inflicted on each other. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement is a first and crucial step to take for a long-term solution. Similarly, any long-term solution on the island requires both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to acknowledge what they have inflicted on the other side.

The historians on both sides should shed light on their pasts no matter how bitter the realities it may reveal. Oberling contends that the Turkish Cypriots' exodus to the north had intensified by the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964. He writes: “Giorgio Bocca, the correspondent of Il Giorno, an Italian daily of the time, reported: ‘Right now we are witnessing the exodus of the Turks from their villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, lands, herds; Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of Hellenes and the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious behavior… Threats, shootings and attempts at arson start as soon as it becomes dark. After the massacre of Christmas that spared neither women nor children, it is difficult to put up any resistance'.”

 Moreover, the UN News Bulletin in May 1964 describes the situation as follows: “The Greek Cypriots continued to build up their arms and war equipment by purchasing heavy weapons, ammunition, aircraft and vehicles from abroad… The Turkish communities remained surrounded by the overwhelming Greek forces and were constantly subjected to all kinds of abuse, vexations and pressure. Freedom of movement on the island was totally denied to the Turks; their economic situation continued to deteriorate rapidly, as they were not allowed to sell their produce in the markets, to cultivate their fields, to graze their flocks and to go to their jobs in areas dominated by Greeks.

In the villages which the Turks had abandoned in the face of Greek attacks, the houses were put on fire, the properties looted and the harvest confiscated. From March to June the Turkish Cypriots continued to be murdered and the Greeks did not give up their abhorrent method of taking hostage among the innocent people.” (Oberling, 1982)

 The grim reality of the island's past is probably caught best by Archbishop Makarios' confession of his genocidal intentions toward the Turks of the island in 1974. Oberling notes, “While the [Turkish] air raid was in progress, Makarios, in a paroxysm of grief and frustration, threatened that unless the Turkish Air Force left the scene within half an hour he would order the massacre of the entire Turkish Cypriot population.”

 The Turkish Cypriots have long been terrorized by such organizations as the EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriakon Agoniston -- National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and other smaller paramilitary groups and victimized by such ideologies as Hellenizing the entire island and uniting with Greece. Interestingly, however, the hitherto Turkish Cypriot leaderships and Ankara in part have continued to stand pathetically apologetic. What is even more problematic is that none of the Turkish Cypriot leaders has ever voiced the Turkish Cypriots' rightful claims over the territories in the south, from where their forefathers were forced out. It is difficult, or maybe not, to understand why former Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş had never made the demand for reparations by the Greek Cypriots a part of his political discourse; his very hometown was Paphos, a small town on the western coast of southern Cyprus, where his forefathers had been persecuted.

In the end, it is more obvious today than ever that in a conflict involving different ethno-religious groups no long-term solution is even possible without mutual acknowledgement of the tragedies the parties inflicted on one another. In this regard, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be bold enough to investigate their common past and be ready to accommodate the demands of the other side for their losses. After all, what do they have to fear if they have not done anything wrong?

*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst and author of the book "A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gülen Movement in Southeast Turkey."