Three main axes and Parties to the initiative
by
MÜMTAZ’ER TÜRKÖNE

This picture implies that significant progress has been made in Turkish-Syrian relations. Until very recently -- about 10 years ago -- the two countries were like two hostile brothers. Syria was hosting the leadership of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the rising terrorism in Turkey was being backed by Syria. Ten years ago, then-Turkish Land Forces Commander Gen. Atilla Ateş had visited Hatay -- a Turkish province neighboring Syria -- and delivered a speech there, threatening to wage war against Syria. The subject matter of his speech was Syria's support of terrorism. Yet, this threat proved effective, and eventually, Syria had to banish PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from its country. This was the beginning of the process in which Öcalan was apprehended in Kenya and handed over to Turkish intelligence teams.

Today, as it tries to settle the Kurdish issue with extensive cooperation, Turkey has formed a strategic partnership with Syria regarding the elimination of terrorism. Syria promised to accept the return of about 1,500 Syrian Kurds who are PKK militants in Kandil to the country and integrate them into Syrian society. In a speech he delivered in front of Syrian President al-Assad, the Turkish prime minister listed the benefits the elimination of Turkey's Kurdish issue would bring to the entire region.

Main balance points of the settlement

The initiative, which the government insists on calling a “democratization initiative,” but which primarily aims to settle the Kurdish issue, has currently become the main axis of domestic politics. The competition among political parties is shaped alongside this axis. Debates regarding the initiative have come to be expressed as a matter of survival in political competition. Polarization increases and develops its own language.

The government still has not disclosed what the initiative contains. But the debates go on as if all details of the initiative were already known. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) says, “The elephant gave birth to a mouse,” while the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) argues, “The initiative must be immediately stopped, and the government must backtrack from this treason.” Obviously, when what will actually be done is disclosed, Turkish politics will become much more complicated and chaotic.

There is a balance between the DTP and the MHP. The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) occasionally tends to side with the MHP, disrupting this equilibrium. Major players of the balance are located within the government. It is said that some AK Party deputies may change their stances depending on the content of the package or raise objections to it.

On Oct. 1, Parliament will open for the new legislative year. The speech the president will deliver during the opening ceremony will possibly give the largest amount of information on the initiative. The subject matter to be discussed during the already controversial "secret session" of Parliament will lead to new debates. Parliament symbolizes the most suitable venue for democratic communication. The opening of the new legislative year will allow the sides to express themselves better and polarization to become more pointed. In a nutshell, we can predict that debates will increase. To a discerning eye, it is easy to predict what these debates might be. The limits are set by the government, and everything that can be said makes sense if they stay within these limits.

The speeches Prime Minister Erdoğan delivered before Syrian President al-Assad and İstanbul's elites on Wednesday and to the editors-in-chief of media organization on Thursday contained these limits.

Three basic axes of the AK Party government

The fundamental points that the prime minister insistently stresses give important hints about the content and future of the initiative. First of these is the government's resolution and boldness in going ahead with the initiative. Rumors circulating in Ankara claim that the government is inclined to backpedal from the initiative. But, the prime minister responds to these rumors and declares that they will take the initiative to its successful completion whatever the costs might be. This is a strong a promise that guarantees the future of the initiative. After making such a clear and insistent commitment, it is not likely for the government to withdraw.

Second, the prime minister gives a clear answer to the controversial question, "Who will be the participants of this settlement?" The DTP insists that the government should discuss the initiative with Öcalan, and if this fails, the DTP should be regarded as the exclusive representative of Kurds. On the other hand, the prime minister has underlined that the entirety of Turkey's population are addressees of this initiative. The prime minister's definition of addressee is democratically sound.

Third, he voices an argument that the MHP and CHP are not likely to counteract. The MHP and the CHP wage their opposition against the AK Party and an initiative that they say is developed by the AK Party. When they want the AK Party to backpedal from the initiative and accuse the prime minister of treason, they refer to a project that they claim is developed and implemented by the AK Party. On the other hand, the prime minister has asserted that this project is not a project that belongs to the AK Party and, at that, not to the government. The words he has chosen and the emphasis he makes while he underlining this point are meaningful. "The democratic initiative is not a project of the AK Party, and it is not even the project of the government and not even my project as the head of the government. This project is directly the state's project," he said, and with this, he reinforced his line of defense in an insurmountable manner.

With the first axis, the prime minister silences the opposition within his own party and reinforces this position. With the second axis, he sends the PKK and the DTP out of the game. With the third, he escapes attacks from the opposition parties, particularly from the MHP. All these three axes are very important. The future of the democratization initiative should be assessed with reference to the balances established on these axes and the moves made with reference to them.

According to the first axis, the AK Party is making irreversible progress. In any case, any step taken backward will make the AK Party lose more. For reason, the AK Party does not have a chance other than acting in a disciplined manner and lending support to the initiative. Any hesitation will be translated as a loss for the AK Party.

According to the second axis, who has the ability to represent the Kurds, which the DTP and the PKK claim to have, will always be subject to debate. Since the DTP tends to make frequent references to the revival of terrorism if its objections are not taken into consideration, it may run the risk of alienating even its own voter base.

The third axis is the most critical one. When the initiative is advertised not as a political party project but a project developed and backed by the state, including the military, the oppositions' objections make no sense. The most important expectation connected to this axis is that the military should not raise objections and keep the process alive at all times.