How to deal with the vicious cycle of violence in the Southeast
by
MEDAİM YANIK*

Vicious cycle of violence

If violence has become a usual and ordinary style and mode of action and gone beyond being a practice in a given society to a dominant form of behavior, we can speak of presence of a vicious cycle of violence in that community. In this case, violence breeds further violence, and the emergent violence leads to another style of violence. Causation of violence by violence is observed in its worst form in intra-family violence and child abuse as is documented in psychological studies. It is a widely known fact that children who grew up in a violent environment are prone to act violently against their children and spouses in their adulthood. The same also applies to the people subjected to physical or sexual violence in their childhood. An abused child is more likely to molest others when he grows up. So it is understandable that children who have grown up in a violent environment that has lasted for more than 25 years throw stones at the police. Violence has become a method of self-expression in the region. Violence will keep influencing the entire region unless proper measures are taken to deal with this cycle.

Indicators of a vicious  cycle of violence

Symptoms are observed in times of illness. The patients define these symptoms as complaints. Physicians diagnose the illness behind these symptoms and develop a plan of treatment accordingly. The vicious cycle of violence in the Southeast provides some symptoms similar to an illness. The deaths of about 40,000 people in the region over the last 25 years is an indicator suggesting that the region has become a center of violence. Interestingly, in environments where political violence becomes dominant, ordinary violence in daily life also becomes normal. The symptoms indicating that ordinary violence is also widespread in the region include a growing number of reports referring to parental violence, honor killings, suicides by young girls, drug abuse, incidents of theft and many others. The recent massacre in Bilge village should be viewed as an indicator suggesting that political violence and ordinary violence are intertwined.

Ramifications of vicious cycle of violence

There are four consequences of the vicious cycle of violence in the region. First, the Kurds have developed a psychology of victimization suggesting that the state is brutal and the Kurds are victimized by this brutality. Second, this sentiment has led to the emergence and rise of ethno-Kurdish nationalism and the perception of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) as a political actor. On the other hand, this has also legitimized another rising movement, Turkish nationalism. The rising nationalism has become dangerously popular among the people as well as political parties. Third, the vicious cycle of violence has led to the popularization of figures relying on violence and the decline in popularity of pacifist actors; this blocked the reign of democratic opposition. Fourth, the violent environment can be seen as the primary reason for the economic desertification of the region and the lack of investments; to this end, it should be noted that capital needs stability and confidence for investment; however, violence generates instability alone.

Emergence of vicious cycle of violence

The vicious cycle of violence referred to above may be explained in its simplest form as follows: The state's policies towards the Kurds prepared the groundwork for the emergence of PKK violence. The PKK's reliance on violence attracted the violent reaction of the state, and this also led to further violence by the PKK; the mutual hostilities created a cycle generating constant violence. At this point, it should be underlined that the vicious cycle of violence has remained alive for more than 25 years. Unless proper measures are taken to deal with this cycle or limit its sphere of influence, it should be noted that this cycle will generate further violence that will be far more influential and destructive.

 ‘Zero violence policy’

What needs to be done at this stage is to take action to deal with the vicious cycle and create a new game with new rules. The gist of such a resolution is to break down the cycle and introduce a “zero violence policy.” Before giving insights on how to do this, let us try to explain why we need a zero violence policy. An environment of violence creates a group sentiment and a sense of belonging because of the existing threat perception. The group becomes more introverted and less self-critical; the members of the group do not pay much attention to their differences; an environment of solidarity is created. The excluded group is now perceived as a homogenous community. If violence loses its impact and the sphere of liberties is expanded, differences and diversities between group members and some sort of group opposition emerge. Moreover, in the case of violence, hawkish figures take the lead and control whereas lenient actors lose power. The reverse happens when violence becomes less influential. In the region, a number of reasonable actors still remain ineffective because of the ongoing violence while only armed groups are dominant. For a viable resolution of the Kurdish issue, the masses should be convinced to take part in the process, and they should be able to express themselves by relying on democratic channels. For this reason, the basic strategy should be the creation of a violence-free environment. This strategy will be as influential as the zero problem policy vis-à-vis neighboring countries designed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

The state can take the lead in resetting the game and introducing the new rules of this game. The new norms should be as follows: The state will minimize reliance on the legitimate violence it is entitled to; further emphasis will be put on democratization and the upholding of human rights; civil society will be promoted; the state will also be extensively tolerant towards groups relying on nonviolent methods to publicize their demands for further rights and freedoms. Once the state declares its engagement with these rules and principles, it will be the turn of intellectuals and civil society actors. They will rely on a language that will be critical of violence of any sort and declare their strong opposition to elements and groups seeking to promote their goals in reliance on violence. An atmosphere where violence and the employers of violence will be effectively protested will be created.

If nonviolence becomes the norm, violent actors will lose their power and influence in the region. The majority will begin criticizing the employers of violence in that case. In a nonviolent environment, a more humane structure will emerge and plurality will be more influential. Alternative democratic forces will rise and positive conditions will emerge for a viable and lasting resolution of the issue.

Implementation of the zero violence policy does not require the disarmament of the PKK or its cessation of violence. Of course, this will contribute to the emergence of a pacifist environment in the region; however, this has not happened in the last 25 years. Instead of holding high expectations for such a final outcome, this method will force the armed groups to relinquish their weapons and violent methods. The biggest obstacle before the implementation of the zero violence policy is the state's traditional perception of power. The Turkish state argues that its employment of force and coercion is legitimate based on the Weberian definition of a nation state which suggests that the state is the actor which has the legitimate right to use coercion and violence. The Turkish state can be compared to a father who tries to raise his children by relying on violence and toughness. However, we use every method and remedy available to treat the children of such fathers at psychiatric clinics. And the father pays all the expenses. The state should go back to the approach of therapist state or the Gandhian state. Let me elaborate on these notions.

Therapist state or Gandhian state

A psychiatrist interacts with whoever requests his treatment. He protects the patient from any actions that will be detrimental to his health and overall condition. He eases the troubles and pains of the patient and takes him under his control; the physician further keeps him away from risky actions. The physician does all these things for his patient. The state should do the same for large groups. Pious people, conservatives, Kurds, Alevis and other major groups have suffered from wrong state actions and policies. The state should act like a therapist and protect these groups from violence.

The notion of a Gandhian state is similar to that of the therapist state. Of course I am aware that Gandhi formulated civil disobedience to act against an imperialist state. What I mean by this notion is as follows: Gandhi relied on nonviolence to sustain his legitimacy. These two things are what the state needs in the region. Gandhi relied on hunger strikes to deal with the vicious cycle of violence. The state cannot be expected to rely on hunger strikes; but it can develop policies that will stop violence. For proper implementation of the zero violence policy, the security forces should adopt different policies during interventions in demonstrations or other incidents in the region. It is necessary to define new procedures for police officers to follow during political demonstrations. A new style may be developed to make sure that the police rely on a more tolerant and lenient approach during social upheavals and demonstrations. The release of the children who have thrown stones at the police and an expression of patience towards such actions may be a starting point. Staying away from embarrassing practices such as suing a child who teaches the Kurdish language to others may be another.