EU dimension of the Armenian initiative
by
ALİ YURTTAGÜL*

In a sense, it is normal for this policy to ignore the other international dimensions of the problem and justify its desperation with statements that the international public “does not understand” or is “ill-intended.” When we look at the Armenian initiative from the perspective of Brussels, we see that the initiative will not only free Turkey from being an “object” but that it will also bring Turkey to a level where it can keep in sight its own national interests, be a candidate to be an important political factor in the Caucasus and be as effective as Russia over the Karabakh issue even though it is not part of the Minsk Group. It would not be wrong to predict that if Turkey is active in the region, Azerbaijan will reunite with its occupied territories and that new dynamics to solve the Karabakh problem will come into play. In other words, the Armenian initiative is not only necessary for Turkey's national interests but is also an important advantage for achieving peace in Azerbaijani and Armenia relations. Let us expand on this issue.

No active role in crisis

As it is known, relations with Armenia were cut with the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Certainly Turkey could not remain indifferent to Armenia's occupation of Azeri lands. Diplomatic ties were broken and borders were closed. Then what happened? For years Turkey did not have its own aim or purpose or an active role in the crisis. It was nothing more than a tool to impose pressure in Azerbaijan's policy regarding Armenia. Not only was Turkey unable to join the Minsk Group, which was established under the auspices of Russia, but it was not able to have as much of an active role between its two border countries as France. What was more perilous was that relations with Armenia and the 1915 events not only became a platform for the annual straining of US-Turkey relations but sowed new seeds of animosity in domestic policy each year. The killing of Hrant Dink is only the visible end of what these seeds produced.  

The answer to the question of whether this policy provides support to its target, Azerbaijan, is unfortunately not positive. Currently 24 percent of Azerbaijan's territories are still under occupation, and close to 1 million people are deprived of their homes and land and are living in wretched sheds.

This policy did not have the anticipated effect for Armenia, either. Aside from keeping old wounds alive, the policy became an excuse for nationalist hawks in Armenia's domestic policy. That was not all; it also pushed Armenia into Russia's arms. This policy resulted in Armenia becoming Russia's tool against not only Azerbaijan but all of the Caucasus. Armenia's Western sympathy in recent years, which it called its “policy of balance,” and the policy it employed with Moscow were completely oriented around Moscow.

If this policy has found understanding in Western capitals, the only reason for that would be Turkey's boycott policy.

The most saddening result of the Armenian policy implemented in the past is that it has become a tool of tension that only serves Russian interests instead of supporting a policy of peace needed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. For Russia, peace in the Caucasus is possible as long as it is exerted under its control. As independent states, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia pose “threats” to Russia's effectiveness in Central Asia and generally in energy policies. It is for this reason that Georgia is being punished. The continuation of tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the control of Russia is the biggest factor that makes these two countries dependent on Russia. For the first time, Turkey has developed an initiative that will free itself from being a tool of Russian policies and that will integrate the Caucasus into the international system. Peace in the Caucasus, which also comprises the relations between Armenia and Turkey, is a prerequisite for this initiative. Independence of the Caucasus is a prerequisite for the EU to have access to the energy resources in Central Asia via the Nabucco pipeline and independently of Russia, and for Turkey to become a “bridge.”

Discussing the Karabakh issue

As for the Karabakh issue and the thesis that Turkey has made nonreciprocal “concessions” in this regard, let us take a look at this matter from the perspective of former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, an expert on this issue who attended university in the US. “Today, the Karabakh issue has become a parallel process, linked to Armenian-Turkish relations, where Turks have become an equal player with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Today, as a result of Armenia's policy, Turks have gained the right to discuss Karabakh both bilaterally and regionally without taking into consideration the Armenian factor. On the Turkey-Russia agenda, the Turkey-US agenda, too, Karabakh now is one of the main issues. This was not possible in the past. Turkey now somehow has assumed the right to initiate a regional meeting with the participation of Turkey, the US, Russia, Switzerland, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where, according to the Turkish foreign minister, not only regional issues and Armenia-Turkey relations but also Karabakh will be discussed." (published in the 168 Zham newspaper of Yerevan, on Armenian-Turkish relations) In the past, apart from this effectiveness noted by Oskanian, Turkey could not become a member of the Minsk Group, which was discussing this issue. In return, the settlement of the Karabakh issue and a permanent peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan will prove most beneficial to Turkey. For this reason, Turkey has to be an effective and major political player not only for peace and stability in the Armenian-Azerbaijani crisis and in all regional issues but also for its own economic and political interests. This is a requirement being fulfilled by current Turkish foreign policy.

The initiative's aspects concerning Turkish-US relations are being sufficiently discussed. So we do not want to touch on this issue. But Turkey's initiative is particularly important for the EU. The most attractive part of the Nabucco project is that it will enable Europe to have access to new energy resources independent of Russia, thereby minimizing its current dependence on Russia. This approach, which will turn Turkey into a bridge, results in overlapping interests in the Caucasus for Turkey and the EU. We would like to reiterate that the Caucasus will have to choose between a “peace” that is implemented under the control of Russia and alternatives that will bring about a rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Armenia so as to integrate the Caucasus with the international system as triggered by the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. For the first time, Turkey's initiative policy offers this alternative.