Turkey and Armenia: Soccer Diplomacy Shifting Rules are Creating a Zero-Sum Game

Many viewed Gül’s decision to accept his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargysan’s invitation auguring the establishment of formal ties between the traditionally hostile neighbors and the re-opening of their long frozen border.

Normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia has been a pressing goal for successive American administrations. Friendship between the two countries would arm Washington against long-running attempts by the Armenian-American diaspora to push through a Congressional bill that would formally classify the mass slaughter in 1915 of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide. With anti-American sentiments in Turkey riding high, adoption of such legislation would be certain to trigger another crisis in Turkish-American ties at a time when Turkish support is crucial to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Additionally, peace between Turkey and Armenia would draw the landlocked former Soviet Republic out of Russia’s orbit and help cement Western influence—and stability—in the southern Caucasus.

A Turkey that is engaged with Armenia would be in a stronger position to coax the latter into a settlement with Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia would not only blunt Russian influence but Iran’s as well.

Finally, there is a moral dimension. Extending the hand of friendship to Armenia would help mitigate if not erase decades of bitterness harbored by millions of Armenians across the globe.

Over a year ago, these arguments propelled Turkish policymakers to abandon the position that peace with Armenia would only be possible if Armenia made peace with Azerbaijan. Aided by Swiss mediation and American encouragement, Turkish and Armenian diplomats held a series of secret talks aimed at establishing ties and re-opening the border.

Peace at last?

Gül’s September visit to Yerevan gave the process a big boost. Six months later, on April 22, the two countries announced that they had initiated a “roadmap” setting out the parameters for formalizing ties. The roadmap called for a set of joint commissions that would, among other things, examine the events of 1915, and foresaw the eventual re-opening of the border without preconditions. The timing of the announcement, however, raised suspicions in Yerevan, as the roadmap had been initiated well before April 22. Was it meant to prevent U.S. President Barack Obama from using the term “genocide” in his April 24th statement, marking the anniversary of the killings? Obama’s use of the phrase “Medz Yeghern,” which means “Great Catastrophe” in Armenian, provoked deep anger among American-Armenians who recalled his campaign pledge to recognize the genocide. Turkey wasn’t thrilled by the reference, but at least the G-word had been averted. The expectation in Washington was that Turkey would now sign off with Armenia.

Ankara shifts the goalposts

Armenia’s suspicions may well have been right. Within days of announcing the roadmap, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister, declared before the Azerbaijani Parliament that Turkish-Armenian peace would not be possible until Armenia withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding region. His announcement hit like a cold shower in Yerevan, Washington, and Ankara alike. What had triggered it?

Enter Azerbaijan

There were several reasons for the policy change. First and foremost were the cries of treason from Azerbaijan. Despite the theoretically cozy ties between Ankara and Baku, the Azeris were apparently unaware of the precise wording of the roadmap. Azeri threats to turn to Russia and an unexpected gas deal signed between the two countries led to panic in Ankara. Turkey’s ambitions to become the main transit hub for natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan hung in the balance. Erdoğan’s trip to Baku soothed Azeri nerves, but in the words of a senior Turkish diplomat “immense damage to our relations” had been wrought.

This begs the question of how Ankara failed to foresee Baku’s reaction. The conventional wisdom was that Azerbaijan

needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Azerbaijan. With the September presidential elections out of the way, it was widely assumed that Azerbaijan would relent. What no one accounted for was Moscow exploiting the opportunity to increase its leverage over Azerbaijan.

But there was another aspect to Turkey’s behavior. Reconciliation with Armenia was primarily driven by the dovish Gül. Erdoğan was never fully on board. Nor was Ahmet Davutoğlu, who before becoming Turkey’s foreign minister in May, had served as Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor. Davutoğlu has long maintained that peace with Armenia would not be sustainable unless Karabakh were resolved. Should the conflict resume, would Turkey be forced to reseal its border with Armenia? It’s a thin argument. Armenia won the war, so it is unlikely to reignite it.

Sargysan’s gamble

Meanwhile, Turkey keeps raising the bar. It insists that any deal with Armenia needs to be ratified by the parliament. This would be a first. When Turkey recognized and established diplomatic relations with Kosovo, for instance, the parliament was not involved. All of this has placed Sargysyan, Armenia’s president, in an increasingly untenable position at home, where there is already widespread anger at the government for going along with the creation of a joint historical commission. For many, this amounts to calling genocide into doubt. The ultra-nationalist Dashnak party, which pulled out of the government following the announcement of the road map, is now baying for blood. Their target is, Eduard Nalbandian, Armenia’s foreign minister.

In a bid to stanch their anger, Sargysan declared that he would not attend a Turkey-Armenia football match scheduled for October 14 unless the border was re-opened or was close to be being re-opened. Amid fears that the rapprochement process will crumble, Swiss mediators have resumed efforts to get each side to agree on a path that would clear the way for formal ties and re-opening the border. Turkey’s reported refusal to cede to Armenia’s demands to reiterate that the deal is unconditional (i.e. not linked to progress on Karabakh) temporarily stalled the process. Armenia has now dropped this demand but wants something concrete from Turkey. Otherwise Sargysan will not come. At the time of publication of this analysis, there were widespread reports that compromise had been struck and that Turkey and Armenia would issue respective declarations underscoring their commitment to the implementation of the April 22nd agreement. The declaration, was expected among other things, to outline a time frame for political consultations that would precede the signing of that agreement. However, qualms from Armenia that Turkey would drag out the process are yet to be overcome.

A Turkish hold out for concessions on Karabakh would be equally unrealistic. When former Armenian President Levon Ter Petrossian tried this in 1998, he was pushed out of power. Few policymakers in Ankara seem to understand Armenia’s internal dynamics, which are usually ignored by the Turkish press.

Outlook

The noises coming out of Ankara suggest that Turkey will not abandon its efforts to get the Armenians to move on Karabakh as a quid pro quo for normalization. Indeed, Turkey seems bent on rallying Washington to its position. The U.S. administration continues to insist that Turkish-Armenian normalization should proceed independently of Karabakh. In private, American officials warn that a Congressional resolution on the term “genocide” may not only be revived but approved this time. The trouble is that Erdoğan, who has final say on foreign policy, is steeped in efforts to solve Turkey’s biggest headache, its Kurdish problem. Many of the proposed measures are a hard sell. Erdoğan’s nationalist opponents are already accusing him of talking to terrorists. A deal with Armenia that sidelines Azerbaijan would give them further ammunition.

So the question is whether a no show from Sargysan on October 14 will spell the end of Turkish-Armenian peace? Probably not. Realpolitik will once again prevail and diplomacy will intervene. But unless Ankara softens its stance, it may take a long time before Turkey and Armenia shake hands.

* Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).

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