Debating Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish intellectuals (1)
by
EMRE USLU*

Despite the fact that Kurdish intellectuals shape Kurdish nationalism mostly in reaction to Turkish nationalism, they simultaneously imitate Turkish nationalism as a model for Kurdish nationalism. From a theoretical point of view, Kurdish nationalism can best be explained by using Michael Hechter's neo-Marxist variant of the instrumentalist theory. Hechter's key argument is that nationalism is a reaction of peripheral minorities to the exploitative expansion and centralization of a central government on behalf of a dominant ethnic group. It is an “exploitative” expansion because the central government seeks to “assimilate” the peripheral minority by reducing or destroying its local autonomy.

In fact it is true that the early republican elites attempted to engineer Turkish nationalism as the glue to keep the multiethnic community of the Anatolians together. To a large extent it was a successful project in that more than 30 different ethnic communities of Anatolia today define themselves as Turks. However, this attempt failed to bring the Kurdish community into the boundaries of the designed civic nationalism. There are many reasons for this failure, but they are beyond the scope of this article. In analyzing these reasons, one can resort to many theories that purport to explain how and why Kurdish nationalism emerged. Yet it is hard to find theoretical explanations that would help us discover why Kurdish intellectuals are imitating Turkish nationalist intellectuals. It is perfectly reasonable for Kurdish intellectuals to manipulate the Kurdish masses around their causes, but it is difficult to understand why they use the very same tools that had been used by Turkish intellectuals to promote Turkish nationalism.

One of the most obvious cases of imitation is a work by Nuri Dersimi called “Discourse to Kurdish Youth,” which is essentially a word-by-word imitation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's “Discourse to Turkish Youth.” Here it is:

“O young Kurd! O son of a brave nation that has for centuries despised usurpation! Listen to me! From the Indian Ocean to the Caucasus, in the high mountains and sunny valleys of Asia Minor and Central Asia, the light of humanity has brightened the proud foreheads of the sublime race that gave birth to you, at its very dawn. Your history is the history of an unending legend. You are the child of a nation that has fought tirelessly for centuries to live in honor and freedom. Thousands of offerings made to the Goddess of Liberty seek a grave; they ask us to build a memorial in their honor. This memorial is a free and independent Kurdistan.”

 When Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani's moves and discourses are analyzed together, it can be seen clearly that they are trying to follow the path of the early Turkish republican elites. For example, in Turkey, in order to show him the nation's respect, Atatürk's pictures are present in all government buildings. This Turkish version of showing respect was imitated by the Kurds of northern Iraq in a comical way. Read the following lines from a critic: “In 2001, the principal of the Layla Qassim High School in Dahuk had in her small office four pictures of Massoud Barzani, two photos of Massoud's nephew, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and two framed portraits of the Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP] founder, Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani. Massoud and Nechirvan Barzani constructed and occupied a huge building complex in Salahuddin; it remains unclear whether the former resort is now the property of the local government, the KDP or the Barzanis.” In reaction to these developments, jokes are circulating around on Kurdish Web sites, saying: “In Sulaimaniya, it is a ‘government order' to have Talabani's photo. In Duhok and Arbil, it is a government order to hang Mustafa, Nechirvan, Massoud, Masrur Barzani… Yeah, don't forget Wajih as well, and now Zebari is forcing people to have his picture displayed as well...”

 Abdullah Öcalan is yet another example of someone who desperately tries to present himself as the “Kurdish national leader.” Of course, his idol and role model is Atatürk. He admitted that he admired Atatürk very much. It is unthinkable to compare these two people, but Öcalan's desperate hope is a good example showing the irony of Kurdish nationalists.

The problem here is not just the ironic position of the Kurdish intellectuals. They moreover fail to offer an alternative model to promote Kurdish nationalism other than imitating the Turkish model of promoting nationalism. Moreover, Kurdish intellectuals do not seem to be aware of the fact that conditions have changed since Turks successfully implemented Turkish nationalism. What the Kurdish intellectuals are trying to advocate today under the name of Kurdish nationalism is outdated arguments that were valid when nationalism was rising. In the era of globalization, advocating ethnic nationalism runs against the current. It is like selling ayran (a yogurt drink) in nightclubs.

After reading one Kurdish writer's article, I became convinced that Kurdish intellectuals know very little about how to promote Kurdish nationalism. Here is what Azad Aslan writes: “On one of the busiest roads in Arbil, an advertisement on a black painted three-floor wall states: ‘One country [nishtiman], one people [gel], one constitution: Iraq has no one except us'.” (Do we need to remind our readers that even this slogan belongs to Turkish nationalists? The Turkish version of it reads “One flag, one nation, one state.”) Aslan continues: “This ad has been shown in the capital of the Kurdistan federal region, in which raising the Iraqi flag is forbidden. If there is one country, one people and one constitution, why then all this fuss about Kurdistan?”