Speaking to Sunday's Zaman, Jeffrey Mankoff, an associate director of International Security Studies at Yale University and adjunct fellow of Russian studies, says Russia's intention in making Turkey a transit country stems from its desire to bypass Ukraine. In this vein, he said, “Given the problems between Moscow and Kiev, Russia's position toward the Europeans carries the purpose of finding a way to not have to rely on Ukraine as a transit country, hence Russia's agreement with Turkey.” After a natural gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January, Russia cut off the natural gas to Ukraine which simultaneously caused the stop of the natural gas running to Europe. To work around this, Russia was “forced” to look for another partner to be able to transport its gas resources by excluding Ukraine.
Relations between Ukraine and Russia, which share a considerable part of their history, worsened after the natural gas dispute emerged between these countries last winter. Russia stopped gas flow to Ukraine on the first day of 2009, accusing Ukraine of failing to pay for gas it used and siphoning off gas meant for other European countries. Because Europe, Russia's main natural gas customer, receives its gas through Ukraine, the Russian move meant European countries were left without their gas. As a result, Eastern European countries, Italy, France and Germany were seriously impacted both economically and socially. In order to prevent energy disruptions experienced by European countries and to exclude Ukraine from energy projects of significant importance, Russia has made an attempt to give weight to pipelines that bypass Ukraine. The South Stream pipeline, projected to run Russian energy resources under the Black Sea to Austria and Italy, does just that.
Considering this, Mankoff says that before the Ankara agreement was signed, it appeared that the South Stream would have to cross Ukraine's territorial waters in the Black Sea, even if it avoided Ukrainian territory onshore. “Now there is at least the possibility that South Stream -- if it ever gets built -- will avoid Ukraine entirely, which would reduce Ukraine's ability to disrupt the transit of Russian gas, though Kiev could still cut gas through the onshore pipelines, which are much larger than South Stream is planned to be,” Mankoff noted.
Eurasian analyst Sedat Laçiner, head of the International Strategic and Research Organization (USAK), does not consider these projects mutually exclusive. He says South Stream is solely designed to bypass Ukraine. “Ukraine and Russia have had several problems in energy policy. Russia's move was to decrease Ukraine's ability to damage Russia's energy policies,” he said. According to Laçiner, Russia's primary source of income has almost entirely comprised revenue from energy resources.
An overview of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Mankoff says, indicates that Russia also has concerns about Turkey. Citing Turkey's amendment of contract terms for deliveries from the Blue Stream gas pipeline after it became operational, the expert states that dealing with Turkey is much easier compared to Ukraine. “These [concerns about Turkey] are manageable and much less politicized than the issues with Ukraine,” he reiterated. Hinting at other benefits the transit deal specifies, Mankoff said: “Turkey will benefit by allowing South Stream to cross its territorial waters. Russia is trying to woo Turkey by offering Ankara a good deal and is doing so by further reducing its dependence on Ukraine as a transit state.”
After Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, the country became closer to the West after it announced its desire to join NATO and the European Union. This move by Ukraine, still considered by Russia as part of its sphere of influence, was met with political disapproval in Russia. Leaving Ukraine outside the South Stream project is considered part and parcel of Russia's policy of using its energy resources as a strategic tool to increase its leverage in the region.
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