Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership

The past several years witnessed confidence building between the countries as the relationship rose to the level of a multi-dimensional partnership; however, there are also ideational and material factors that limit Russian-Turkish partnership. The future of multi-dimensional partnership will largely depend on both countries’ ability to set a strong structural base for mutual and long-term beneficiary relationship.

Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership

Bülent Aras

Historically there were many wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Both countries have imperial legacies and have experienced post-imperial trauma. Great imperial legacies and feelings of isolation which followed the collapse of the respective empires are important factors which shaped the national memory of both countries. The new attitude of Turkish policy-makers has had a positive impact on foreign policy, allowing them to consider better relations with Russia and the possibility of cooperation to solve regional issues.

Turkish-Russian relations were transformed in a unique way during the aftermath of the Cold War era and there was a dilemma in bilateral relations in the early 1990s. The two countries were seemingly rivals in the newly emerging geopolitics of the Eurasia, while cooperating in the economic realm in an ever increasing manner. The relationship between the two countries was shaped by a combination of cooperation and rivalry. The strongest point of cooperation was the increase in trade relations. At the core of the rivalry between Russia and Turkey was the odd perception of the geopolitical roles pitted against each other as well economic matters such as energy.

The new foreign policy orientation of Turkish policy-makers has provided the impetus and the political will to develop better relations with Russia. In their perception of Russia, Turkish policy-makers emphasize adopting a good neighborhood and zero-problem policies in the bordering regions. Turkish politicians have also made developing bilateral political and economic relations with Russia a priority. Furthermore, they also think of Russia as a necessary partner for regional peace and stability in Eurasia. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentions Russia “as an important country from the perspectives of trade, investment, tourism, and energy security.”[1]

From Rivalry to Cooperation

Political relations overshadowed the booming economic relations and created a lack of trust and confidence between the states for a long period of time. The volatile nature of political relations was the main factor in the problematic history of relations between the states with a record of several serious crises in the 1990s. The policy-makers had to deal with the remnants of the Cold War and were under pressure due to the Kurdish and Chechen problems in their bilateral relations. Turkey’s Caucasian Diaspora was active in supporting Chechens in their struggle against the Russian army and in turn, the Russian administration was tolerant towards the PKK activities in Russia. The all time record in economic relations played a catalyzing role for balancing political relations.

Economic relations hit a high in 1997, which also witnessed the visit of the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Turkey in December. There was further development of economic relations on the agenda during this visit.[2] High level officials started to refer to their relations as a “strategic partnership” during this visit.[3] During Chernomyrdin’s visit, both sides signed the agreement for the Blue Stream project, which would carry Russian natural gas beneath Black Sea to Turkey. This agreement played a major role to reverse the atmosphere of rivalry centered on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and the search for cooperation prospects in the transport of energy reserves. Blue Stream was the driving force behind the developing relations in the following year. Blue Stream faced an opposition from nationalist circles in Turkey with the allegations of over-dependence to Russia. However, the Turkish administration decided in favor of the project despite these criticisms.

The international interest focus was an inviting atmosphere to the develop relations despite the number of regional challenges presented in both states. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, once members of The Warsaw Pact, stepped into the road of NATO membership in December 1997, despite Russia’s reservations. It was an unacceptable development on the Russian side. The EU rejected to grant membership prospects to Turkey during the Luxemburg summit in the same year. In addition to political factors, Turkey and Russia were facing economic crises in 1997 and 1998. The economic considerations and international developments changed the character of the relations from one of a competition to an era of cooperation.[4]

Turkey’s then-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s visit to Moscow in November of 1999 was a turning point in relations between Turkey and Russia. Ecevit’s visit resulted in Turkey’s change of attitude on the Chechen question as an internal problem of Russia, in exchange for Russia’s acceptance of a policy of non-involvement in the Kurdish problem.[5] Ecevit’s visit laid the groundwork for better relations.

These developments at the end of the 1990’s paved the way for the better relations in the next decade. The center of gravity in the relationship shifted to a focus on economic relations and cooperation schemes in the energy sector.[6] The partnership started to gain depth under a new approach: a diversified focus on energy security, economy and regional security. Russia adopted a new attitude of cooperation with regional and international actors under the condition that it will not serve against their interests under Vladimir Putin’s Presidency.[7] Turkey appropriated a new dynamic and multidimensional foreign policy line with a specific focus on minimizing the problems with the countries in the neighboring regions.[8] The visible increase in the number of mutual visits and the new channels of political dialogue showed the prospect of development of relations between Russia and Turkey.[9]

The September 11thattacks led to a number of U.S. invasions and designs in Eurasian geography. The immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack created an environment for cooperation in the struggle against terror, which was facilitated the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia; which led to the Foreign Ministers of the two countries to sign a document for regulating an action plan for cooperation in Eurasia.[10] The action plan was targeted at elevating relations to the level of strengthened constructive partnership.

Tayyip Erdoğan, as leader of the Justice and Development, visited Moscow and was accepted by President Putin and Prime Minister Kasyanov in 2002. The most important development in the relationship this period was Turkish Parliament’s refusal of March 2003 motion, which designed to grant permission to American soldiers’ access to Iraq through Turkish territories. As reported by Russian Interfax news agency Russian President Putin underlined the importance of the March motion as a significant event on the eve of the Iraq invasion.[11] After Turkey’s refusal of the motion, Russian policy-makers started to perceive Turkey as a more independent actor in foreign policy in contrast to the Cold war definition of a loyal U.S. ally. Turkey’s independent attitude created trust and confidence to Russia that it will not automatically endorse U.S. interests in the neighboring regions. In addition, the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions kept the U.S. administration busy in these countries and both Russia and Turkey had more room to maneuver in the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Russian President Putin’s visit to Turkey on 5-6 December 2004 was the first of its kind in the 32 years. Putin’s visit created a new energy for strengthening and deepening the relations. Putin signed six agreements in the areas of military and economic cooperation. After the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit, Turkey’s prime minister paid a one-day official visit to Russia in January of 2005. Russia supported Turkey’s EU membership and Turkey supported Russia’s observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference. Erdoğan and Putin met ten times in five years. Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Russia in February 2009. Gül has been the first Turkish President to visit the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan. The positive Russian attitude toward Turkey’s contact with a Turkic-Muslim populated administrative unit in Russia was interpreted as a sign of confidence from the Russian side.[12]

Emergence of a Multi-Dimensional Partnership

For Moscow, the existence of a conflicted national memory and an East-leaning geopolitical orientation makes it difficult to determine a fixed and well-functioning foreign policy towards Turkey.13 Like Russia, Turkey has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and European identities and different interests at stake in all of these regions. Another significant factor is that both countries are going through dynamic domestic and economic transformations. The changes that have occurred during the nine years of the current decade are dramatic at both societal and state levels. High-level reciprocal visits in the recent past have highlighted a number of important issues of concern for bilateral relations. Officials on both sides have signed several agreements that are likely to facilitate the establishment of a more constructive relationship. These include trade and investments by Turkish and Russian businesspeople, tourism, natural gas purchases, joint pipeline projects, and Russian arms sales. The volume of bilateral trade reached USD 38 billion in 2008, and both sides aim to increase the annual trade volume to USD 50 billion.14 Russia has been the largest trade partner of Turkey.

Turkey’s construction sector is active in Moscow and has continually increased its market share in Russia since 2005. Turkish contractors finished 59 construction projects worth USD 3.6 billion in Russia in 2007.15 Further, Turkey’s construction sector was involved in 20 billion USD worth business in 2008.16 Also, it is to be noted that thousands of Turkish workers are employed in Russia. The number of Turkish workers sent to Russia through Turkish Employment Organization is 15.696.17 Turkey bought 63% of the natural gas and 29% of the oil it consumed in 2008 from Russia.18 Russian businesspeople closely follow Turkey’s privatization process and are involved in Turkish telecommunication and energy projects.19 Russian company, Atomstroyeksport, participated in Turkey’s nuclear reactor bid, and the Russian administration pays special attention to Turkey’s nuclear contract for possibilities to expand economic relations. The nuclear deal may pave way for a more structured relationship between the two countries.

Another major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to Turkey. Turkey is the first NATO country to develop a technical cooperation scheme in the sphere of Russian military. However, Turkey’s NATO membership restricts the variety and volume of military relations with Russia. Despite this difficulty, Russia and Turkey are in a continuous search for expanding cooperation in this realm. Turkey looks to Russia for a number of military procurement projects, such as a medium-range anti-tank weapon system. The Russian S-300 or S-400 missile systems are attractive to the Turkish military industry’s proposed multi-billion-dollar long-range missile defense project.20

Finally, 2.8 million Russian tourists visit Turkey annually and increasingly prefer Turkey’s Mediterranean coast for their vacations. The degree of interdependence between Turkey and Russia is higher than ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests between Turkey and Russia, contentious issues remain. In Mid-August of 2008, Russian customs officials began inspecting Turkish trucks with exceptional diligence; the trucks were taken to a “red lane” and checked one by one for extensive lengths of time. Although this act was interpreted by many as Russia’s punishment for Turkey’s decision to permit American and European naval ships to pass through the Black Sea to Georgia, this was in fact the result of deadlocked customs regulations negotiations between the two countries, which had started earlier in the year but coincided with the Russian-Georgian conflict.21 On the verge of losing its long-standing and beneficial commercial relations with Turkey, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov insisted during a joint news conference with his counterpart, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, that “this is not an action directed against Turkey. Turkey is not being singled out.” He added, “[t]here can be no politics involved in trade.”22 The customs crisis between the two countries came to an end when Russia and Turkey signed an agreement on a simplified customs procedure in mid-September.23 Despite this agreement, Turkish products in Russian customs continued to face similar problems. The custom regulations also apply similar difficulties with Turkish products going through Europe to Russia. President Gül brought this issue to the table during his visit to Russia, and sides agreed to form a joint technical commission to deal with this problem. Director of Russian Federal Custom Service Andrey Belyaninov was invited Turkey on 18-20 February to activate the commission.24

Turkish-Armenian relations, which have been and continue to be determined by historical enmities and Turkey’s Azerbaijan-leaning policies in the Caucasus, constitute another concern in bilateral relations and regional politics. Russia is currently Armenia’s main ally, and it’s possible that Russian mediation between Turkey and Armenia on a number of issues could be expected. Russia has adopted a new activism towards a solution of the Karabakh problem. To this end, Sergei Lavrov met several times with his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts. The Russian administration brought the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents together in Moscow to discuss the Karabakh issue.25 Here, Turkey emerged as an unexpected partner for Russia in the attempt to solve the chronic problems in the countries of the Caucasus. Following recent positive developments on this front, the future may see joint Russian-Turkish attempts to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

The mutual agenda for Russia and Turkey is extensive. It revolves around Russia’s energy policy, its foreign policies, the Russia-Georgian crisis, the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Turkey’s rival pipeline projects, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, finding a solution to the Karabakh problem, the reduction of Russian military forces in the region in accordance with international agreements, the Chechen question, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian soil. Russia dislikes the BTC pipeline, which bypasses its territory to transport Azeri and Kazakh oil to the West. Moscow regards this pipeline as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to its oil trade. Although the major conflict surrounding the BTC pipeline has been between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it has also influenced Turkish-Russian relations. The Blue Stream, a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey underneath the Black Sea, and several other Turkish-Russian oil pipeline projects have led to the emergence of some degree of tolerance towards the BTC pipeline. Russia also aims to carry more Turkmen gas to the European market, which may stymie the projected Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe pipeline. Although Turkey and Russia cooperate in the Blue Stream projects and although there are potential joint projects, they also compete in providing alternative routes for oil and gas transfer to Europe. A number of Eurasian and European actors interpreted Nabucco project, a new artillery of East-West energy corridor, which aims to transfer Caspian energy reserves to Europe, as an attempt to by-pass Russia. However, Turkey does consider Russia’s involvement in this project and do not see the project with any anti-Russian sentiments. Although the general perception is that Russia does not participate in the projects without its control or dominance, the Russian administration may decide to participate in projects in future as an equal partner in Nabucco project; and as would be witnessed during Putin’s visit to Turkey in early August in 2009, Turkey and Russia have Blue Stream II and Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline projects on the table in the ongoing talks.

Limits of the Turkish-Russian Partnership

Russia’s regional profile has been to maintain its sensitivity over its dwindling influence in the former Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as a significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with the EU and emphasizing the importance of building good relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. During Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow in January of 2005, then-President Putin said: “I hope that Turkey’s integration in the European Union will open up a new horizon for Russian-Turkish business cooperation.”26 Putin’s support is meaningful in terms of showing the potential for bilateral relations, but the situation is more complicated at the regional and international level. After receiving a negotiation date for EU membership, Turkey has emerged as a “European” actor in the region. There is no guarantee that the Turkish politicians’ projection of good relations with Russia will be possible without endangering its relations with the EU and the US.27 Thanks to the dynamic nature of regional politics, Turkey’s new orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations of Georgia and Ukraine.

Turkey adopted a low-profile attitude towards Russian policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Georgia and with sensitivity displayed a constructive outlook by pointing to relevant international norms and agreements as a way to resolve the crises. Under the strong influence of its new geographic thinking toward Russia, Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any “Russia versus the West” struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow. Turkey pursued this policy also during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August of 2008. Turkish policy-makers acted carefully in order to minimize tension during the crisis and launched the idea of a regional platform to settle regional problems. During the crisis, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan pointed out the importance of relations with Russia in the following way: “America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interests. [...] We cannot ignore Russia.”28

Turkish policy-makers aim to contain the Russian-Georgian crisis in the Caucasus region and to prevent its expansion to the wider Black Sea region. Turkey’s strict adherence to the Montreux agreement, which regulates the passage of military ships through the Bosporus, helped it to play a constructive role in the conflict despite its Western orientation and NATO membership. As the Montreux Convention dictates, non-littoral states may have up to nine military ships in the Black Sea for 21 days with a total weight of 45,000 tones. Turkey limited the entry of U.S. military ships to the Black Sea by applying the binding regulations of the Montreux agreement. At present, there is a clear tendency to seek support from outside actors and wider regional alliances to providing greater security in the region. Azerbaijan and Georgia rely on NATO and the Western powers and seek regional alliances with Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkey. Armenia relies on Russia. Moreover, Russia calls on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to support the Russian cause in the Caucasus.29 In contrast, Turkey has suggested a Caucasian Stability Platform to configure a dialogue between the three Caucasian states, Russia, and Turkey in order to contain any crises in the region.

Turkish policy-makers stress the need to create a confidence- and trust-building mechanism to foster a regional understanding of security. The U.S. administration was reluctant to endorse with a criticism that they were not informed about the platform. The EU gave the green light to this initiative and the EU progress report on Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU positively mentioned the project.30 Furthermore, NATO supported the platform as a constructive step for security in the wider Black Sea region with reference to Turkey’s constructive policy line during the crisis.31

The current developments indicate that Turkish and Russian policy-makers have the political will to improve bilateral relations in the realm of politics, economy and security. However, these relations are not free of a number of serious problems that could threaten a derailing in the growing ties; both countries have converging and conflicting interests in neighboring regions. This fact, in combination with the high-profile status of both countries, makes Turkish-Russian relations promising, yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors in Eurasian geopolitics, and their relations have implications for the whole region. For this reason, if Turkey’s new approach for developing multi-dimensional relations with Russia succeeds, this policy may have far-reaching positive consequences for the Eurasian region.

Policy Recommendations

The growing number of mutual high level visits, booming economic relations, cooperation in energy related projects, agreements for military-technical relations and arms sales, and the diversity of activities designed for the region are strong signs of an emerging multidimensional partnership between Turkey and Russia. The new partnership, however, has its own limits due to the burden of past negative memories, difficulties of regional geopolitics, growing pains in the relationship, and approaching challenges. The future of the multidimensional partnership will be determined by the ability of the sides to tackle these challenges. The following points may help policy-makers in formulating policy in bilateral, regional and international level.

1- Turkey’s Western orientation and Russia’s assertive policies in Eurasia are likely to be confronted by a number of regional issues. The result of such confrontation would be reproduction of Cold War era security dilemmas. Russia’s unilateral actions in the former Soviet geography should be balanced through Turkey’s bilateral relations with Russia and Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy in regional and international terms. In addition, Turkey should use its relations with Russia as well as the EU as leverage to both of them and as means of easing tension between them if necessary.

2- The perception of relations with Russia in domestic politics should shift away from considering Russia as an alternative to the EU, toward an important policy within the framework of Turkey’s multidimensional and integral foreign policy. In this sense, Turkish-Russian relations should be named a multidimensional cooperation to reflect a realistic account of the current status of the partnership.

3- Russia has a tendency to manipulate economic interests in order to create pressure on the political relationship. It should avoid applying this policy in relations with Turkey. Such measures may seriously damage Russian image in Turkey, which is still in the process of recovering from past negative perceptions. The custom problem does not fit into the future projections of the relationship, having regional and international weight.

4- The current high level political dialogue should continue with an exemplary attitude toward the rest of the Eurasian countries. The mutual official visits create a mechanism of early warning of any problems and of conflict resolution in a timely manner. Turkey’s regional policy is based on an all-inclusive policy with particular reference to Russia as a necessary partner of political and economic initiatives in the area. This policy is well received in Russia so far and the Russian side should develop a similar understanding of Turkish involvement of the solution of the regional problems.

5- Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Initiative is a useful platform for Russia and Turkey to raise a regional consciousness of peace in the region. This platform should be supported by a dynamic involvement between Russia and Turkey. A dynamic cooperation in Caucasus is likely to trigger further cooperation in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

6- Russian academy still interprets Turkish foreign policy through the prism of a Cold War understanding, while Turkey suffers a lack of experts who follow Russia’s complex domestic and foreign policies. There is need for developing further academic interest on countries, joint research platforms, think-tank dialogue and other activities to constitute the necessary framework of knowledge required on both sides.

7- The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was a source of contention in bilateral and regional relations between Turkey and Russia. Turkey should follow a careful policy toward the Nabucco Project to prevent such damage in the multidimensional cooperation with Russia. Turkey should have a firm position in its invitation of Russia to Nabucco Project.

8- Although the strongest side of Turkish-Russian relations is on economy, it is still not free of major problems. The new projects in arms transfer as well as energy related areas have potential to further expand economic relations. Turkish experience in medium and small size industry promises technical aid to Russia.

9- The status quo with existing inter-state conflicts, ethnic tensions, and de facto states is not sustainable in the Caucasus region. The Black Sea is also a sensitive region with the potential threat of becoming a battleground of international forces. Turkey and Russia should express a strong political will and, and undertake region-wide and international responsibilities in order to achieve peace and security in the region.

10- Russia has a Kurdish and Armenian Diaspora, and Turkey has a Caucasian Diaspora. Both sides should designate and adopt a zero tolerance policy toward illegal activities emanating from these communities and should limit damaging initiatives based around the ethnic lobbies.

11- Turkish and Russian officials’ attempts for developing relations should be supported by broader societal activities. These activities would not only help consolidation of official relations but would also begin to fade negative historical memories on both sides, into the background. The way to foster societal dialogue is to foster joint activities in culture, education, arts and sports. Civil society dialogue is also a necessary component in this regard.

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_{* Prof. Dr., Coordinator of Foreign Policy Studies, SETA.}

1 Mensur Akgun, “Rusya’nin Onemi,” Referans, September 1, 2008.

2 “Türkiye ve Rusya: Hem Ortak, Hem Komşu”, Perspektif, Vol. 2, No.9 (February 1998), p. 4.

3 “Stratejik Ortaklık Önerisi”, Milliyet, December 17, 1997; Sami Kohen, “Bir ‘Stratejik Ortaklık’ Daha…”, Milliyet, December 17, 1997.

4 Mitat Çelikpala. “1990’lardan Günümüze Türk-Rus İlişkileri”. Avrasya Dosyası, Vol.13, No.1 (2007), p. 278.

5 Aydın Mehtiyev, “Vstrecha Putina i Ecevita s tselom proshla uspeshno”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 6, 1999; Gayaz Alimov, “Bulent Ecevit: Chechnya – vnutrennoe delo Rossii”, Izvestia, November 4, 1999.

6 Çelikpala, p. 280.

7 Izvestia, April 22, 2000.

8 I.S. İvanov. “Vneshnyya politika Rossii na sovremennom etape”, MID RF DIP, April 20, 2001.

9 For example, Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov visited Turkey twice in February and May 2000 as special representative of Russian President. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Putin met in Millennium Summit in New York in June 2000. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov paid an official visit to Turkey on 23-25 October 2000. Both sides talked on further development of the relations from cooperation to strategic partnership. Sami Kohen,

“Rusya ile Ortaklık”, Milliyet, October 26, 2000; Hikmet Bila, “Türkiye-Rusya”, Cumhuriyet, October 25, 2000; Fikret Bila, “Kasyanov’un Ziyareti”, Milliyet, October 26, 2000; Mehmet Ali Birand, “Competition and Cooperation With Russia”, Turkish Daily News, October 26, 2000.Yalçın Doğan, “Ver Helikopteri, Al Elektriği”, Milliyet, October 26, 2000.

10 Belge metni için bakınız: _{http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_2_t.html.}

11 “Putin: Meclis Kararı Haftanın Olayı”, Radikal, March 5, 2003.

12 İsmail Küçükkaya, “Rusya’dan Tataristan’a Geçişin Öyküsü”, Akşam, February 15, 2009.

13 An analysis of the current factors determining relations between these two states is necessary here. Domestic politics in Russia are often the result of the competing views of Westerners, anti-Westerners, Eurasianists, ultra-nationalists, and nostalgic communists. Russian foreign policy is generally determined along the lines of domestic political preferences. There is a symbolic pendulum in Russian foreign policy that oscillates between Europe and Asia, depending on the political balances at play. Under the current administration, Russian foreign policy is more critical of the West and follows a more Eurasia-oriented path. See, Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Finding a Civilizational Idea: ‘West,’ ‘Eurasia,’ and ‘Euro-East’ in Russia’s Foreign Policy,” Geopolitics, Vol.12, No.3 (2007).

14 Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Institute of Statistics) database.

15 Rusya Ülke Bulteni, (Istanbul: DEIK, 2008), p.39.

16 Data provided by Turkish Embassy in Moscow.

17 Data provided by Turkish Employment Institution.

18 Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Institute of Statistics) database..

19 For a detailed analysis, see Hasan Selcuk, Turkiye-Rusya Ekonomik Iliskileri (Istanbul: TASAM, 2005); Oleg A. Kolobov, Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Fatih Ozbay, Çağdaş Türk-Rus İliskileri: Sorunlar ve İşbirliği Alanlari (1992-2005), (Istanbul: TASAM, 2006).

20 Lale Saribrahimoğlu, “Turkey, Russia Begin to Overcome Military Distrust,” Today’s Zaman, April 15, 2008.

21 Sinan Ogan, “Rusya ile Gümrük Krizinin Gercek Sebebi ve Alınacak Önlemler.” Turkishforum, September 2, 2008; Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Gumruk Mustesarligi, “Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Gumruk Mustedarligi ile Rusya Federasyonu Federal Gumruk Servisi Arasinda Gumruk Islemlerinin Basitlestirilmesine Dair Protokol Hakkinda Bilgi,” available at _{www.gumruk.gov.tr/duyurular/Rusya19EylulBasinToplantısı.pdf.}

22 “Russia Denies Punishing Turkey over Georgia,” The International Herald Tribune, September 2, 2008.

23 “Turkiye ile Rusya Arasında Gumruk Protokolu,” CNN Turk, September 19, 2008, available at _{http://www.cnnturk.com/HaberDetay/Ekonomi/4/Genel/303/Turkiye_ile_Rusya_arasinda_gumruk_protokolu/493999/0.}

24 Sinan Ogan, “Gül’ün Rusya Ziyareti ve Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem”, February 15, 2009. _{http://www.turksam.org/tr/a1584.html}

_{25 Hurriyet, November 2, 2008.}

26 “Turkey-Russia Relations,” EurActiv, November 9, 2006.

27 For a comprehensive discussion see, Omer Taspinar and Fiona Hill, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?” Survival, Vol.48, no.1 (2006), pp.81-92.

28 Fikret Bila, “Erdoğan: Rusya’yi Gozardi Edemeyiz,” Milliyet, September 2, 2008.