The meeting took place at a time when the relations between the central government in Iraq and the regional government in the north have long been tense, and it may be a sign of new developments in Iraq. However, we should not expect an end to difficulties right after the visit or an end to the disputes between Arabs and Kurds.
Maliki has never visited Northern Iraq since he became Prime Minister, and he conducts an open and sharp discussion with them in the media. The following conditions may have led to Maliki’s visit:
With the start of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq, the most serious concern of the USA is possible conflict if the problems between Arabs and Kurds cannot be solved. Violent incidents hit their peak in 2007, and their relative decline since has strengthened the USA’s hand in Iraq. As a matter of fact, it wasn’t just the USA who took advantage of it. In the January 31, 2009 elections, Prime Minister Maliki, with his trustworthy, centrist and nationalist image, left other parties behind. However, the start of the withdrawal of U.S. troops caused conflicts to increase again in two areas. One of these two areas saw violence seeking to reignite the Shia-Sunni conflict, especially in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The other area saw attacks caused by tensions between Kurds and Arabs in the regions called “controversial regions,” extending from the district of Sincar west of Mosul to the district of Hanekin in Diyala. Since the attacks carried out in the second area occurred mostly in regions where Turkmens live, Turkmens were also targeted by the attacks. Thus, in the last few months, the security situation in Iraq has progressively deteriorated. Moreover, the rise in tensions between Kurds and Arabs makes pelotee fear that ethnic conflict is more likely than sectarian war. For that reason, the US has started to put strong pressure on both Maliki and Barzani. The main topic on the agenda of the visit to Iraq made last week by the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, was the Kurd-Arab problem. Gates explained that the problems between Kurds and Arabs need to be solved before the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Furthermore, Raymond Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said that border and oil disputes between Kurds and Arabs were the biggest threats to stability in the country. Therefore, we can say that the successive visits, negotiations and statements triggered the Maliki-Barzani meeting.
The timing of Maliki’s visit was clearly connected to the elections in Northern Iraq. The most suitable opportunity to attempt to break the ice between Maliki and Barzani was right after Barzani’s victory. Thus, Maliki recognized Barzani, and Barzani conveyed his intent to reconcile with Maliki by giving up his hard-line and fiery statements. So far, when serious problems have arisen between both parties, they have used the media and dispatched committees to argue with each other. For that reason, the meeting of these two leaders is also important because of the image it creates. Yet, it should not be forgotten that Jalal Talabani is one of the most important factors in the situation. Talabani, who made special efforts to resolve the problems between the two, speeded up his efforts during the election campaign. Not winning the expected number of votes and facing serious opposition in the future, the KDP and PUK states their unwillingness to fight at front-lines, both inside the country and abroad, by strengthening their relations with the central government. It is important for the ruling parties in the north to have good relations with Baghdad in order to fight Change List challenge. In the event that Baghdad cuts off the cash flow and cannot finance their projects, the opposition may gain more power. In addition, the announce of a guarantee on the subject of the implementation of Article 140 is useful for responding to the opposition’s criticism: “You are not doing anything about Kirkuk.” Even though it is a very unlikely that Maliki gave such a guarantee, this is valuable as a propaganda tool. In summary, since the KDP and PUK’s election results were unexpectedly dismal, Maliki’s visit is important since it sends the message that “we have strong relations with Baghdad,” “we are walking away from conflict,” and “we are resolving the Kirkuk issue as we see fit.”
The most important part of the visit for Baghdad is the possibility of it causing Maliki to get into trouble. Constantly resisting the demands of the government in the north concerning Kirkuk, the controversial regions and oil law was the only way Maliki could get support from the Sunni-Arabs and the Shiites who are nationalists. Even groups that oppose Maliki appreciate his attitude. Therefore, the visit may weaken his position with those groups. Maliki may begin to be criticized for maintaining very good relations with Kurds, as Iyad Allavi and Tariq Hashimi were, by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq among other Iraqi political parties. This fact may make Maliki’s situation difficult as he struggles to form a coalition right before elections.
Soon we will see how successful or productive the visit has been. How to resolve the Kirkuk issue, the major hurdle highlighted throughout the visit, is still a matter of curiosity. On the first of December 2008, 5 committees were formed in order to solve shared problems regarding security, the peshmerga, disputed territory, international policy, oil and gas, power sharing and constitutional reforms. These committees have achieved no concrete results. Therefore, Maliki’s Provincial Assembly election and his attitude towards Article 140 will be of great importance. If Maliki accepts the implementation of Article 140, while looking for reconciliation because of the U.S. pressure, he may lose all the support from Sunni Arabs. What’s more, this situation may create again an atmosphere where Shi’ah, Sunni and Kurdish parties take part in the elections with their own alliances, but if Maliki’s visit fails to lead to solutions, the tension between Baghdad and the regional government may increase again. That is why it can be said that the visit may cause negative or positive new developments, rather than merely restoring Maliki’s public image.
[*] ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Assist. Prof. Dr., Ahi Evran University
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