An Analysis of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government’s Election Results: Changed Domestic Dynamics and Expectations

While the Kurdish parties and coalitions that participated in the elections ran for a hundred seats in the Parliament, Chaldeans and Assyrians ran for five seats, Turkmens ran for five, and about 200-250 Armenians living nearby Turkish border fought for control of for one seat. The total number voters was 2,518,229. Of these, 898,735 were registered in Erbil, 1,058,189 were registered in Sulaimaniyah, and 568,849 were registered in Dohuk. Iraqi Electoral Commission officials who attended a briefing at Arbil International Hotel (known as the Sheraton Hotel in the region), announced that the percentage of voters who participated in the elections was 78%. They said that the participation rates were 79% in Arbil, 74% in Sulaimaniyah, 85% in Dohuk and 15% in Baghdad . Although 41 political parties participated in the elections, the real race was between 3 important lists. These are: the “Kurdistan List,” that is, the KDP-PUK alliance, “the Goran (Change) List” headed by Nawshirwan Mustafa and supported by the former KDP Secretary General Namik Salim, the “the Service and Reform List” which includes the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group in Kurdistan, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Future Party. The 2009 elections saw competition between these three lists. Thus, the results of the elections show that the Kurdistan List took the 57%, the Change List 23%, and the Reform List got the 12% of the total votes. From the votes received, it is clear that the Kurdistan List won 62 seats, the Change List, 26, the Service and Reform List, 12 seats in the new Parliament.

According to these results, the Islamists, who were not far behind the KDP and the PUK prior to the elections, have lost power. As a result, this alliance of four groups, which received fewer votes than expected, might disintegrate. On the other hand, it is important to note that the KDP-PUK alliance has lost major share of its voters, falling from 89.55% of the votes and 104 seats won in the previous elections. 

Evaluating of the Election Results Party by Party

PUK: Looking at the election results, we see that the KDP and the PUK received fewer votes than expected. Both parties expected to receive about 75% of the votes. In this context, the  KDP repeatedly stated that they would be loyal to the regulations that the party instated in 1998 and 2002 and leave the presidency to the PUK. However, after the announcement of the election results, the prospect that the PUK take the presidency post were radically diminishes since they reduced votes for the Kurdistan List by losing large numbers of voters in the Soran region. Above all, it is likely that the KDP will enact structural reforms. In accordance with this picture, the President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, has announced that he may leave his post as the head of the PUK is the first sign of this pressure for the change. The pressure for change was also increased by the stunning loss of voters in Sulaimaniyah. In the Sulaimaniyah elections, while the PUK-KDP alliance won the 52% of the votes, the Change List received 48%. Despite Jalal Talabani’s attempts at reconciliation over the last two months, it is now clear that Talabani was unable to prevent the split between the grass roots and the PUK elite. After the war, in 2003, Nawshirwan Mustafa’s had already criticized Sulaimaniyah and Kosret Resul, Arbil. Both were among the party’s founders . However, when Jalal Talabani became the President, he mitigated internal opposition by assigning the leadershhip of Sulaimaniyah to Nawshirwan Mustafa and that of the PUK caucus in the Parliament to Kosret Rosul. Rumors about the health problems of Jalal Talabani and claims that Kobat Talabani would take over the KYB became evident, leading to the renewed opposition of Nawshirwan Mustafa and Kosret Resol. This time, to silence the opposition Jalal Talabani had to give control of the intelligence services and monetary issues to Sulaimaniyah. However, Nawshirwan Mustafa’s opposition did not cease, and six months before the elections he decided to run for office in the name of the Change List. The election results will directly affect the race for leadership of the KYB.  Nawshirwan Mustafa’s victories over Jalal Talabani in the first general elections is important. The elections show the reduced impact of Jalal Talabani on the PUK grass roots. It is unlikely that Talabani’s plan to install Kobat Talabani as the head of the KYB will succeed. According to a verbal agreement between Jalal Talabani and Masud Barzani, KDP management will meet for an hour and announce Kobat Talabani as KYB’s new leader ion the event of the death of Jalal Talabani.  However, the 2009 elections show that the KDP does not have enough power to solve the problem of the PUK’s leadership on their own.

The Goran (Change) List: No doubt the biggest success story of these elections is that of the Gorran List and, as the people of Sulaimaniyah people say, Kak Nawshirwan Mustafa. It is wrong to call the movement of Nawshirwan Mustafa, this former Peshmerga commander who has been the second man in the KYB for about 40 years, but who is also a new media boss and a businessman, an “orange revolution.” As the name suggests, the success of Nawshirwan Mustafa, who used Barack Obama’s slogan in his election campaign, “change” should be analyzed from several perspectives. First of all, given the election results, Nawshirwan Mustafa’s claims that he received support from the growing opposition to Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, who have controlled the Kurdish region since 1991, are not a realistic analysis, since the Change List was not supported by the population in Arbil and Dohuk as a serious alternative, as argued. Second, the Change List began in Sulaimaniyah and received enough votes in this province to change the distribution of seats in Parliament. Here, we may observe that the Change List is a regional movement, which can win votes in a specific region and is ineffective elsewhere. Additionally, it should be noted that the success of the Change List has affected both the PUK and the KDP. Above all, we see for the first time a new opposition party against the KDP and the PUK has emerged in the Regional Parliament. Obviously, Nawshirwan Mustafa criticizes corruption, ineffective management, and centralization, which he also expressed during the election campaigns. At the same time, Mustafa questions the relations of Barzani’s government with Baghdad and accuses Arbil’s leaders of causing to the increase of aggressive Arab nationalism. He claims that the problems of “Controversial Areas” cannot be solved by military action, which, when practiced, had a negative impact, initially on Arab nationalists, but also on other ethnic communities and sects. Nawshirwan Mustafa criticizes the use of harsh discourse and radical actions in order to protect the gains the Kurds have acquired. Since Mustafa has the chance to make these criticisms in the Parliament in Arbil, it may lead the parties that will compose the government to pursue more careful and responsible policies.

KDP: After the elections, the KDP again showed that their traditional power is consolidated in the provinces of Arbil and Dohuk. For Talabani’s traditional grass roots support to have been successful in the July 25, 2009 elections, KDP management had to comply with the prime minister, as well as important ministries of the PUK in the new government. In this new situation, KDP has a strategic advantage with both the prime minister position and the more members of Parliament. Another important KDP advantage concerns ethnic minorities and Islamist parties.  They traditionally work with these groups. As a result, the KDP has the flexibility required to form new alliances whatever may occur. On the other hand, the fact that the Change List won 26 seats in the Parliament will directly influence the KDP-PUK alliance. The KDP will cause the PUK to get fewer positions in the new ministries. This might lead the ministries who are going to enter the Parliament from KYB list to change sides and give their support to Nawshirwan Mustafa.  The worst scenario for the KDP is of Mustafa’s domination of the PUK, and potential to attain a more powerful position than KDP in the Parliament during Jalal Talabani’s absence. Thus, it is very probable that  KDP leaders will live in fear of the consignment of the party leadership to Nawshirwan Mustafa in an attempt to prevent the dissolution of the party after Jalal Talabani. This possibility might lead to serious discussions, first, regarding the distribution of Parliament members, and then, the ministries for both parties. Nawshirwan Mustafa, on the other hand, will wait for KYP’s call for his leadership during these debates. Apart from the votes they received, we see that the KDP could not penetrate Sulaimaniyah--in other words, the Soran region--and remained limited to its historical borders. The KDP’s status as an Arbil and Dohuk centered party shows that the sharp division between Soran and Bahdinan is still in effect. The divergence between the two sides came out very clearly, especially in the Regional Presidency election.

Regional Presidency Elections and the Position of Masud  Barzani 

Since Talabani’s election to the presidency, with a decision taken in Kurdish Regional Parliament in 2006, Masud Barzani was declared the head of the region. As a result, in the July 25 elections (after the elections in 1992), the community went to the polls to choose a president for the second time. With 5 candidates running in the elections, the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader, Masud Barzani, with the support of the KDP-KYB alliance and the Islamic parties, was seen as certain to win the majority vote. In fact, according to the released election results, Masud Bargain took the 67% of the votes, and managed to be elected Regional President again. Barzani, who entered the elections in 1992 as an independent took the 48% of the votes at that time. It can be argued from a mathematical point of view that Barzani has successfully built up his support base. Morover, in the 2009 election, Barzani was chosen directly by popular vote for the first time. Hence, no group is in a position to question his leadership directly. Masud Barzani will use his 67% election results as an effective tool from now on.

However, Masud Barzani’s uncompromising approach to issues with Kirkuk and Mosul, along with the “Controversial Areas”, and the nationalist stance towards neighboring states were shown to be ineffective in garnering support for Barzani in Soran, so that, with the possibility that Islamist parties supporters and the KYB withdraw from the 67% majority, it can be inferred that Barzani actually won fewer votes than in the 1992 elections. Moreover, Dr. Kemal Miradeli, a Change List candidate, took a respectable 23% of the votes, and this has drawn attention. In this context, it is likely that Barzani will revise his relationships both within the region and with other actors. Considering Turkey’s recently democratizing projects towards Kurdish questions it can be thought that the relations between Kurdistan Regional Government and Turkey will be improved. 

Questions to be Answered after the Elections

In light of the election results, a series of issues need to be discussed regarding the domestic affairs of the Kurdish Regional Government in the following weeks and months. In these discussions we will seek to answers the following questions:

1- Despite diminishing PUK support, can the KDP-PUK alliance be sustained? If so, is a new alliance going to be formed? With the present results, will there be negotiations between the members of the Parliament between the two parties? Is the KDP going to be able to persuade the PUK to take less than %50 of the cake?

2- In accordance with the rules of the KDP-PUK alliance, will the prime minister’s seat be given to KYB? Or, will the KDP insist on giving this seat to Nawshirwan Barzani again, instead of giving it to the KYB’s Bahram Salih because of his declining popular support?

3- Despite his announcement that he will not participate in the government, will Nawshirwan Mustafa refuse to join a coalition?

4- Will Talabani give the KYB to Nawshirwan Mustafa or will the Change Movement become a party?

5- Will the rift between the Kurdish regions, Soran and Bahdinan, continue to grow wider?

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[*] Assist. Prof. Dr. Veysel Ayhan, Abant İzzet Baysal University, Department for International Relations, ORSAM Middle East Advisor