Rhetoric and Reality: Turkish Politics Inside and Out

However, Turkey itself is polarized, ridden with cultural clashes, tolerance deficits, and widespread conviction that domestic balances of power are inadequate. And it is not only the domestic environment but also perceived dissonance in Turkish foreign policy that raises questions about Turkey’s ability to maneuver the complex dynamics of its neighborhood.

Turkey’s added value

The debate about Turkey’s foreign policy in Washington centers around whether Turkey is anchored to the West as it strengthens its regional ties or whether Turkey is intent on creating a second bloc, a “Muslim pole,” for a new and just world order. In other words, does Turkey aim to leverage its indispensability toward being a full and equal partner of the Western bloc, or is Turkey positioning itself as a stand-alone power that has to be reckoned with for policy accomplishments in this region?

In terms of anchoring Turkey in the West (and vice versa), a promising step took place on July 13 with transit countries signing an agreement on the strategic Nabucco pipeline, set to bring natural gas from the Caspian to Turkey and onwards to Europe. At the time, this author was in Baku facing questions from Azerbaijani oppositionists on why the Turkish government can confront Israel over the Palestinians and China over the Uigurs, but remain silent as youth activists face violence and are imprisoned in Azerbaijan.

Energy deals between Turkey and Azerbaijan, alongside rhetoric of brotherhood between the nations, does not meet their expectations. However, there are no easy answers to the challenges of Turkey’s neighborhood, and leaving questions hanging is a tactic used all too frequently by Ankara. Asked by some in Washington, “If Turkish foreign policy is all about realpolitik, why does the Prime Minister seem to be trying to win the Arab street when it comes to Middle East policies, even when this means alienating key Arab regimes?” Lala Shovket Hajiyeva, the head of a small opposition party in Azerbaijan, echoes a common sentiment among the vocal opposition when she says, “I wish it was Turkey and not the Europeans bringing us democracy.” A young activist noted that the frustrations in his country, coupled with schools and networks allegedly connected to the Fethullah Gülen movement, gradually lay the foundation for a religiously-motivated political alternative in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the country’s ruling establishment performs a challenging balancing act between not only the West and Russia, but also the interest-driven power centers within, as well as expectations within society, that have grown by witnessing domestic changes in neighboring Georgia that have improved many aspects of Georgians’ lives. Commenting on Turkey’s influence in Azerbaijan, a more cynical (and older) Azerbaijani simply said, “just make sure to move Turkey forward to the EU because if you head anywhere else, it will affect our direction ever more.”

Turkey as a center of attraction

Today, Turkey is ever more polarized. Clashing camps speak of the “greater good” of their cause. A member of the government may claim that a de facto affirmative action-like approach is legitimate, in order to empower the conservative classes that have been excluded for decades. On the other hand, many staunch critics of the government perceive state capture and power abuse by the ruling party and fear this will become irreversible due to a weak balance of powers.

The shortcuts to identifying who belongs to each camp get shorter by the day, including the newspaper one reads, the TV channel a company advertisement is broadcasted, and even the restaurant that slips a person’s name to the front of the waiting list. Express concern of patronage in an AKP municipality and someone is coined a “Kemalist.” Mention the harm of banning headscarves in universities and one is labeled an opportunist who must be trying to appease the government, if not an outright Islamist. There is a divided judiciary, parallel lawyers associations, bureaucrats pitted against each other, and battling nongovernmental organizations. Turks might get shuffled into a camp to which they do not feel affinity, based on shortcuts for classifying people based on symbols.

Foreigners are not immune from this absurd reductionism either. After four Azerbaijani members of Parliament visited Turkey and criticized the government for their Armenia policies in April, the Turkish Prime Minister reportedly accused them of being connected to Turkey’s deep state. There have indeed been attempts to wrestle power from this government using undemocratic means, with many of the involved currently on trial or being investigated. However, exploiting this by labeling critics of the government as coup-mongers is unjustified. Tolerance to criticism on behalf of the government in Turkey would be most inspiring to those from countries where aligning with power holders is necessary for social and economic mobility.

International expectations of courage and vision from both Turkey and the current U.S. administration are enormous. While the U.S. administration is mirroring its policy of “reaching out” in the world with its domestic efforts to do so, the Turkish government must also go out of its way to overcome traditional lines of confrontation with its legitimate critics in Turkey itself. This will be what determines its success both domestically and globally. A good place to start in building confidence inside would be to move forward with reforms foreseen in the European integration agenda that also curb the power of the government.

The United States, the European Union, and Turkey

Within Washington the debate about Turkey is weak and divided. While some in the U.S. capital noted the rapid extension of congratulations from Turkey to Ahmadinejad after the elections in Iran as an extension of Turkey’s realist and pragmatic foreign policy, others saw this as a sign that power would eventually be consolidated by Islamists in Turkey while Iran joined the free world.

In a sense, the Turkish government has a stronger hand in its relations with Washington than ever before. The Obama administration is attempting to reach out to the Muslim world and a conservative Muslim party with strong popular backing is governing Turkey. In negotiating with the United States, AKP can conveniently point to the still very high levels of anti-Americanism in Turkish society as a bargaining chip. The leading opposition parties are all more U.S.-skeptic in rhetoric than AKP. Moreover, with many more pressing challenges on its agenda, Washington would hardly opt for more strain in its Turkey ties.

During the Cold War it was important for the Western alliance not to “lose” Turkey, and it is today too. However, today when the risks of losing Turkey are debated, it is the value of Turkey’s soft power that is in the forefront, not its geostrategic and military function. Faced with a new set of regional challenges and very different power balances in Turkey, it is the ruling AKP with which Washington needs collaboration most. It is often said that Washington turned a blind eye to abuses committed by the Turkish military when the military relationship was central to the two countries’ joint interests. It is important today that expectations from the Turkish government regarding rule of law and pluralism are not lowered.

Ranging from impartiality of the judiciary to institutional arrangements to combat corruption, the EU membership requirements address the many issues that are critical for Turkey to implement in order to break out of the nearly chronic perception of existential crisis. It is, therefore, puzzling that the Turkish opposition parties are not calling for the EU accession agenda to be implemented more aggressively in Turkey. Those in both Turkey and the United States who are concerned about Turkey’s direction should put more emphasis on the roadmap that the EU process provides.

The messages President Barack Obama gave during his recent visit to Turkey reflected a welcome sensitivity to Turkey’s internal balances by emphasizing principles over partisanship. Though it is in the interest of the United States that Turkish democracy is consolidated, Washington has a limited set of tools to steer Turkey down this path. The EU process is the single most influential factor in correcting the many distortions within Turkey’s political world. In this sense, disheartening messages from European capitals about Turkey’s eventual membership strike a blow not only to Democrats in Turkey but also to the strategic interests of Washington.

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* Nigar Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF or those of the European Stability Initiative.