Receding power of Turkey's military
A leap for democracy or another power struggle?
by
AMBERİN ZAMAN*

Without question, the military's influence has been steadily waning ever since the Islam-friendly Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. Through reforms aimed at gaining EU membership, the AKP has tried to reduce the generals' powers on paper at least. The single biggest reduction in their political weight came when the AKP relegated the National Security Council (MGK), through which the military would dictate domestic and foreign policy, to an advisory role and decreed that henceforth its secretary-general would be a civilian not a general.

On June 26, the military suffered an even bigger blow when the AKP-dominated Parliament, in a post-midnight session, rushed through legislation that bars military courts from prosecuting civilians and allows civilian courts to prosecute officers who commit crimes within their jurisdiction. The measure was adopted after another alleged coup attempt was leaked to the press and the law was approved soon after by Abdullah Gül, the Turkish president, despite considerable pressure from the generals for him to strike it down. In a sop to the generals, Gül did add a footnote to his signature calling for the law to be refined in ways that would address their concerns. But this has not stopped Gül's detractors from accusing him of leaning in favor of the government.

Even so, the law has been widely hailed as a big leap for Turkish democracy that will put an end to coups and bring the meddlesome military under greater civilian control. But it has left the secular elite feeling even more defenseless and has reinforced their suspicions that the AKP's “real agenda” is to defang the military so it can impose religious rule.

More likely, the AKP's campaign to whittle down the military's influence has less to do with democratic or Islamist zeal than with a desire to cement its control. Otherwise put, the constitutional amendment marks the latest stage in the AKP's ongoing power struggle against the generals. Their differences have been more broadly framed as a tug of war between the old elites and an encroaching class of pious Anatolian entrepreneurs who have prospered under the AKP. Either way, the military is losing ground; a string of abortive coup plots and its bungled campaign to block Gül's ascent to the presidency has further eroded the army's image, and it is once again the pro-secular main opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) that is riding to the rescue. CHP leader Deniz Baykal has vowed to appeal to the Constitutional Court to get the law overturned, and herein lies the problem.

One of the biggest failings of Turkish democracy is that its secular opposition has opted to become the fiercest opponent of pro-EU reforms, rather than spearhead them. This has led to accusations that the CHP is nothing more than a stalking horse for the generals whose sole aim is to perpetuate their dominance over politics. The CHP's dogged resistance to change has sapped its popularity. The party has not won a single election for more than half a century. In 1999, the CHP failed to get into Parliament altogether. Yet Baykal, who has led the party for over two decades, is firmly glued to his seat. This is thanks to internal party regulations that allow the party leaders to appoint delegates who in turn vote them back into power. (This is the case for virtually all political parties in Turkey, with perhaps the exception of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party [DTP] whose leaders are vetted by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK]).

The CHP's opposition to the law allowing military officers to be tried in civilian courts looks doubly bad because it comes amid revelations of an alleged plan by the military to discredit the AKP. A copy of “The Plan to Combat Islamic Fundamentalism” was published on June 12 by Taraf, a liberal daily newspaper, touching off a political storm that culminated in Parliament's adoption of the law, clearing the way for prosecution of the plan's alleged perpetrators.

Signed by Dursun Çiçek, a navy colonel serving in the military's psychological warfare unit, the plan calls for “mobilizing agents” within the AKP to discredit the party and foment internal divisions. More controversially, it speaks of planting guns and explosives in the homes of members of Turkey's most influential Islamic brotherhood, led by Fethullah Gülen.

The generals count the Gülenists among their most formidable enemies. The Gülenists are widely thought to have heavily penetrated the police force and, to a far lesser degree, the military itself. Indeed, it is generally assumed that it is these Gülenist elements that leaked the plan as well as other military documents that exposed the military's alleged incompetence in staving off major PKK attacks along the Iraqi border in November 2007 and October 2008.

The controversy swirling around the alleged plan took an embarrassing turn when a civilian prosecutor called in Col. Çiçek for questioning and then ordered his arrest within a day of being cleared by military investigators. The colonel, whose name has been linked to an earlier plan to besmirch nongovernmental organizations (including the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association [TÜSİAD], the largest industrialists' lobby), was freed soon after for lack of evidence. Çiçek denied all the allegations, but other retired generals who are being investigated over their alleged attempts to unseat the AKP could end up in jail. On July 13, a group of lawyers in the mainly Kurdish city of Van lodged a formal complaint against Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt, the former chief of general staff, over his alleged involvement in extrajudicial activities during his term in the mainly Kurdish Southeast region.

Gen. İlker Başbuğ, Büyükanıt's successor, has repeatedly asserted that he will not tolerate coup plotters within the military's ranks. Yet, the alacrity with which he dubbed the latest plan a fake “piece of paper” (it was allegedly cooked up in April), and his failure to suspend Col. Çiçek from his duties during the military's own investigation, has raised questions about his sincerity. A further test will come in August when the military holds its annual Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting, where promotions, expulsions and other personnel related matters (including the fate of Col. Çiçek) are decided.

Meanwhile, all eyes are turned to the Constitutional Court, which is expected to deliver an opinion on the CHP's petition soon. Whichever way it rules, the genie is out of the bottle. The military is no longer untouchable, at least in the national debate. The onus is on the AKP now to prove that it is not selective about reforms and to push through other changes that do not necessarily chime with its outlook. The onus is also on the CHP to find a way to unseat its moribund leader and give the millions of Turks who neither want Shariah nor coups a credible alternative to the AKP.