‘Military, gov’t embroiled in controlled tension’

The General Staff has been at odds with the government and its policies since the detention and arrest of a number of its members as part of the Ergenekon investigation, a probe that was launched in February 2007 into an illegal network suspected of having plans to overthrow the government. Bayramoğlu noted that Turkey is in a process in which the military's legitimate grounds for dominance over society are decreasing. Last week, President Abdullah Gül approved a bill paving the way for military personnel to be tried in civilian courts, a landmark step in improving Turkey's democracy.

For Monday Talk, Bayramoğlu elaborated on this issue and discussed how civilian-military relations have evolved in Turkey.

The latest National Security Council (MGK) meeting started under tense conditions as Turkey's military and civilian leaders met in the wake of an alleged military conspiracy to discredit the government. The nation held its breath about the outcome of the meeting, but in the end, there was almost nothing to be excited about. What do you think has been happening?

The MGK is a place of engagement between the military and civilian leaders. It is a place to have reasonable talks as well as to be confrontational. Indeed, this depends on the balances in society. What we see right now is a controlled tension adopted by both civilian and military leaders. This is what they have to do. Neither are the military leaders in a position to spell out their political powers loudly nor are the civilian leaders in a position to risk having a legitimacy crisis by pressuring the military. So the MGK meeting did not end with a crisis but absorbed some of the negative energy created by the expectations of a crisis.

Why do you think the military leaders are not in a position to assert their political power?

The military has two roles in the Turkish political system. One of them is to inspect the political mechanisms on behalf of the state. This inspection can be seen in the military's presence in political decision-making processes, either formally or informally. Secondly, the military has to have enough power; in other words, it has to be autonomous to do that. These factors describe the system that we call a system of military tutelage in Turkey.

However, the military has been pressured since the 2000s not to intervene so much in the decision-making process, as Turkey's accession process to the European Union requires. This change has not occurred with a confrontation between the military and the civilian government. Indeed, the military has not been an object in this process of change but a subject because it is an institution that has to carry out the change as some of the EU reforms have been adopted. We see that former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök did not object to that new role.

Ali Bayramoğlu, civilian-military relations analyst A graduate of the Grenoble Institute of Political Studies in France, he teaches sociology, humanities and Turkish cultural history at Kültür University in İstanbul. He is a regular writer for the Aksiyon newsweekly and the Yeni Şafak daily. Among his books are "28 Şubat/Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi" (Feb. 28/Diary of an Intervention), written in 2001, and "Türkiye'de İslami Harekete Sosyolojik Bir Bakış 1994-2000" (Looking at the Islamic Movement in Turkey 1994-2000). Together with Galatasaray University's Ahmet İnsel, he is the co-editor of the recently released “Almanac Turkey 2006–2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight.”

What has happened since Gen. Özkök's retirement?

The military has started an active resistance since his retirement. We see the implementation of this resistance in the e-memorandum on April 27, 2007, warning the government. And then came the rejection of Abdullah Gül's presidency by the military, especially in the period of Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt. And then came the general elections.

‘Military protects its turf’

The ruling party came out of the July 22, 2007 elections with a landslide.

The 47 percent victory of the ruling party was the biggest blow to the legitimacy of the armed forces in society. And the confrontation continued, this time with a closure case against the ruling party. In the meantime, we have had the Ergenekon case, which started a cleansing process and put the military in a difficult position in society. There were other developments that weakened the position of the armed forces, even in the military sphere. As the Taraf daily revealed some documents showing how security flaws played a large role in the deaths of a number of Turkish soldiers in confrontations in Dağlıca and Aktütün [military outposts in the Southeast attacked by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK); in both raids, there was evidence suggesting that military command had intelligence about the terrorists' attack plans].

Now back to your initial question about why the military leaders are not in a position to assert their political power; under these circumstances, they are in a position to protect their turf rather than interfering in the political decision-making process. If you look at the speeches of [current Chief of General Staff Gen.] İlker Başbuğ since March, you see that he is trying to position the military on legitimate ground, and at the same time, he is not willing to compromise the political role of the military.

And with this situation, the government passed a new parliamentary amendment with the midnight proposal on June 25, allowing the trial of military personnel in civilian courts.

This is very important because it touches on the military's autonomy as we see it exercised in three areas: financial, administrative and judiciary. There are steps taken in the financial arena by bringing control over military procurements by the Court of Auditors even though it hasn't been sufficiently implemented yet. But administrative and judiciary autonomy of the military continues. And when you touch on that autonomy, you touch on the closed structure of the military, which by being so closed can assert political power. So the passage of this law was the biggest step in history. And the military has shown its annoyance.

How does it show its annoyance?

There have been no memorandums issued. And no open policies of tension creation have been adopted because the debate is about the reforms not the regime. So the military shows its irritation by using the media, especially the Doğan Media Group, through such journalists as Fikret Bila and Ertuğrul Özkök. And the military is resisting, however, in a more democratic way when compared to the past.

Do you pay heed to expectations of another military coup or similar attempts?

The nation cannot be steered efficiently if there is a military coup. The economy would burst in the hands of coup leaders. But there are methods even worse than a military coup. We have seen it in the Feb. 28 [1997] process, in which a government was toppled. The military has had good tools in that regard, and these methods have been used in the past. They can use such methods again, especially considering that the ruling party carries Islamic baggage.

‘AK Party’s Islamic baggage’

How would that “baggage” play a role?

It is true to say that Turkey has been governed by pious Muslims even though it is not true to say that it adopts religious policies. It is a religiously conservative government. And every step that this government tries to take in the arena of basic human rights and freedoms -- taking steps in the arena of military-civilian relations carries even less risks and is easier -- will be difficult and will have the potential to lead to a regime crisis. For example, working toward the adoption of a civilian constitution means changing Article 24 of the Constitution regarding freedom of religion. It would mean revising the definition of secularism, the role of the Diyanet [Religious Affairs Directorate], religion classes in schools and so on. Another example would be changing the Political Parties Law.

Touching on those issues in the past led to some crises. But the government was able to adopt several reforms in the past. What is it that makes it so risky today?

If the government manages to steer the process of change, it would not lead to a crisis, and that means adopting new participatory mechanisms. In other words, the government would need to be able to open a public discussion about much needed changes instead of preparing draft constitutions in its party headquarters. In 2000, when the [Justice and Development Party] AK Party came to power, it had a strict reformist policy, even on the issue of Cyprus.

And reforms were realized at the time.

But how? Because there was support behind the AK Party. When [retired general and chairman of the Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD)] Şener Eruygur [who stands as a suspect in the Ergenekon investigation] went to [Doğan Media Group head] Aydın Doğan and asked his support for a Feb. 28-like process, Aydın Doğan did not support him. In addition, TÜSİAD [the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association] supported the government during its first term in office. If the AK Party again catches the winds of change and has … the support of society in general, today it could start a reform process again.

Would you elaborate on that issue more? What is happening to the civilian leadership? At the very beginning of our interview, you said the civilian leaders are not in a position to risk having a legitimacy crisis by pressuring the military.

The AK Party came to power in 2002 with a serious political and economic roadmap. But after 2005, there was the crisis related to the presidency, which meant the failure of the 1982 Constitution [drafted after the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup], which envisaged a presidency checking on the government. During the crisis, [Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan made inconsistent moves. Even though he first dared to challenge the presidency style that the 1982 Constitution enforced, later he came against Abdullah Gül's candidacy because he had seen what the conflict with the military would lead to. So he tried not to disturb the military. Meanwhile, Gül announced his presidency, and the Dağlıca crisis occurred. Erdoğan again sought an alliance with the military. He did it through adopting a militarist and statist line, especially on the Kurdish issue. Later came the closure case against the AK Party. This pressure forced the government to adopt a cautious line. At the time, he spoke out publicly about Aydın Doğan. Indeed, he was giving messages to the military. Erdoğan was backtracking as a result of the top court's decision to annul constitutional amendments that would allow women to wear Muslim headscarves at Turkish universities and the closure case. So he has been giving his full support to the Ergenekon case even though he even compromises on that, too.

‘Erdoğan knows his limits’

In what way does he compromise?

[Ergenekon suspects] Tuncer Kılınç and Kemal Yavuz [two retired generals known to have been influential in the Feb. 28 process] were released as a result of the meeting between the prime minister and Gen. Başbuğ.

Why did he do that?

Because if these retired generals were held, there was a possibility of further investigation into their chiefs at the time, [former Chief of General Staff Gen.] Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu [who is frequently rumored to be the top figure in the Ergenekon criminal network] and retired Gen. İsmail Hakkı Karadayı [who was chief of general staff during the unarmed military intervention that brought down the government in 1997]. I know that Erdoğan communicated with Ergenekon prosecutor Zekeriya Öz through the justice minister and said that if Kıvrıkoğlu and Karadayı were investigated, the military would be greatly harmed so the prosecutor should know this as a fact.

So you are saying that Erdoğan knows his limits.

Yes, he does. And if he crosses those limits, he will face a legitimacy problem. Indeed, both sides, the military and the government, need legitimate ground, and I say this in a positive sense. If they don't have legitimate ground, they will not be able to take further steps. The point where we stand right now is not so bad in comparison to the past. It will take time to develop Turkish democracy further. We have to see where we were and where we are.

Where are we?

We are at a stage in which a controlled clean-up period is continuing. We are in a process in which there is not as much legitimate ground as before for the military actors' dominance over society; it is shrinking. We also have to note that when there are such changes, it is not easy for military people either as their might has been challenged. In the military, there are divisions, discussions, conflicts and so on. At this time, the Turkish military has been going through an internal crisis. Remember how [retired Gen.] Hilmi Özkök defined an army officer on television. He said an army officer is one who is an intellectual, not one who uses hard power. He represents a democratic movement in the army. All of these discussions are likely to lead to positive developments if there are no accidents on the way.

What kind of accidents?

Those are not so predictable. There could be wars in the world that could change the current balances. … We should also note that the AK Party looks like it's going to lose votes as it stays far from reformist policies.