Analyst does not expect a new Iranian revolution

Working at the Ankara-based Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TÜRKSAM), Keskin said that Iranians have seen many rebellions and revolutions but have not been able to reach some of their aspirations such as freedom and justice.

“They feel closer to a model within the regime which will evolve slowly and in time,” he said. “The green color used in protests is not reminiscent of revolution. It represents change and something new and especially something fresh.”

Presidential elections were held in Iran on June 12. According to official figures, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won 62.6 percent of the vote, whereas his rival Mir Hossein Mousavi garnered 33.75 percent. Mousavi's supporters have claimed massive fraud tilted the election and want the vote to be cancelled and held again.

Tens of thousands of people have participated in mass demonstrations protesting the results of the elections despite a government clampdown on the Internet and cell phones, which have been used by Iranians to tell the world about protests and violence. Iranian police say 20 people have been killed and more than 1,000 arrested in the post-election unrest. Human rights groups have put the death toll much higher.

However, Iran's powerful Guardian Council, which consists of six influential clerics and six jurists who decide who can and cannot run for office and can also reject legislation passed by the parliament, recently warned the opposition to no longer protest the disputed presidential vote after upholding the re-election of incumbent Ahmadinejad. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also sided with Ahmadinejad, calling the election a “definitive victory.”

For Monday Talk, Keskin elaborated on the behind-the-scenes issues such as cracks in state legitimacy at the very heart of the regime and whether the protests have the potential to bring about reform in the country's political system or will cause regime leaders to further tighten their grip on power. He also touched on Turkey's role in the process.

Ostensibly, there is a conflict between the supporters of the challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. What is behind the conflict?

Although there is personal rivalry between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad the developments can not be demoted to just this. The developments are an element of the differences in views and interests within the Iranian state and the desire to find a new relationship model between the state and the society. The competition between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi is actually a mirror of the clashes in the state and in the different groups, classes and segments of the society.

Can you talk about these differences? Which groups and classes are clashing?

The developments within the state and the developments within the society need to be distinguished from each other in order to be able to properly analyze the developments. It is difficult to understand the conflict inside the system from looking just at the streets or understand the street protests from just looking at the conflict inside the system.

What are the differences within the state?

The presidential elections in Iran can not be evaluated as a reformist-conservative clash. This election is actually an outcome of the fragmentation and internal conflict within conservatives. A portion of conservatives aligned with reformists in the elections and another portion stood by Ahmadinejad. This situation has altered the traditional leftist-rightists or reformist-conservative division model in the Iranian state system and has resulted in the birth of a new drift.

Arif Keskin, a Middle East analyst from Iran Working as a Middle East analyst at the Ankara-based Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TÜRKSAM), Keskin is an Azerbaijani Turk born in Iran and a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. He studied sociology in Tabriz and political science in Ankara. He worked as a Middle East analyst at the Ankara-based Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) from 1999 to May 2009. Keskin has numerous academic articles, translated to Farsi, English, Russian and Arabic.

Would you elaborate on this new direction?

Groups in the Islamic Republic of Iran have had different political views since 1979. Many Khomeini supporters had different views on issues. “Leftist” and “rightist” divisions in the state started as of 1981. Although Khomeini tried to protect the balances in the system, he began supporting the “left” leaning segment of the society. It is for this reason that the leftists under the leadership of Mousavi took control of power in 1981. With Khomeini's support the left-wing had the most control over the executive, legislative and judiciary branches until 1988. Khomeini's death in 1989 shook the balances within the Iranian political system. In 1989, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was elected as President and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was elected as Supreme Leader. These developments strengthened the hand of the right in the Iranian political system. With the right's increasing power, the left was pushed outside the ruling power bloc.

So you are saying that we call the left groups as reformists and the right as conservatives. How is the conservative group structured?

The conservatives can be divided into three different groups: traditional, moderate and radical. Traditional conservatives are outcomes of the historical alliance between major religious leaders and merchants and appeal to Iran's traditional middle class constituents. Their position on cultural and political matters is based on the “Velayat-e Faqih” – headed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This movement generally avoids radical practices in both domestic and foreign policies. The moderate conservative movement emerged from the traditional conservative trend but followed a different path. It defends an industrial bourgeoisie in economics. Moderate conservatives defend pragmatism in foreign policy because it is a movement that seeks economic integration with the international system. This movement identifies with the former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and there are many moderate conservatives in the Iranian bureaucracy.

‘Ayatollah Khamenei divides to rule'

‘Iran cannot be Turkey, Turkey cannot be Iran' How was Turkey's congratulatory message to Iranian President Ahmadinejad before the Guardian Council approved the election results received in Iran? This was seen as a strange act and not understood at all by the Iranian people. The general public has perceived this rush as an act not commensurate with the image of Turkey, which aspires to be a European Union member. This will probably not hurt short-term relations with Iran, but Turkey should be able to evaluate what the future might hold for Iran. So this rushing to the front to present congratulations was not a good investment for the future. Turkey should have a place in a more democratic Iran because it has such potential. Turkey should at least remain neutral to the developments in Iran. Do the reformists in Iran expect Turkey's support? The pro-reform movement and street protestors expect Turkey's moral support. But Iranian Turks, whose population is about 30 million -- most of them being Azerbaijani Turks, have the biggest expectations from Turkey. What are those expectations? They have been returning to their ethnic Turkish identity for about the last 20 years. And they expect Turkey to be interested in them, though it has declared that it would be wrong to interfere in Iran's internal affairs. But they expect a little interest, even if only a little, in the cultural and political areas. Have they been supporting the reform movement? They have, but only from the outside, not through active participation. This is because they don't see eye to eye with the reformists when it comes to democracy as the Persian pro-reform movement has not given up its nationalist stance. Indeed, most of the ethnic groups in Iran have not taken an active part in the reformist movement. So the Iranian Turks, as other ethnic groups of Iran, are suspicious about the motives of the pro-reform movement and question how the reformists differ from the present rulers. Some news reports indicated that many Iranians would like Iran to become like Turkey. Does this view have a large support? Iranians have widespread envy for Turkey. To them, Turkey has taken important steps on the way to democracy: the Turkish people still struggle for it and this struggle has reached partial success. They also think that Turkey has been moving in the right direction and developing every day, becoming even more powerful. Some Iranian hard-line nationalists do not seem to be pleased with Turkey's political clout in Iran, where there is a considerable Turkish population. When you compare the two countries, Iranians perceive Turkey as more powerful and self-confident. The Turkish economy is four times the size of the Iranian economy. About a million Iranian tourists visit Turkey annually, while about 10,000 Turks go to Iran each year. However, it is not entirely correct to see the situation as “Iran becoming like Turkey,” because Iran's ethnic, social, religious and historical characteristics are different. Such a metaphor -- or the opposite, “Turkey becoming like Iran” -- are contrary to the logic of Turkey-Iran relations, which have been dominated by rivalry and balance. You see the opposite option, the possibility of Turkey becoming like Iran -- a very much discussed issue in Turkey with the rise of a religiously conservative ruling party – as unlikely? It would be a mistake to see it that way. First of all, except for a marginal part of Turkish society, the Iranian regime is not a model of success. The Iranian regime is not even a center of attraction for Turkey's Islamists. They know the regime is barely surviving. In Iran, the state structure has been shaped on the “Velayat-e Faqih.” This Shi'ite-based system has no theological support in mainly Sunni Turkey. It is not possible to establish this understanding in Turkey. Turkey's pluralist structure, economy-politics, relations between the state and the public, bureaucratic structure and its organic ties with the West stand well away from the conditions that formed the Iranian model.

What about radical conservatives?

Radical conservatives are a variation of the traditional movement. After 1997, Khamenei finally accepted the defeat of conservatives who were constantly losing to the reformists. Khamenei launched a new ideological struggle against the reform movement. He divided the revolutionary movement into two categories namely the pro-American Revolution and the pro-Islamic Revolution. He claimed that recent reformist demands were in line with American interests. He defended that every kind of political pluralism and freedom was Western-based and aimed to destroy the state. Opposing the “western” political reform, Khamenei presented an administrative and economic reform as the “Islamic Revolution.” His pro-Islamic discourse established an ideological ground for the young conservative generation. In this respect, they started a new movement by focusing on the social justice rhetoric forgotten by reformists. This process lead to the rise of a new movement known as Usulgera in Iran. This movement was supported by the Khamenei-controlled Guardian Council, the judiciary, and military-security organizations. They won the municipality elections in 2004, parliamentary elections in 2004 and the presidential elections in 2005. This movement made Ahmadinejad first a mayor to Tehran then the president. Ahmadinejad, who was a governor under Rafsanjani and considered to be a low profile figure in the Iranian political life, appears to have gained enough strength to pose a threat to Rafsanjani's power.

Why do you think they support Ahmadinejad?

When we look at why they support him, we realize that Khamenei not only applies the “divide and rule” policy but he also believes these groups are trying to stop him and trying to undermine the regime. The Revolutionary Guards, who identify themselves as the guardians of the regime, obtained such power since 1979 that they no longer want to obey mullahs. Moreover, they believe others have degenerated and lost their revolutionary qualities. It is for this reason that Khamenei and the military want to use Ahmadinejad to weaken other groups.

Can they achieve this?

It looks like they have done so, and in Ahmadinejad's second term, efforts to weaken the opposition will be quick and widespread. However, as the opposition weakens, the regime's inner balances will simultaneously get damaged. In a way, efforts to weaken the opposition hurt the state's established mechanisms. So this process bears paradoxical results for Khamenei.

What is the situation on clashes between classes?

Political power struggles based on economic interests continue to have more weight in divisions within the Iranian state. From the perspective of class roots, there is conflict between the industrial and trade bourgeoisie and the new state-supported middle classes that feed from the military power. This clash is taking place on the ideological ground of “what a religious state should be like.” While the industrial and trade bourgeoisie want a more moderate Islamic Republic that is open to integrating with the world, the new economic, religious and political elite that emerged with state support want a stricter State of Islamic Justice that challenges the West.

‘Tehran blames outside world for its own failures'

When Ahmadinejad or some other political leaders say that it is the West which provokes people to demonstrate, are they credible?

Such conspiracies are no longer so convincing to the Iranian people. The regime has been responding to the political demands of people by using anti-American slogans for the last 30 years. And the Iranian people perceive that the Tehran regime's anti-West stance is nothing more than a tool to keep its power and suppress the opposition.

What do the street protestors who have been clad in green represent?

The Iranian people are apparently seeking a new regime model. At the same time, they are not warm to the idea of a new revolution. This presents a paradox for Iranian society. Iran has seen many rebellions and revolutions since 1890, but it has been unable to reach such aspirations as independence, freedom and justice. Therefore, Iranians are doubtful that they will reach their aspirations through another revolution, so they feel closer to a model within the regime which will evolve slowly and in time. From that perspective, opposition and clashes within the regime can be seen as part of a strategy for Iran's democratization. The green color used in protests is not reminiscent of revolution. It represents change and something new and especially something fresh.

Who are the most talked about Besijis that are reportedly suppressing people on the streets by cruel methods?

The Besijis are under the orders of the Iran's Revolutionary Guards, set up after the 1979 revolution to defend the Islamic system. The problem is that they do not only protect the regime but they are involved in politics. They are loyal to supreme leader Khamenei who sides with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. They now have the capacity to steer the regime. Together with Ahmadinejad, they implemented their own concepts in domestic and foreign policies. They also worked in Ahmadinejad's election campaign, supporting him. They were well organized and they sought votes for Ahmadinejad in villages.

Is it realistic to expect new demonstrations?

They have subsided because the large cities of Iran are now under control of the Revolutionary Guards. There is a martial law environment even though not officially announced. There might be small-scale demonstrations any time. But it does not seem likely that they will reach to a high level to become a nationwide phenomenon.

Is there a possibility that some organizations can resort to violence?

Armed organizations in Iran did not have a presence during the election process. And this showed that they don't have grassroots support. However, the number of groups which might resort to violence could increase because the current regime made a mistake by separating itself from the supporters of change, leaving people with feelings of hatred and revenge. The opposition in Iran does not have an area for political involvement because it was suppressed by the regime rather than being convinced about the legitimacy of the election results.